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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores state-sanctioned violence used as part of law enforcement in riot 
control with a view to determine whether the definition of crimes against humanity 
under the Rome Statute effectively criminalises the use of force by state actors in riot 
control contexts. It analyses tensions arising from criminalising the use of lethal force 
against a ‘civilian population’ under the Rome Statute, while recognising the 
responsibility of states to enforce law and order through force, including through lethal 
force. The study is qualitative and uses doctrinal analysis to identify definitional gaps 
and paradoxes within relevant laws. It uses positivist theory and the Hobbesian concept 
of sovereignty to illuminate how the fusion of power, law and violence perpetuate 
circularity around the standards regulating state use of force in riot control situations, 
and how this in turn hinders specificity of culpability under article 7 of the ICC Statute.  
 
This study explores the effect of merging and applying without reflection, two 
prescriptive regimes; human rights and humanitarian law, within an international 
criminal law framework under the ICC Statute which is proscriptive and punitive. It also 
analyses definitional circularity under relevant national laws which are viable 
interpretive sources under the Rome Statute. The study concludes that article 7 is 
ineffective as a basis for criminalising excessive force in riot control contexts. The legal 
frameworks regulating use of force in these contexts, and those regulating crimes 
against humanity still operate in isolation and states retain a high level of discretion over 
the definition of national of standards of lawful force. The study argues that state parties 
never intended the application of crimes against humanity under the Statute to riot 
control contexts and that the internationalization of criminal liability for force used in 
internal riot situations is premature. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
RIOT CONTROL AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY. 
 1. Introduction and Background to the study 
 
Mobilization by citizens against governments takes various forms, including peaceful 
demonstrations, which may graduate to riots, or to full blown armed violence. This 
mobilization in the recent past has centred on a wide range of issues, from protests against 
the rising cost of living, protests against state backed development projects, rigged 
presidential elections, the demand that dictatorial regimes be removed and protests relating 
to national identity issues. The composition, organisation, and structure of the 
demonstrations have varied, so, too, has the incidence of fatalities and the extent of the 
damage caused. In Cote d’Ivoire, riots against disputed presidential election results 
culminated in the death of about 3,000 people (Van der Pol and Bax, 2011). In Uganda, 
riots over the rising prices of commodities left an unknown number of people dead from 
live bullets fired by anti-riot police, with an estimated 29 people arrested (Njoroge and 
Wanambwa, 2011). Libya’s 2011 riots in Benghazi left an estimated 200 unarmed people 
dead after ‘shoot to kill’ orders were allegedly issued (BBC, 2011a). In Egypt, by 
November 2011, the death toll in riots against a new military regime had risen to 28 people 
(BBC, 2011b). In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) an estimated 14 people died at 
the hands of state security forces in protests against ostensibly rigged presidential elections 
(BBC, 2011c).  In Syria, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) estimates that 3,500 civilians were killed by government forces since March 
2011 in riots against president Bashar al-Assad that year alone (UN Doc.  A/HRC/S-
17/2/Add.1 para 28). In areas of Syria deemed supportive of the anti-government riots 
several people were arrested arbitrarily, tortured and detained. In Ukraine, riots in 2014 
allegedly left over 70 people dead, including some police officials following exchange of 
gun fire with armed protestors (RT television network, 2014). The Ethiopian government 
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reportedly killed over 400 people since November 2015. The alleged killings occurred 
amidst protests by the mostly Oromo land owners against the capital city’s expansion, a 
move that would see them displaced from their land (Human Rights Watch, 2016).   
 Armed violence has also manifested at the horizontal level between opposition groups 
from among the population as was the case in Egypt between supporters and opponents of 
the Muslim brotherhood (The Times of Israel, 2013). In Kenya’ the 2007 post-election 
violence between opposing ethnic groups and against the state resulted in the death of over 
1,000 people, some of whom were allegedly killed by the Kenya  Police Force (Kenya 
Situation ICC-01/09, 2010). All these examples of situations in which the populace 
expressed frustration with the incumbent regime resulted in violent state-sanctioned 
repression. 
The commonest form of government retaliation to violent protests has been the use of force 
which in numerous instances has been lethal. Given the nature of the violence and the 
extent of deaths in some of the countries, allegations of crimes against humanity have even 
been made (UN. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 para 108, 1973, UN Doc. S/RES/1973, 2011). 
The situations in Kenya (Kenya Situation ICC-01/09, 2010), Libya and Cote d’Ivoire 
became the subject of inquiry by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for, among others, 
crimes against humanity. While referring the situation in Libya to the ICC, the Security 
Council indicated that the crimes committed may amount to crimes against humanity (UN. 
Doc. S/RES/1973).  
However, it could be argued by states, as was the case for Libya, that the force used in riot 
control constituted law enforcement in line with national law and was not in breach of 
international law (BBC, 2011a). Egypt’s Interior Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim responded to 
accusations of excessive force against protestors in Rab’a and al-Nahda squares by stating 
that it was a justified state response to violence including gunfire from the crowd. He 
allegedly stated: “I am not saying everyone was firing, but it is more than enough if there 
are 20, 30, or 50 people firing live fire in a sit-in of that size.” (HRW 2014: 8-10). These 
responses have thus far not been met with concrete legal responses under the ICC Statute 
framework.  
This study analyses the current international legal regimes on right to life, crimes against 
humanity and certain concepts in international humanitarian law (IHL) which offer the 
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closest universal standard regulating use of force and explores them against the tensions 
between law enforcement in violent protests and crimes against humanity under the ICC 
Statute.   
 
2. Research questions  
 
The central question this study seeks to answer is whether article 7 of the ICC Statute 
effectively criminalises the use of excessive force in riot control contexts as crimes against 
humanity. It also uses the concept of the Hobbesian sovereign to analyse the legal 
inadequacies and contradictions arising from the application of article 7 to riot control 
contexts.  
The following sub-questions necessarily follow from the main question: 
 Whether the threshold requirements of an attack against a ‘civilian population’ for 
crimes against humanity adequately address the use of force by state actors in riots 
or similar violent situations not amounting to armed conflicts.   
 Whether the threshold requirement of a “State or organizational policy” provides an 
adequate standard for establishing liability for crimes against humanity in the 
context of law enforcement and use of force during riots 
 
 
3. Context of the research 
 
The study analyses laws regulating use of force in riot control contexts. It makes a specific 
focus on the justifications for the application of force and the justified means and methods 
of force. The analysis is juxtaposed against the legal framework of crimes against humanity 
under the Rome Statute.  
While there is no universal definition for a riot, the term is broad and includes a wide array 
of violent disturbances ranging from ad hoc episodes with small numbers of participants, to 
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major confrontations requiring control by regular or paramilitary police (Nigel 1991: 67). 
In any event, a riot is distinguishable from a demonstration, which is essentially peaceful 
and lawful (Gregory 1985: 53). In referring to riot control, this study contemplates any 
situations of violent protest against the state, or which have occasioned the use of force by 
the state forces in response to violent protests. As indicated above, these situations occur in 
a wide range of contexts including ethnic tensions, election protests, protests against state-
backed development projects, protests concerning labour rights, among others. The study 
does not situate itself in any specific riot control context but rather adopts a perspective 
whose focus is on how the law regulates and justifies state forces’ forceful response to 
unlawful and violent situations in general. Thus ‘riot control’ in this study is used as a 
generic term to represent the wide spectrum of violent crowd protests against state forces 
from low threshold situations of violence to high threshold contexts bordering on internal 
armed conflict.  
As such, the study has no specific geographical scope or temporal scope. It draws general 
examples from events where states have used force against violent protests and the actions 
resulted in claims of crimes against humanity such as the Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire 
situations stated above.  
4. Significance and objective of the study 
 
While numerous authors have written about crimes against humanity, few, if any, have 
considered them in the context of the use of force by the police and security forces against 
violent protestors with a view to illuminating the definitional challenges arising there from. 
This thesis’ modest objective is to discuss these legal challenges in such a context, drawing 
on examples of decided cases and reports of commissions of inquiry where the foregoing 
questions have arisen. It explores whether and how these challenges fit in with or push the 
boundaries of existing laws, particularly international criminal law and international 
humanitarian law. The thesis approaches these questions using the Hobbesian sovereign as 
an agent for analysis. I argue in chapter two that the Hobbesian sovereign represents a 
fusion between law, power, force and politics which reinforces circularity around 
limitations on state conduct in riot control contexts. It illuminates the nature and 
significance of the omissions and contradictions arising from the application of article 7 of 
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the ICC Statute to riot control contexts where the law on riot control remains largely state-
centric. It enables a demonstration of how this circularity in turn affects interpretation under 
article 7.  
 
5. Analysis of definitional problems 
 
Article 7 (1) of the ICC Statute defines crimes against humanity as follows: 
 
 
For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
 
It then proceeds to list a series of acts including murder, extermination, torture and other 
inhumane acts. Article 7.2(a) proceeds to define an attack against a civilian population as 
follows: 
For the purpose of paragraph 1: 
 
(a) ‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy 
to commit such attack; 
 
This definition gives rise to a number of interpretation challenges as briefly explored below 
and as is further analysed in the ensuing chapters.  
 
 
Attack against a civilian population 
One of the threshold criteria for exercising jurisdiction in respect of any of the atrocities 
listed as crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute is that they must be committed 
against a civilian population (ICC Statute, Art.7).The term ‘civilian population’ is not 
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defined. However, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR, Prosecutor v. 
Akayesu: para 582) and the International Criminal tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY, 
Prosecutor v. Tadic: para 638) have adopted the definition in common article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions and have held that ‘civilian’ in the context of crimes against humanity 
includes persons taking no active part in hostilities or are no longer taking an active part in 
hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have surrendered or are hors de 
combat by reason of sickness or injury.  It has been held also that the presence of some 
combatants among the civilian population does not deprive a population of its civilian 
character as long as the population is predominantly civilian (Prosecutor v. Kupreskicet al: 
para 549, Prosecutor v. Tadic paras 636-8).  
The problem, as some scholars like Sadat (2002:154) and Cassese (2003:90) have argued, 
is that there is no need, in situations where rules of international humanitarian law do not 
apply, to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, as the rationale behind the 
supplementary and more inclusive protection afforded by proscribing crimes against 
humanity during peace time would otherwise be lost.  
I also add to the foregoing observations, that without clear guidelines on the use of force in 
the context described above, balancing law enforcement and criminal liability may be 
problematic for the state. To illustrate this point, in Syria and Libya former armed state 
officials joined citizens in demonstrations against the state and even  reportedly used lethal 
weapons to the extent that some state officials called them terrorists (BBC, 2011a). In such 
cases, that is, before internal violence qualifies as armed conflict, a technical question arises 
whether the state would still be bound to regard such armed demonstrators as ‘civilians’. In 
particular, what attributes should the state use to establish whether the demonstrators are 
predominantly a group of civilians?  And if they are ‘non civilians’ would they then qualify 
to be identified as combatants in the sense of an armed conflict context or would they 
simply be ‘armed civilians’ in a violent context bordering on armed conflict? How can the 
state, in such circumstances, draw a balance between lawful use of force and avoiding 
liability for crimes against humanity? What principles apply in such a context; IHL or 
international human rights law? Or would they both apply? Is it the IHL or IHRL principles 
of proportionality that would apply in this context and what are the practical implications of 
a decision on either one? Would the defence of collateral damage apply?  These are some 
of the critical questions that the study seeks to analyse under the main research question: 
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whether article 7 of the ICC Statute effectively criminalises the use of force in riot control 
contexts.  
 
The requirement of an ‘attack’ as a state or organizational policy  versus law 
enforcement 
 
The other complication that arises in riot control contexts is the jurisdictional requirement 
of a state or organizational policy or plan for an ‘attack’ against the civilian population to 
qualify as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute (Art 7.2). For this threshold 
requirement to be met, a state or organisation must actively promote or encourage the 
policy or plan, and such conduct can be inferred only from a deliberate failure by the 
government to take action against alleged crimes against humanity (Art 7.3).What amounts 
to a ‘deliberate failure’ is not defined.  
While these requirements have been criticized (Sadat 2002: 157) as stringent and 
detrimental to the successful investigation and prosecution crimes against humanity. I also 
submit that they are ambiguous and inadequate as they do not reflect the current realities of 
law enforcement and use of force in violent riot contexts.  The Rome Statute provides a list 
of acts, including murder, which would amount to an ‘attack against the civilian 
population’ (Art 7.1). It renders that list inclusive by referring to ‘other inhumane acts of a 
similar nature intentionally causing great human suffering’ (Art 7.1.k). However, for a 
provision creating a uniform standard of criminal liability at the international level, it offers 
no uniform guidance as to which conduct, otherwise lawful and part of national law 
enforcement policies, would translate into ‘murder’ or an ‘inhumane’ act amounting to a 
crime against humanity.  
The foregoing criticism is pertinent in the current discourse on law enforcement and the use 
of force against violent demonstrations, as different countries have different standards in 
their national laws, practice or rules of conduct for their law enforcement officials 
regarding the dispersing of riotous assemblies and the use of lethal force. However, there 
are no universal rules for the use of force in such cases (UN. Doc. A/HRC/17/28, 2011). 
With these considerations, it would be difficult to decipher whether a state’s plan or policy 
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for riot control would amount to a plan or policy to commit crimes against humanity under 
the ICC Statute.  
It is based on these and subsequent arguments in the study that I maintain it is doubtful that 
when states negotiated the definition of crimes against humanity they considered that it 
would extend to internal situations where matters so directly connected with their very 
functions as sovereign states to maintain law and order in quelling riotous demonstrations, 
would be the subject of international scrutiny, let alone through criminal liability before an 
international criminal court. This state of affairs is further extrapolated in the review of 
literature below. 
6. Existing scholarship 
 
Since the Nuremberg trials to date, a comprehensive definition for crimes against humanity 
has been elusive.  According to Bassiouni (1999: 60) the preambles of the First Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 bore the seeds of crimes against humanity in its reference to 
‘laws of humanity’ also known as the Marten’s Clause. The expression in that context 
referred to customary law and state practice in armed conflict; Bassiouni (2011a, 45). Some 
scholars trace the first use of the term crimes against humanity to the phrase “crime of lese-
humanity” which was used in a condemnation by Belgium of Germany’s destruction of its 
Louvain library in 1914 during the first world war (Kramer 2007: 24)Bassiouni has traced 
the use of the full expression ’crimes against humanity’ to 1915 in a joint declaration made 
by France, Great Britain and Russia condemning the Ottoman Empire for massacring the 
Armenian population in Turkey, although it was not articulated as a treaty crime at the time 
(2011: 45). The expression metamorphosed into the first positive international law 
definition as a crime under Article 6 of the 1945 Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg (London Charter), proscribing murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or 
during the war and persecution whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the 
country where perpetrated; Bassiouni (2011b: 3). The same definition, with a slight 
alteration (eliminating the reference to civilian population), was carried under the 1946 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter (IMTFE Charter) also known as the 
Tokyo Charter; Cryer (2005: 249). Indeed, according to Bassiouni (2011b,6) the London 
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Charter definition of this crime has provided a template for subsequent treaty definitions for 
crimes against humanity, citing examples such as the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR), The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the statutes of 
mixed tribunals including the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). Furthermore, Bassiouni (2011a: 51) points 
out that several countries have since the Second World War, incorporated variations of 
crimes against humanity as interpreted under international law, in their domestic 
legislation.  
However, several scholars agree that despite these developments, the evolution of crimes 
against humanity has been rather varied and to date, there is no universal definition for the 
crime. Bassiouni himself highlights (2011a: 51) that there are twelve international 
definitions of crimes against humanity, while Sadat (2002, 148) points out that the disparate 
definitions paused one of the most difficult challenges during negotiations for the ICC 
Statute, the main bottlenecks being: the distinction between war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and separating international crimes punishable on the basis of individual criminal 
responsibility from  acts amounting to state responsibility for human rights violations. In 
Cryer’s estimation, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunal judgments did not resolve many 
definition issues, so much so that he points to this as the reason for Bassiouni’s proposal of 
a separate convention to harmonise the various definitions of crimes against humanity 
(2005:249).  
For all this uncertainty, there appears to be some consensus that although the ICC Statute 
does not present the universal definition, at least it contains a more comprehensive 
delineation of the elements of crimes against humanity compared to its predecessors.  
According to Ambos (2011a: 280), Article 7 of the Rome Statute which defines crimes 
against humanity, is both a ‘codification’ and ‘progressive development’ of international 
law, combining the main features of the crime, that he refers to it as the ‘common law’ of 
crimes against humanity. He also refers to it as more reflective of historical developments 
in which spirit Cryer (2005:254) and Robinson (1999: 43) point to how it discarded the 
need for an armed conflict nexus that was crucial in the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, as 
well as the requirement of discrimination as a mental element for the crime. Robinson 
(1994: 46) points out that the elimination of the armed conflict nexus was essential to the 
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effectiveness of the ICC in dealing with large scale internal atrocities that do not occur 
during armed conflict situations. Moreover, he also highlights that unlike its predecessors, 
Article 7 was not imposed as part of the World War II’s victor justice but rather was crafted 
through negotiations between over 160 states which explains its more detailed definition 
(1994: 43). Bassiouni (2011b: 202)  adds that almost all the specific crimes enumerated 
under article 7 including murder, extermination, enslavement, torture and rape, to mention 
but a few, are crimes in all domestic jurisdictions, excluding a few like persecution, 
apartheid, and ‘other inhumane acts’, which although not criminalized under all domestic 
laws, are criminalized under international law. Robinson (1994: 57) concludes with 
confidence that Article 7 is a modern and clarified position that presents a firm basis for 
prosecuting crimes against humanity in the future.  
However, there is also a general recognition that while the participation of states in the 
drafting of the Rome Statute ensured a more detailed enumeration of crimes against 
humanity, Article 7 was also aimed at guarding against the ICC’s autonomously to decide 
what conduct amounted to crimes against humanity, a concern which Cryer (2005: 261) 
identifies as one of the criticisms against the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. As such, he 
argues that Article 7 in fact introduced a higher threshold for crimes against humanity with 
a cautionary definition that is less inclusive than customary international law (2005: 261). 
In particular, Cryer points out the introduction of the requirements of ‘course of conduct’ 
and a ‘policy’ which he argues that if read together with the requirement of ‘wide spread’ 
or ‘systematic attack’ in fact render the need for a conjunctive albeit weakened application 
of a wide spread ‘and’ systematic attack (2005: 254). In his assessment, this is a regression 
from the unfettered wide spread ‘or’ systematic requirement under customary international 
law. However, Robinson (1999: 47) explains that such a provision was necessary if a 
compromise was to be reached between the minimalist and maximalist agitators at the 
Rome negotiations. Bassiouni (2011b: 202) cautions that not everything in Article 7 reflects 
customary international law and that the article has not achieved customary international 
law status despite the high numbers of state ratifications. He further cautions that whereas it 
is estimated that 55 countries have criminalized crimes against humanity under national 
law, their provisions do not conform to Article 7 provisions (2011b: 202).  Particularly, 
even with countries which use Article 7 as a foundation, he points to differences in with 
respect to elements of crimes.  It is in this context that Bassiouni states (2011b: 204) that 
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Article 7 of the ICC statute was not drafted by the Diplomatic Conference’s Drafting 
Committee, but rather was a result as a series of diplomatic compromises hinged on 
consensus rather than legal techniques and requirements and that as such, it is no wonder 
that Article 7 along with other similar provisions of the Rome Statute is troublesome to 
sound legal drafting and Judgment.  
Bassiouni’s observations put a dent in Robinson’s confidence in the soundness of article 7, 
as a firm basis for prosecuting crimes against humanity in the future. But perhaps this 
difference in attitudes might be reflective of the time in which both scholars were writing, 
with Bassiouni (2011) having the benefit of time for reflection and context analogy nine 
years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute  compared to Robinson who wrote 
before the treaty even entered into force.  
This state of affairs appears to be true upon a survey of the literature concerning some of 
the threshold requirements and elements of crimes against humanity. While several 
controversies abound, of particular interest to this study are the threshold requirements of 
an ‘attack against the civilian population’, the nature and scope of the policy requirement, 
and the mens rea and scope of certain specific crimes such as murder and ‘other inhumane 
acts’.  An ensuing analysis of relevant law on the question of applying crimes against 
humanity to riot control contexts might add a dent to Robison’s confidence in the 
soundness of Article 7 as a basis for prospective prosecutions of crimes against humanity as 
contexts of violence continue to evolve and present new definitional challenges for the ICC 
statutory framework.  
 
 
Civilian population 
 
According to Ambos and Wirth (2002: 22), the threshold requirement of ‘civilian’ in an 
‘attack against the civilian population’ is most likely a result of confusion based on 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which offers protection to persons 
taking no active part in hostilities in non-international armed conflicts. The reason for such 
an assessment stems from the fact that Article 7 dispensed with the war nexus requirement 
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and as such there is no logic to the ‘civilian-combatant’ distinction.  In her own 
consideration of this controversy, Sadat ( 2002: 154) points out that if Article 7 evolved to 
dispense with the required application of the Geneva Conventions, the presumption should 
be that no one in a ‘conflict’ is a ‘non civilian’ for purposes of Article 7. In further probing 
the ‘civilian’ requirement, Sadat (2002: 154) alludes to situations of massacres and 
atrocities in contexts not deteriorating to the level of an armed conflict and which therefore 
do not trigger the application of war crimes provisions. She rejects the ‘civilian-combatant’ 
distinction in such scenarios, considering a situation where Government soldiers and their 
family members might be part of or are victims of such a massacre. Sadat in fact points out 
that for a provision that was meant to fill the gap left by international humanitarian law 
(IHL); by the retaining this ‘civilian –combatant’ distinction the Rome Statute is in 
regression. In an attempt to suggest a remedy, Ambos (2002: 25) proposes a definition for 
‘civilian’ which encompasses both the IHL meaning and a broader conception of the word 
that is applicable during ‘peace time.’ He then seems to suggest (supra), while recognizing 
that IHL does not apply directly to crimes against humanity in peace time, that it might 
nonetheless offer some useful guidance in such an exercise. He gives an example of the 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic case where he claims the court applied the broad Common Article 3 
concept of a ‘civilian’ without distinguishing between situations of armed conflict and 
peace. Ambos also develops a curious concept which he refers to as the ‘specific situation’ 
context by which he claims that the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Bagilishema clarified 
that the formal status of an individual does not limit the protection of their human rights for 
as long as they are not ‘active’ members of a ‘hostile’ armed force (2002: 25).   He does not 
indulge further on this suggestion, leaving unexplored certain pertinent concepts such as 
‘peace time’, and who a civilian would be in such a setting, or the scope of these concepts 
in scenarios of atrocities and massacre not amounting to armed conflict such as those 
alluded to above by Sadat. Neither does he address the fact that his ‘specific situation’ 
argument is still couched in an armed conflict and not a ‘peace time’ context. Interestingly, 
in a later publication, Ambos (2011: 287- 288) then states that recourse to the IHL 
definition of ‘civilian’ during ‘peace time’ is not possible and recommends that the term 
should be deleted from the Statute as it cannot be reconciled with the ‘humanitarian 
character’ of crimes against humanity. He in fact suggested that maintaining the reference 
to ‘civilian’ under Article 7 meant that its drafters still regarded crimes against humanity as 
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an extension of war crimes and not a crime in its own right (2011: 287-8). In all the 
foregoing discussions the main point of convergence appeared to be that maintaining the 
‘civilian’ element as part of the threshold requirement meant that certain members of the 
state forces might be left unprotected in situations not amounting to armed conflict simply 
by virtue of  their being part of the ‘armed forces’. While Sadat (2002: 154) makes this 
argument with reference to ‘members of the Government forces and their families’, Ambos 
(2002: 24) makes it with reference to “any individual” and later attempts to make it by 
reference to the police forces (2002: 25) although he still does so within the context of an 
armed conflict. In his 2011 analysis of the subject (2011: 287), Ambos cautions against the 
broad interpretation of the word ‘civilian’ in attempting to remedy this apparent anomaly 
for fear that it might violate the principle of legality. None of the scholars however analyse 
extensively their arguments under the ICC statute regime. But more specifically, none of 
them analyse their concerns from the context of riot control or situations of violence 
bordering on armed conflict where challenges with the qualification of conflict situations 
also means that the designation ‘civilian population’ presents a targeting challenge for law 
enforcement officials. This state of affairs regarding the threshold requirement for an attack 
against a ‘civilian population’ lends credence to Bassiouni’s warning (2011) about the 
troublesome nature of Article 7 of the Rome Statute and is further explored in chapter three 
of the study.  
 
 
‘Policy’ and ‘attack’ 
 
Sub paragraph 2 (a) of Article 7 defines an ‘attack against the civilian population’ as: 
 a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in 
paragraph 1..against any civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy to commit such an attack… (emphasis added).  
 
 There is an apparent consensus among some writers that the foregoing definition has the 
effect of creating a conjunctive but low threshold test, which according to Robinson 
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(1999:51) requires the proof of multiple acts and a policy to commit these acts before 
proceeding to the higher threshold where the option may be taken to prove whether the acts 
were either wide spread or systematic. Ambos (2011: 284) refers to it as the ‘widespread-
systematic’ test, reiterating that Article 7 obscures the otherwise clear disjunctive ‘wide 
spread or systematic’ test by replacing ‘wide spread’ with ‘multiple commission of acts’ 
and ‘systematic’ with ‘a state or organizational policy’ and interconnects them in so far as 
the multiple commission of the acts in paragraph 1 must be based on a ‘policy’. Thus in 
Robinson’s assessment, (1999:51) should the prosecutor opt to prove the widespread 
element, the conjunctive requirement of a state or organizational policy will minimize 
concerns about isolated acts being characterized as crimes against humanity, while if the 
choice is for the systematic approach, the concerns over the scale of the crimes will be 
addressed from the requirement of a course of conduct and the multiple commission of the 
acts in Paragraph 1. Indeed according to Lee (1999: 97) during the negotiations on the 
Rome Statute, the inclusion of the ‘policy’ requirement was essential in order to reach a 
compromise on crimes against humanity, as it was a means through which unrelated and 
isolated in humane acts could be collectively described as an attack against the civilian 
population. Triffterer (1999: 13) also emphasizes that the requirement of a policy is 
essential to the elements of the crime.  
From such an analysis, Ambos (2011: 285) concluded that ultimately, the policy 
requirement is mandatory to prove crimes against humanity under article 7. According to 
him, the concept of crimes against humanity as a political crime confirms the mandatory 
requirement of a policy as the only thing that can turn isolated acts into crimes against 
humanity.  
However, some scholars such as De Than and Shorts (2003: 92) argue that there seems to 
be no final agreement for the requirement of a policy under the Rome Statute, while Sadat 
(2002: 157) criticizes the policy requirement as stringent and a hindrance to the prosecution 
of crimes against humanity. 
There is some consensus on what amounts to a ‘policy’. According to Bassiouni (1999: 
249) ‘state action’ or ‘policy’ implies the use of public power and resources or of public or 
legal authorities acting under the law to  perpetrate actions which if carried out by another 
person would be criminal. This definition seems to share common elements with the 
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threshold requirement of a ‘systematic attack’, the exception being that the latter requires a 
higher degree of organization and substantial public resources (Robinson 1999: 50). Ambos 
(2011: 286) points out that the policy requirements differ for ‘a systematic attack’, where 
one typically needs to show some guidance by the accused as to intended  victims of the 
attack,  while a widespread attack that is not systematic will require proof of a policy of 
deliberate inaction or acquiescence on the part of the accused. In other words, almost all 
state or organizational actions involving the application of public resources such as police 
or military personnel and weapons would logically require the application of the 
‘systematic attack test’ which might very well go to prove the policy requirement.  
However, for all the foregoing unanimity, there is not a comprehensive definition of state 
policy in juxtaposition with the concept of law enforcement. This omission, in light of the 
subsequent review of the literature concerning the use of force in law enforcement and riot 
control, evokes the same concerns about the legislative and judicial soundness of Article 7 
as expressed by Bassiouni (2011). It is thus interesting to note that it is Bassiouni himself 
who states in an earlier publication (1999: 249-250) that a state policy can be established 
from a range of actions whose scale and nature requires the use of government resources 
acting under ‘arbitrary’ power. He then proceeds to state that such a policy can be 
perpetuated by an absolutist government claiming the legitimacy of positive law and 
rejecting any discrepancy between law as an instrument of ideology and power. In this 
regard he criticizes states which he claims have justified their excesses on the claim of 
necessity for the preservation of public order (1999: 250).    
Bassiouni’s self-contradiction seems apparent when juxtaposed with his admission in the 
very same book that owing to a lack of codification there does not exist a general part for 
international criminal law (ICL) to effectively regulate the particulars of whether or not 
certain conduct amounts to criminal liability (Bassiouni, 1999: 394). It is on this premise 
that Bassiouni admits that in fact, because ICL is not codified, it must rely on the domestic 
general part of criminal law, or the general principles of law, which he admittedly states 
could present inconsistencies that might compromise the principle of legality (Bassiouni 
1999: 397). 
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Murder and ‘Other inhumane acts’ 
 
The foregoing dilemma is borne out by the lack of unanimity on the scope of culpability for 
‘murder’ as a specific act and ‘other inhumane acts’ under article 7. In his analysis of this 
subject, Bassiouni (1999: 301) states that while the protection of life is a general principle, 
and all the major criminal justice systems include the offence of murder under their national 
laws, this does not automatically make murder an international crime.  He traces (1999: 
304) the formulations for murder as a crime against humanity under the London Charter 
and the Charters of the ICTY and ICTR and concludes that in his assessment, the 
definitions failed to fully address some major concepts of murder such as ‘lawful 
justifications’ in otherwise unlawful killings. In analyzing the ICC statute, he states that this 
omission remains and that as such, the ICC leaves unaddressed, the very questions that 
were raised under the ICTY and ICTR statutes.  Moreover, Politi and Nesi (2001: 82) also 
seem unsure about the exact scope of the offence of murder envisaged under Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute. They state that it is uncertain whether mental elements such as the ‘intent 
to cause great bodily harm resulting in death’, ‘reckless’ or ‘negligent killing’ are also 
envisaged by the ICC statute, and point out that there is disagreement among some scholars 
on the issue. 
Similar concerns arise for the inclusion of ‘other inhumane acts’, which albeit allegedly 
reined in by the requirement that they must be of a similar character to the acts enumerated 
in paragraph 7(1) still raise concerns under the principle of legality, in the view of some 
legal scholars and in light of some positivist legal systems (Bassiouni 2011b: 411). 
 
Attack, use of force and law enforcement 
 
As earlier stated, the foregoing discussion raises pertinent questions regarding the 
legitimate use of force by state actors as part of law enforcement in riot control contexts.  A 
preliminary survey of the literature reveals two major sub topics under this subject, namely: 
the principle of proportionality under IHL and international human rights law (IHRL), and 
the concepts of means and methods of law enforcement in riot control. There is a paucity of 
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academic analysis on these subjects and where there is, the literature lacks any cross 
reference to crimes against humanity or to the ICC statute.   
According to Watkin (2004: 10), IHL and IHRL share the right to life as a common ground 
and as such share the justified use of force to limit this right to life under their respective 
legal regimes. He further advances that since the state is required to maintain law and order, 
it may be required to use force, although such power must not be arbitrary (2004:9). Such 
power may be used for purposes such as self defense and defense of person and property, 
effecting an arrest, dispersing a riot, among others (2004:10). Watkin proceeds to point out 
that IHL has not evolved a comprehensive body of law for application in non-international 
armed conflicts and for that matter, situations could arise which might call for the closer 
interaction between IHL and IHRL. He points to some such scenarios including 
emergencies where the military may be called upon to perform internal policing duties 
(2004:14) or where law enforcement forces are responding to a scenario bordering on an 
armed conflict (2004:25) which is reminiscent of Sadat’s allusion in discussing the 
threshold requirement of a ‘civilian’ under Article 7 of the ICC statute, or where there is 
presence or potential presence of firearms within a rioting crowd, calling into question the 
possible application of several methods of riot control (2004:33). Watkin further advances 
(2004, 26) that the exact nature of the distinction between such scenarios and armed 
conflict may not always be clear considering that Common article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions does not offer a clear guidance on the conditions required before it can be 
invoked.    
Sassoli and Olson (2008: 610) also deal with similar questions in tackling the interaction 
between IHL and IHRL, pointing out that while IHL does not apply the principle of 
proportionality in relation to combatants, the IHRL principle of proportionality is applied 
more generally provided there is no arbitrarily killing. They point out that most IHRL 
treaties do not define what amounts to arbitrary killing (2008: 610), calling to mind 
Bassiouni’s reservations regarding the Article 7 definition of murder and the principle of 
legality. They refer to the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement officers (UN Basic Principles) which they consider 
authoritative principles on the level of proportionate force that must be used in order to 
avoid arbitrary killings (2008: 610). However, these principles have been criticized by Osse 
(2006: 129) on account of their lack of a definition for what amounts to fire arms, or force, 
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the lack of a definition for how the rules are to be applied in practice, the lack of a 
definition of proportionality and ‘imminent threat’, and the lack of specific guidelines on 
avoiding the need to use force’. It is also pertinent to point out that as guiding principles, 
they are not binding and as such their significance in the determination of criminal liability 
under the ICC statute is largely uncertain.  
In addition to the criticisms pointed out by Osse, reports by Amnesty International (2003) 
and the Omega Research Foundation1  also reveal that there is no universal standard on 
what type of weapons are acceptable or would lead to disproportionate force when used 
under a crowd or riot control context, more so in the complex scenarios bordering on armed 
conflict highlighted above. 
It follows therefore from this analysis that it is not clear from Article 7 of the Statute, 
whether certain state conduct that may be implemented pursuant to a state policy of law 
enforcement, might be equivalent to an ‘attack’ as a state policy of crimes against 
humanity.   
Thus, from a review of the literature, the legitimate use of state force in riot control remains 
un explored and unarticulated under Article 7 of the Statute, given the indeterminate scope 
of murder and ‘other inhumane acts’, and the threshold requirement of a ‘civilian 
population’ or the nature of a ‘State policy’ that would amount to crimes against humanity. 
The study will pursue the Foregoing discussion further, analyzing the outstanding issues in 
light of the stringent requirements of the principle of legality and the sources of 
international law, while drawing upon some examples of violent protest situations 
including post-election violence, and ethnic violence which attracted allegations of crimes 
against humanity before the ICC.  
 
 
                                                          
1http://www.omegaresearchfoundation.org/assets/downloads/publications/04.pdf 
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7. Research methodology  
 
This study has used broadly doctrinal analysis. It has been done on an exploratory basis 
entailing across sectional analysis of laws and decisions of regional criminal tribunals and 
the international criminal court, relevant United Nations (UN) instruments, among others.  
While cognizant of the experimental, longitudinal, case study, and comparative research 
designs, the study opted for a design suited to its scope, the nature of data it sought to use 
and the time and resources available to it. A cross sectional and exploratory design enables 
the coverage of a wide range of relevant cases in order to provide as comprehensive an 
answer as possible to the research question. As the study did not involve the study of 
variables, the experimental and longitudinal approaches were not relevant to it. 
Additionally, given the time and resources available, the data for the study was to be 
collected simultaneously, which while not feasible for experimental and longitudinal 
designs, fit in well with the nature of the cross sectional and exploratory design.  
Furthermore, the multifaceted and exploratory nature of evidence required for the research 
question under inquiry, rendered case study and comparative designs too limiting as these 
require a focused study of selected subject(s) with those subjects as the centre of interest. 
As indicated earlier, the study has been based on a general analysis of laws implicated in 
riot control and crimes against humanity and not specific case studies. It was anticipated 
that the answers to the research questions paused, the method adopted and the sources of 
such information could not be achieved through an isolated case(s). 
This thesis has used broadly a doctrinal analysis of primary and secondary literature. It has 
relied on primary sources including: UN treaties, international judicial decisions, state 
reports to international and regional monitoring bodies, national laws, parliamentary 
documents, protocols, and policy documents. These were sourced using online searches on 
websites of relevant international and regional political systems and their bodies including: 
The United Nations, The European Union and The Organisation of American States; 
websites of judicial bodies including the International Criminal Court (ICC), International 
criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
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(ICTR), The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), The International Court of Justice (ICJ), 
among others.  
Secondary sources were obtained from electronic and where necessary, hard copy reports 
of key organisations including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), among others. Academic material 
including Journals, and books and e-books were accessed through physical and virtual 
library searches while media reports were drawn from online searches of mainstream 
international media houses including Aljazeera, BBC, CNN, as well as relevant local media 
houses. National laws on riot control were obtained from the database of the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary and Arbitrary Executions and where 
necessary, from national law databases.   
 
7.1 Limitations of methodology 
 
The main limitation with accessing national laws from online databases has been 
recognized by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions 
in his own compilation of national laws on riot control. The Rapporteur notes that in the 
first instance some of the national laws regulating use of force are not contained in statutes 
but rather in internal police regulations or court precedents. This means that accessing all 
countries’ standard regulations on riot control is a near impossible task. Secondly, the laws 
are open to amendments and those available in online databases may not always contain the 
updated version (UN Doc. A/HRC/26/36, 2014: 6). Indeed, as is further argued in chapter 
four, these limitations are reflective of the broader challenge at the center of the research 
question, which is the lack of an objective and universal standard regulating the use of force 
in riot control contexts.  
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7.2 Theory and Method  
 
This study proceeds on the premise that law can provide an objective understanding of 
minimum boundaries of culpability and in this particular case, the boundaries of culpability 
for state conduct in riot control contexts, and explores where and how the law contains a 
definitional gap for these contexts. As has been stated above, the study adopts an approach 
of doctrinal analysis using positivist theory.  
The question whether article 7 of the ICC Statute effectively criminalizes the use of force in 
riot control contexts is for the aims of this study posed as a doctrinal as opposed to 
empirical or applied research question. As Chynoweth points out, doctrinal analysis is 
concerned with the analysis of ‘black letter law’ with the guiding research question being, 
‘what is the law’?, unlike empirical approaches which may seek to understand or predict 
human behavior in relation to law, or the applied research approaches which are concerned 
with systematic explanation of a given legal doctrine (2008: 29-31).  The main objective of 
the study therefore is to discover, through analysis and legal argument, what the law is, the 
gaps, paradoxes and ambiguities within it that limit article 7’s definitive scope for riot 
control contexts. There are a number of options from legal theoretical frameworks which 
might be adopted to aid in this inquiry including those that could aid in achieving a more 
prescriptive outcome, such as the natural law theory, those that might offer a more critical 
lens such as critical legal studies, and those that offer an interpretive approach such as 
Dworkin’s third theory of law. However, as it is the aim of this study to investigate the 
adequacy of the definition of crimes against humanity under in criminalizing force used in 
riot control contexts, a doctrinal approach that would enable a black letter law analysis of 
article 7 and other formal sources of law including treaties, statutes, and legal decisions 
implicated by the research question would be most suitable. As indicated, this has been 
pursued through the theoretical framework of modern legal positivism with a particular 
focus on the state-centric nature of law as laid down by a Hobbesian sovereign. Hobbes’ 
concept of sovereignty, as an agent which embodies the complex interconnectedness of 
law, force, power and politics represents the centrality of the fundamental question of the 
necessity of the state and the importance of force to the state. An analysis of black letter 
law coupled with an analysis which recognizes the fusion between force, power and politics 
in determining the legality of force used in riot control is most suitable as it illuminates the 
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nature of complexities and contradictions arising from the legal vacuum created by article 
7’s definitional inadequacies. This theoretical framework and method are further analysed 
in chapter two on law and politics. 
 
8. Thesis outline 
 
Chapter one contains the introduction, setting out the background to the study, the research 
question, the significance of the study, methodology its limitations and a review of the 
relevant literature.  
Chapter two explores the theoretical framework and method through which the study 
answers the research question. It contains a brief review of other theories and methods, 
explaining why they are not suited for the study and justifying the selected theory and 
method.  
Chapter three analyses the current international legal frame work regulating the use of force 
during violent mass uprisings. It considers in detail, the historical development of Crimes 
against humanity and its definition under the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia (ICTY 1993, UN SC Res. 827), the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR 1994, UN SC Res. 955) and the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC Statute). The chapter also analyses the threshold requirements of ‘a 
State policy or plan’ and ‘an attack against the civilian population’ and analyses the tension 
this presents for the use of force against ‘armed civilians’ during peace time. It analyses 
these tensions against the strict legality requirement of the ICC Statute.  It also explores the 
complexities arising from the hybridization of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law in the definition and application of crimes against humanity 
to riot control contexts.  
Chapter four explores the adequacy of state laws on use of force in riot control as 
interpretive sources for establishing liability for crimes against humanity under the ICC 
Statute’s article 7. The chapter also explores the effectiveness of the Basic Principles on the 
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Use of Force and Firearms for Law Enforcement Officers (UN Basic Principles on 
Firearms), which is the closest instrument to providing a universal standard on the use of 
force in riot control, but is not binding on states.  
Chapter five contains a summary of findings from the study, conclusion and a general 
suggestion on further research into how the challenge might be managed for future 
applications. 
 
 
9. Ethical issues 
 
The study does not involve the use of human participants. As such, there was no 
requirement for securing ethical clearance to conduct interviews. There was also no need to 
secure private state documents as the relevant statutes were readily available from public 
sources and as such, the study did not require ethical clearance in this regard either.  
 
 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
This study aimed to answer the main question whether article 7 of the ICC Statute 
effectively criminalises the use of force in riot control contexts as crimes against humanity. 
It also investigates how the concept of the Hobbesian sovereign helps to explain the 
contradictions and legal vacuum in the definitional scope under Article 7 of the ICC 
Statute. The study does not consider specific riot control situations as case studies but 
rather adopts a general approach to the question of how states forces’ response to violent 
protests are justified through the law and whether liability for such force can be established 
effectively as crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute. It undertakes this task 
through a doctrinal analysis of positive law, particularly of relevant treaties, statutes and 
judicial cases. It juxtaposes these sources of law against the strict legality requirement of 
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the ICC Statute in order to explore the definitional gap under article 7and the extent and 
nature of contradictions arising from it. This is fundamental given states’ recognised 
mandate to enforce law and order using force, including lethal force, and the purported 
criminalisation under the ICC Statute of state force in riot control contexts, without 
guidelines as to what law enforcement conduct might be criminal as a crime against 
humanity.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LAW AND POLITICS: A REVIEW OF THEORY AND METHOD FOR THE USE 
OF FORCE IN RIOT CONTROL AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER 
THE ICC STATUTE. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter’s central claim is that state parties to the ICC Statute have not engaged in 
consensus building and as such have not developed a shared understanding of the 
boundaries of liability under article 7 of the ICC Statute, for force used in riot control 
contexts as part of law enforcement activity. Moreover, other sources that would aid in 
clarifying these boundaries offer no remedy as they exist in the more prescriptive realms of 
human rights and humanitarian law which have no specific prohibitive standards on which 
to base a criminal prosecution under article 7. These observations render the article 
ambiguous and ineffective in criminalizing state officials’ conduct in riot control contexts.  
The foregoing claim is based on the argument that while politics may influence legal 
definition and interpretation under international law, states through a consensus building 
processes can agree on shared understandings on the boundaries of liability which offer 
legitimate standards for the prosecution of crimes under an international criminal law 
regime. However, the current law on use of force in riot control dissolves on application to 
actual situations of violence. It contains no structural framework within which to demarcate 
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lawful and unlawful use of force to enable a prosecution for crimes against humanity under 
the ICC statute.  
However, these contentions are not made with the assumption that it is possible to achieve 
absolute certainty in definition and are rather made with the awareness of the inherently 
indeterminate nature of law itself. As such the study proceeds on the more modest premise 
that at the very minimum, article 7 ought to have articulated the critical question of the 
aspects of state responsibility implicated under it, and countered the indeterminate nature of 
state discretion in riot control contexts. The omission of these indicators renders a vacuum 
in the article which then makes it ineffective as a basis for criminal prosecution. This is 
particularly critical given the unique nature of the challenge which the ICC poses to the 
internal concept of sovereignty. As has been observed by Corrias and Gordon (2015: 106-7) 
an international criminal tribunal, unlike a human rights court, is distinguishable because it 
applies principles of humanity and public conscience and has the power to deprive 
individuals of liberty on the basis of law. This act is perceived to be the highest and most 
controversial power associated with political collectivity and which it might be added, is 
also a significant intrusion onto the sovereign’s internal mandate to make and implement 
law over its subjects.  A similar observation is made by Robinson (2015: 332-3) who 
argues that the acute nature of the foregoing tensions within international criminal law is 
because this system, unlike the prescriptive human rights systems, seeks to create a vertical 
system of legal coercion on a horizontal plane among state actors who are more accustomed 
to a consensual regime. Given the apparent disparity of state approaches to internal security 
threats as will be further explored in chapter four, this scenario appears stark in light of the 
significant role that the sovereign state structure continues to wield over the ICC 
framework.  Whereas the ICC makes a significant advancement in piercing the veil of state 
sovereignty, it is still largely dependent on states’ support given its treaty based nature. 
Compared to other international institutions, the ICC’s more intrusive jurisdictional power 
leads it to the very site of conflicting internal forces between state and citizen, where it 
must contend with and challenge states’ tools of power, and make a judgment about them 
all within the foregoing complex architecture. 
Moreover, the ICC statute’s strict legality requirement calls for an absolute specificity in 
definition which is paradoxical given the highly indeterminate nature of state discretion in 
law enforcement and particularly in riot control contexts. The principle of legality is 
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narrowly defined under article 22 of the ICC statute. It is highly positivist and state centric 
and offers in its current state no substantial guidelines on how the court as a mechanism for 
interpretation might legitimately proceed in this exercise without exceeding its 
interpretative mandate. 
This chapter develops the foregoing arguments in six parts. Part two foregrounds the 
discussion around law and politics and explains the method of analysis adopted by the 
study.  Part three explains the option and unsuitability of the natural law framework of 
analysis, part four explores the option of Dworkin’s third theory of law, and part five 
explores critical legal theory, while part six will demonstrate the preference for modern 
positivist legal theory as the framework of analysis. This part will also address the concept 
of sovereignty and argue the Hobbesian sovereign as the most suitable agent through which 
to address the question under study. It will also briefly explore the concepts of legitimacy 
and indeterminacy in order to clarify the positivist premise of the study. It will then 
conclude in part seven with the main argument that the definition of crimes against 
humanity under article 7 of the ICC statute is ineffective in riot control contexts as it 
implicates the powers of the state to use of force as law enforcement in riot control contexts 
and yet offers no guidelines as to the boundaries of liability for such use of force. It will 
maintain further that the interpretive sources that would aid in clarifying these boundaries 
offer no remedy for the interpretation gap under study. This is because they exist in the 
prescriptive realms of human rights and humanitarian law, which have no specific 
prohibitive standards on which to base a criminal prosecution under article 7.  
The overall conclusion is that the application of article 7 to riot control contexts is 
premature for an area of law which implicates state responsibility and for which there 
currently exists no shared understanding under international law on what conduct under 
state law enforcement processes would amount to criminal liability under article 7.  
 
2. Contextualising Law, politics and method 
 
The brief survey of literature in chapter one indicates that questions concerning 
proportionality of force in both conflict and non-conflict situations have been articulated 
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using the language of law. Koskenniemi (2011: 2005) rejects the claim that law and in 
particular, international law is objective and devoid of political ideals or preferences. 
Robinson (2015) has contextualized this struggle between law and politics in a discussion 
of the dyads shaping the debate around the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) mandate. 
In it he points to some criticisms levelled against the court for being too utopian where it 
does not acknowledge state interests and for being too politicized where it takes into 
account state interests. Both Koskenniemi (2011) and Robinson(2015) seem to agree that 
an attempt to find a middle ground between the two struggles is impossible as the end result 
is precisely that which the arguments seek to avoid, namely the criticism that the law is 
political. This dilemma is articulated by Robinson (2015: 332-3) in the following terms:  
 
It is not just that you cannot please everyone, but rather that the Court has a 
fundamentally contradictory assignment. It is understandably expected to be ideal 
(normative, aloof, transcendental) and to be real (grounded, engaged, effective). 
The Court is expected to be 'in the world but not of it'. At every juncture, it can be 
credibly argued that it breached at least one of these expectations. 
 
My point of departure from Robinson’s observation is that the problem of law for the 
question under study is not the inherently political nature of international law but the in-
articulation at the international level of the critical line between state functions and criminal 
liability. This omission at the international level can be overcome with ‘language’ and 
consensus building which through positive law can demarcate predictable avenues of 
liability. The thesis proceeds on the understanding of law’s potential through definition, to 
provide some outer boundaries for the scope and substantive nature of crimes against 
humanity in riot control contexts. Combined with a more liberal understanding of the 
principle of legality, language can yield a ‘legitimate meaning’ that can avail some 
minimum predictability for state actors in riot control contexts.  
This study does not adopt a pragmatic approach to the foregoing challenges or aim to 
provide a final solution to article 7’s legal vacuum. The study merely proceeds on the 
premise that law can provide an objective understanding of boundaries of culpability and in 
this particular case, the boundaries of culpability for state conduct in riot control contexts. It 
does recognize international law’s potential to shape the discourse on the issues raised.  As 
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will be further illustrated below, the study adopts an analytical approach using modern 
positivist theory. Positivist theories while cognisant of law’s indeterminacy depart from 
critical legal theory in their reference to ‘legitimacy procedures’ and ‘language 
conferences’ for managing indeterminacy without claiming an absolute determinism. 
Thus, in gauging ‘effectiveness’ the thesis does not pretend at an absolute determinacy but 
rather aims at an analytical approach to article 7 which recognizes the manageability of the 
fundamental  questions of state responsibility implicated in the article’s equivocal and 
consequently ambiguous nature on three core issues: the demarcation between state 
responsibility and criminal liability, the combination of human rights, humanitarian law and 
international criminal legal regimes without reflection and the inherently abstract nature of 
the question of proportionality in ascertaining lawful  or unlawful  force in riot control 
contexts.  
The question whether article 7 of the ICC Statute effectively criminalizes the use of force in 
riot control contexts is for the aims of this study posed as a doctrinal as opposed to 
empirical or applied research question. As Chynoweth points out, doctrinal analysis is 
concerned with the analysis of ‘black letter law’ with the guiding research question being, 
‘what is the law’?, unlike empirical approaches which may seek to understand or predict 
human behavior in relation to law, or the applied research approaches which are concerned 
with systematic explanation of a given legal doctrine (2008:29, 30-31).  The main objective 
of the study therefore is to discover, through analysis and legal argument, what the law is, 
and what are the gaps, paradoxes and ambiguities within it which limit article 7’s definitive 
scope for riot control contexts.  
There are a number of options from legal theoretical frameworks which might be adopted 
as alternative approaches to this inquiry including those that would aid in achieving a more 
prescriptive outcome, such as the natural law theory, those that might offer a more critical 
lens and challenge law’s determinacy, such as critical legal theories, and those that offer an 
interpretive approach such as Dworkin’s third theory of law. However, as it is the aim of 
this study to demonstrate the inadequacy of article 7 in criminalizing force used in riot 
control contexts without dismissing law’s definitional potential, a doctrinal approach that 
would enable a black letter law analysis of article 7 and other formal sources of law 
including treaties, statutes, and legal decisions implicated by the research question would 
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be most suitable. As indicated, this will be pursued through a positivist framework and with 
a particular focus on the state centric nature of law as laid down by a Hobbesian sovereign. 
But first, a brief discussion of the other theoretical frameworks and the basis for rejecting 
them in favour of positivism is undertaken below.   
The ensuing sections are summarised analyses of only some basic aspects of the theories as 
they may relate to the thesis. This thesis does not purport to make a comprehensive study of 
the origins and substance of these theories or of the various conflicting views within and 
between them.  
 
3. The content and sources of law: Exploring natural law theories 
 
Certain approaches to twentieth century legal theory were reportedly so “anti-political” and 
“anti sovereign” that they led one German scholar to observe that the sovereign who was 
the engineer of the machine (of the law) had been pushed aside and that ‘the machine now 
run by itself’. The key elements of ‘unity’ and ‘system’ in most normative theories of law 
have been viewed as strenuous attempts in their time to eliminate any understanding of law 
as an expression of political power but rather as a field of professional knowledge and 
practice (Cotterrell 1989: 112). However, questions about what the law is also involve 
inevitably, questions about the sources of the law and natural law principles do offer an 
answer which closely echoes equity, justice and ‘good faith’ as sources of law (Fastenrath 
1993: 327, Harris 1980: 7-15) and these are briefly discussed below. 
 
3.1 The substance and source of law: comparing positivist and natural law approaches  
 
Natural law traces its foundations in concepts such as ‘nature’, ‘reason’ and ‘justice’, 
(Fuller 1969: 1968, Orakhelashvili, 2008).These foundations remain despite the evolving 
concepts and parameters which natural law has experienced over various periods of history 
(Orakhelashvili 2008: 71). Fuller notes a fundamental connection between law and justice, 
the universality of law and the existence of an ideal law laid down by God (1969: 157-9, 
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1968:162). Contemporary legal scholars like Fastenrath identify justice as the linchpin of 
all natural law theories, whose content was deduced by historical natural law philosophers 
including Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, from various sources including the will of God 
and an all-embracing world order (1993: 327). In relation to its substance, natural law 
theory contains many variations which it is beyond the objectives of this study to explore. 
However, some core claims of the theory include; a conceptual connection between law and 
morality, the belief that an unjust law is not law and ought not to be obeyed including by 
state officials, the God given nature of law and the centrality of reason in law making 
(Fuller 1969,1968, Doyle 2009: 206, Fernando 1991:2, Orrego 2004:302). Harris further 
states that natural law is universal and as such, is available at all times for those whose 
positions require them to enact or develop law and is superior to law made by man (1980: 
7).  
 
In contrast to positive law theory, natural law does not trace its origins to a human 
legislator and in asserting that its moral principles rank higher than human law, it 
implicates national legal systems, and positive international law (Cotterrell, 1989: 120, 
Orakhelashvili 2008: 71). However, its foundations in ‘God’, and ‘human nature’ have not 
escaped criticism for being logically inept and prone to internal and external  
inconsistencies including questions regarding the nature  of  ‘god’ and evidence of this 
‘god’ who is creating law (Landman 2013: 19). Indeed the observation has been made that 
for positivists, the source of a law is approached as a technical question while for natural 
law; it has to be approached as a moral question. This is bound to present with various 
political controversies as moral reasoning when applied to social or public issues turns into 
a directive on how state power ought to be exercised (Cotterrell 1989: 125). 
In establishing the law on proportionate force, a natural law approach would therefore 
obscure state legislation as the starting point of analysis and privilege concepts of humanity 
embodied in frameworks such as human rights law and general principles of international 
law where natural law precepts are predominant (Orakhelashvili 2008: 77). However, 
presently, the application of the natural law rules such as justice and equity cannot yield on 
their own, operational legal definitions, but rather play a role complementary to positive 
law. Furthermore, perceptions of justice are themselves bound to end up in subjectivity 
(Fastenrath 1993: 328, 330).  
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As indicated in the introduction, the main objective of this study is to demonstrate the 
argument that ICC statute article 7 is inadequate in criminalising force used in riot control 
contexts. It is as such not a study aimed at a prescriptive result of what article 7 ought to 
state in order to achieve a more just, moral or equitable result, which would be the inquiry 
under a natural law framework. In this particular study, the question of what article 7 of the 
ICC Statute covers or does not cover regarding force used in riot control contexts is 
grounded in positive law.    
The positive law framework stands in opposition to the natural law theory in relation both 
to the source and content of law.  The theory asserts, as will be further explored under part 
five, the separation between law and morality. As such, a rule does not lose validity simply 
because it violates standards of morality (Hart 1958: 599). This theory is represented in 
what Jeremy Bentham referred to as the command theory of law (Harris 1980: 24).  
Bentham as the founder of the command theory of law sought to see law in terms of 
political facts such as power, punishment and reward. This approach was later further 
developed by John Austin for whom the sovereign was one whose commands the subjects 
habitually obeyed and regarded as laws (1980: 25). On this basis, Austin argues that the 
core characteristics of these laws included the fact of a wish or desire laid down by a 
sovereign either in writing or through signs, and a penalty ensued where such desire or wish 
was not complied with. It followed from this that laws other than those from the sovereign 
or the sovereign’s subordinates were not considered law in Austinian thinking.  
In reference to the question of what amounts to proportionate force, a strict Austinian 
approach would thus centre around the sovereign’s stated law on the subject and undermine 
references to undefined natural law precepts such as ‘humanity’.  According to Nagan and 
Haddad (2011-2012: 449) Austinian thinking influenced scholars such as Johann Jakob 
Moser and George Friedrich von Martens who advocated for a strong sovereign under 
international law and a positivist approach there under where only treaty law and customary 
law as opposed to natural law sentiment could be accepted as binding upon a sovereign 
expressly agreeing to be so bound.   
However, as will be demonstrated under part six, this strict positivist approach to 
international law has been superseded by a more liberal modern approach which this study 
will adopt. In any event the positivist theory unlike natural law theory is aligned with the 
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inquiry of what the law on use of force in riot control contexts is, as it implicates the critical 
question of the sovereign’s law making power. This question is central to the contention 
that article 7 fails to demarcate the boundaries between state responsibility and criminal 
liability. By centering transcendental concepts of justice and humanity, a natural law 
approach would obscure this contradiction within article 7, misdirect the study to a more 
prescriptive as opposed to an analytical approach and dissolve the main point of 
investigation in the study.  
A different theory propounded by Ronald Dworkin would offer that establishing the scope 
of article 7 in riot control contexts poses no real legal challenge as questions of what the 
law on a particular issue is, including in hard cases where there is no clear legal position, 
always have a determinate objective answer which can be found within the wider and 
unified historical, social and political scheme of the law. However, as will be argued below, 
this theory is of limited practical application in the highly decentralized and varied 
international law system and is too centered on judicial interpretation when the question 
under study is first a matter for state officials’ interpretation before it becomes a matter for 
judicial interpretation.  Moreover, the theory is also more concerned with the apportioning 
of rights rather than the establishment of criminal liability which is the question this study 
is concerned with.  
 
4. Assessing Dworkin’s third theory of law  
 
Dworkin’s theory of law sought to establish a middle ground between strict positivism and 
natural law (Alexander 1987: 420, 438). Some scholars have labelled it the third theory of 
law (Himma, 2003: 346). However, aside from critiques regarding the theory’s internal 
inconsistencies demonstrated below, Dworkin’s theory of law is too abstract and oriented 
towards judicial interpretive considerations.  Like the natural law theory approach, it 
obscures the analysis of critical questions regarding boundaries between state responsibility 
and criminal liability under article 7, which this study aims to demonstrate, as further 
argued below. 
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4.1 Comparing Dworkin and Hart’s positivist theory of judicial interpretation  
Dworkin’s main point of departure with positivist theory and in particular, with leading 
legal positivist H.L.A Hart is in relation to the criteria of legality and on the law making 
power of judges in deciding hard cases (Himma, 2003:346).  Hart’s criteria for legality is 
entirely conventional while Dworkin considers legality criteria to be interpretive, with the 
result that for him, the question of what law is cannot be decided simply by reference to  
enacted statutes and rules but also ought to incorporate general principles such as justice 
and fairness that are implicitly justified within legal rules (Himma, 2003: 346).  
Dworkin rejects Hart's view that courts make new law when they exercise judicial 
discretion in hard cases. He argues that for every hard case, there is an objective and correct 
answer in pre-existing law, which judges draw from when deciding cases rather than make 
new law (Himma 2003: 346, 348). Thus, if applied to the law on use of force in riot control 
contexts, Dworkin’s approach would rely on the substantively indeterminate nature of pre-
existing law on riot control to claim a pre-existing objective standard. Through his thesis, 
Dworkin departs from rigid positivist theory by propounding a more liberal approach to 
what the law is. He creates a contrast between rules and principals and considers principles 
to be part of law thereby discounting positivists’ strict application of a master rule as the 
only law to the exclusion of other social standards (Dworkin 1977: 45). Dworkin (1977: 39) 
emphasizes that legal obligations consist not only of what positivists consider to be rules 
but also of principles, which strict positivists argue are outside the law and are only used by 
judges in exercising discretion and to create ‘new law’.  
According to Dworkin, in hard cases where the policy considerations may not be so clear or 
settled, applying the relevant principles to a case would still be well in line with the 
political goals of the legislature (1977: 83). In this way Dworkin manages to merge an 
approach to the law that is ‘politically conscious’. To explain his approach, Dworkin 
creates a super hero of sorts, a lawyer with great learning skills and patience who he 
endows with the Herculean ability to juxtapose and analyse all possibly applicable 
principles and rules to the scenario at hand, and emerge with the best solution to the case 
under investigation (1977: 105). However, to arrive at this decision, this Hercules must 
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have considered not just the rules but all possible theories in light of the entire scheme of 
Government (1997: 107).  In Dworkin’s argument, by Hercules’ methods there is clearly no 
‘norm creation’ in judicial discretion as the norms already exists in the form of the 
principles he applies (1977: 109).However, Dworkin is cautious and clarifies that the 
interpretation Hercules arrives at might not necessarily be the right interpretation but is one 
of many possible solutions that a different panel of judges might arrive at using different 
principals and arguments. In so admitting he ends by cautioning judicial humility when 
deciding hard cases as a judge may well be wrong in his or her political judgments 
(Dworkin 1977: 130).  
By contrast, Hart’s positivist outlook leads him to argue that in certain cases, what renders 
cases hard is that there is a gap in pre-existing law and that law is substantively 
indeterminate and cannot provide a uniquely correct answer. As such, the only way judges 
can fill the gap during the interpretation process is to exercise a certain minimal law 
making power whilst ensuring they do not usurp the legislator’s power (Himma 2003: 367). 
Hart’s view is summed up as follows (Hart, 1994: 272):  
 
[I]n any legal system there will always be certain legally unregulated cases in which 
on some point no decision either way is dictated by the law and the law is 
accordingly partly indeterminate or incomplete. If in such cases the judge is to reach 
a decision and is not, as Bentham once advocated, to disclaim jurisdiction or to refer 
the points not regulated by the existing law to the legislature to decide, he must 
exercise his discretion and make law for the case instead of merely applying already 
pre-existing settled law. So in such legally unprovided-for or unregulated cases the 
judge makes new law and applies the established law which both confers and 
constrains his law making powers.   
 
In line with positivist thinking, Hart cautions that the law creating power he ascribes to 
judges in his thesis are not the same as those of the legislature, as the judges’ powers can 
only be exercised within the constraints laid down by the legislature as the main law 
making body.  They are to be interstitial and avoid large scale innovation (Hart, 1994: 237). 
Hart’s restrictions echo and foreground tensions around the interpretation of the ICC 
Statute’s article 7 and its application to the indeterminate legal regime on riot control as 
well as the restriction on the ICC’s judicial innovation via the strict legality principle under 
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article 22. By recognizing the tensions between legislative and interpretive questions of law 
Hart’s approach offers a more suitable framework for an analytical inquiry of article 7.  
 
Dworkin’s approach on the other hand, would obscure the foregoing inquiry. His 
interpretive approach to the law is limited to a particular type of actor within the law, 
namely; legal experts and judges (Cotterrell, 1989). Certainly the Hercules that Dworkin 
creates does not represent an ordinary law enforcement official whose situation in a volatile 
riot control context would not afford him or her time for arm chair intellectual 
considerations as to what would be the best political or moral action to take within the 
wider scheme of the law. Dworkin’s approach obscures legal actors whose interpretation of 
the law may warrant more practical considerations leading to immediate and physical 
responses. Indeed, questions concerning proportionality of force in riot control contexts do 
not only arise before a panel of judges and are not interpreted by just by this set of legal 
actors. They are bound to arise for determination and application by law enforcement 
officials acting in the name of a sovereign state. As the question under investigation seeks 
to explore the complexities of interpretation from both the state and judicial perspectives, 
Dworkin’s approach offers a limiting framework of analysis in as far as it obscures the 
complexities of tactical decision making in riot control contexts.  
In addition, his approach to legal theory is one that seeks to establish the most attractive 
political or moral principles which if followed can account for the most coercive decisions 
taken by a society bearing in mind such society’s legal and political history (Alexander 
1987: 419).  It would be more suitable for a normative and prescriptive approach to the 
question rather than doctrinal analysis, which this study adopts. Moreover, Alexander 
(1987) criticizes Dworkin’s theory for offering no clear indicators on how to determine 
which political moralities of a community should be considered in order to ensure that 
courts as well as legislatures cohere with past decisions and pre-existing law (1987 :426-7, 
442). He uses the example of the Nazi community to demonstrate that a Dworkinian 
approach would require a Nazi judge to extend Nazi principles rather than undermine them 
by going outside the existing legal framework to create new law (1987: 427). In his view, 
Dworkin’s response that there is a threshold of moral acceptability which gauges correct 
and incorrect political moralities is still unsatisfactory as he offers no criteria for 
determining which political moralities along a spectrum of incorrect political moralities 
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would be closest or furthest from moral acceptability in order to justify or reject certain 
legal rights (1987:428).   
 
Finally, Dworkin’s theory is built around the determination and distribution of rights in 
hard cases. It is of limited application to the determination of criminal liabilities, which is 
the focus of this study. While the right to life is implicated in the use of force during riot 
control, it is subsumed under the ICC Statute’s article 7 in the context of this study, whose 
objective is criminal prosecution as opposed to rights distribution. Thus the Dworkinian 
theory is also rejected owing to the foregoing inconsistencies and inadequacies.  
Critical legal theories offer critical approaches to law from non-judicial and non-state 
perspectives as well as from criminal liability and rights perspectives. However, as is 
analysed further below and as announced above, these theories maintain a pessimistic view 
towards positive law’s ability to act as an indicator of shared understandings of boundaries 
of liability and rights, contrary to the premise upon which this study proceeds, and for these 
reasons, also prove unsuitable as its framework of analysis.  
 
5. Critical legal theory 
 
There are numerous variations of critical legal theory which it is beyond the scope of this 
study to comprehensively describe (Ward 2004). However, some major common 
contentions of these theorists include that law is but an expression of power and politics 
(Ward 2004: 140-1, Purvis 1991:89, Standen 1986:995,997), the rejection of a liberal rights 
discourse, the assertion that law is indeterminate, and the inherent bias in liberal ideology 
(Purvis 1991, Standen 1986:997). To this end, some critical legal scholars are dismissive of 
neutral judicial processes, believing judges to be political actors whose decisions only serve 
their political agendas (Ward 2004: 145, Standen 1986:997). In relation to international 
law, critical scholars argue that the law is rhetorical and a reflection of ideology which is 
but a set of reified ideas about what the world is and affirmations that how the world is, is 
how it ought to be. They maintain that owing to law’s political and indeterminate nature, 
competing yet equally convincing arguments can be made from opposing stand points, 
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rendering international law a useless means for judging international behaviour (Purvis 
1991: 106, 108-9 ).  
 
In a critique of international law’s indeterminacy Koskenniemi argues in the statement 
below: (2005:590) 
…the claim of indeterminacy here is not at all that international legal words are 
semantically ambivalent. It is a much stronger (and in the philosophical sense, more 
“fundamental”) and states that even where there is no semantic ambivalence 
whatsoever, international law remains indeterminate because it is based on 
contradictory premises and seeks to regulate a future in regard to which even single 
actors’ preferences remain unsettled. To say this is not to say that much more than 
that international law emerges from a political process whose participants have 
contradictory priorities and rarely know with clarity how such priorities should be 
turned into directives to deal with an uncertain future. Hence they agree to 
supplement rules with exceptions, have recourse to broadly defined standards and 
apply rules in the context of other rules and larger principles…It follows that it is 
possible to defend any course of action –including deviation from a clear rule –by 
professionally impeccable legal arguments that look from rules to their underlying 
reasons…and interpret rules in the context of evaluative standards.  
 
 
This ‘manipulable’ character of international law is reflected in discourse around how states 
justify their actions in situations of violence using law. As observed by Kennedy, there is a 
more common occurrence of irresolvable debates around law in war as law is increasingly 
being employed as a strategic ally. He identifies the term ‘lawfare’ as coined by the 
American military in this discourse (2012: 160-161). He argues that with lawfare, 
international law’s malleability allows the boundaries of war to be strategically managed 
and justified by all sides of a conflict. The result is that pertinent questions in war such as 
‘when does war end’ are really answered through strategic decisions and legitimised using 
the rhetoric of law (2012: 165-6).  
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5. 1 Comparing critical legal theory to positivism 
 
The foregoing analysis offers a critical legal framework for the question under study, in 
particular, relating to determinations whether article 7 of the ICC Statute can be objectively 
interpreted to cover force used as part of a law enforcement activity in a riot control 
situation. However, as stated above, this approach is dismissive of law’s potential to deliver 
a shared understanding (Fastenrath 1993, Brunnee and Toope 2010, Franck, 1990) of the 
boundaries of criminal liability, which is the premise upon which this study’s analysis of 
article 7 proceeds. This dismissive approach to law’s objectivity by critical legal theorists 
has been criticised by positivist scholars who point out that critical legal theory is highly 
‘inward looking in nature’ and unable to offer operational solutions to practical questions 
such as how to punish human rights violators or indeed how to solve conflict (Ratner and 
Slaughter, Symposium on methodology 1999: 308), which questions are implicated in the 
analysis of article 7.  
 
Furthermore, legal positivist theorists do not deny international law’s indeterminacy 
(Ranter and Slaughter 1999: 306, Nalbandian 2009:140), their point of departure from 
critical legal theory, which is also this study’s point of departure lies in the recognition that 
this indeterminacy can be managed in such a way as to secure predictability of the law 
while providing a legitimate process through which the law’s ambiguities can be filled even 
in hard cases (Fastenrath 1993, Brunnee & Toope 2010, Franck, 1990). This is indeed 
partly the basis of Hart’s disagreement with Dworkin on the nature of judicial officer’s 
interpretive discretion and law making power (Hart, 1994: 272-6).  
Modern positivism does not deny law’s political nature. Its departure from critical legal 
theories is the insistence that political considerations must be rooted in formally recognized 
and binding sources of law in order to procure a balance between the dichotomies of 
idealism and realism or apology and utopia among others (Ratner and Slaughter, 308).  
Thomas Hobbes who was a prominent philosopher held arguments about law and politics 
which align with modern legal positivist theory. In articulating his approach to the law, he 
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centered politics and power within the sovereign’s law making functions (Boyle: 1987-
1988). As observed by Ward: (2004: 131,138-139) 
 
Thomas Hobbes should not be remembered solely as one of the progenitors of 
English legal positivism. He was also considered, the original progenitor of power 
and thus a great prophet for the modern theories of the relationship between law, 
government and the modern political state.  …Hobbes wrote to rid us of any illusion 
that law or politics was anything other than an expression of power…..Hobbes 
signalled the end of natural law and heralded the emergence of a legal positivism 
which aligned law with politics rather than ,metaphysics or moral philosophy.  
 
While positivist theory recognizes the role of politics and power in law, it does not view 
this as a hindrance to international law’s functions as a source of solutions to international 
conflict. Indeed some scholars have observed that the critical legal theory’s dismissal of 
international law’s functionality is contradicted by states’ general acceptance of it, as well 
as the authority and legitimacy it enjoys among them (Purvis 1991: 110).  
While the approach taken in this study is analytical and not prescriptive, it does proceed on 
the basis that international law can -but simply has not yet- provided guidelines to remedy 
the ambiguity of article 7 in relation to its boundaries with state responsibility and the 
indicators for criminal liability for unlawful force in riot control contexts.   
These arguments are developed further below in the analysis of the principal of legitimacy, 
the Hobbesian sovereign and modern legal positivism as the concepts, theoretical 
frameworks and methods of analysis adopted by this study. 
 
 
6. Exploring legal positivism  
 
This study uses doctrinal analysis to approach the question whether article 7 of the ICC 
Statute effectively criminalises the use of excessive force in riot control contexts. The main 
claim the study makes is that as article 7 does not effectively criminalise force used in riot 
control contexts, as it does not articulate the boundaries of state responsibility and criminal 
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liability for force used as part of law enforcement in these contexts. Furthermore, the ICC 
Statute’s recognized sources of law for interpretation of article 7 contain no guidelines 
regarding this demarcation and are prescriptive as opposed to the ICC Statute’s prohibitive 
regime. As such they offer no clear standards for establishing criminal liability. This 
inadequacy of article 7 is further aggravated by the ICC Statute’s strict legality requirement 
which is a paradox, given the highly abstract nature of the law force used in riot control 
contexts.  
This analysis will entail an analysis and description of the black letter law in the ICC 
Statute and other sources including regional and national laws implicated in the 
investigation. The most suitable framework for this inquiry therefore is one which 
perceives the law in terms of what it is and not what it ought to be, accepts the law’s 
functional nature as a tool that can be used to define and communicate shared 
understandings of meanings, which offers a basis and method for establishing culpability 
under international law and accepts that politics does influence law. Modern legal 
positivism possesses these attributes and in particular, the concept of the Hobbesian 
sovereign as a source of law as explored further below.  
 
6.1 Exploring modern positivism 
 
There is an array of approaches to positivism which it is not the objective of this section to 
describe. Such discussions can be found elsewhere (Fastenrath 1993, Shauer 2011). 
However, the classic common attributes of positivist legal theories include the view that 
law emanates from a sovereign and that law and morality are separate concepts (Boyle 
1987-1988:387, Ranter & Slaughter, Symposium on method, 1999, 303-4). Under 
international law, positivism propounds voluntarism as a critical basis for establishing 
whether or not a state is bound by a given treaty or custom and a lawyer’s interpretation of 
the law is thus restricted to an interpretation that is in line with the concerned state(s)’ 
authentic will within the treaty (Symposium on method, 1999 303-4). This strong positivist 
view manifests in the following statement by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
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(PCIJ)   in the Lotus judgement (S.S. "Lotus" (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCU (ser. A) No. 10, at 
18 (Sept. 7): 
 : 
 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent 
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon 
the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed. 
  
In addition to the voluntarist approach under international law, positivist theory places 
emphasis on formal sources of law that are part of a unified legal system and rejects all 
extra legal sources such as morality, and political ideology through rigorous demands for 
legality (Symposium on method, 1999: 304).  
However, in what Ranter and Slaughter refer to as modern positivism, positivist legal 
theory does recognise positive law’s proximity to political realities and admits that political 
and moral considerations are not alien to law. It also recognises the role of soft law and 
non-state actors in defining what the law is. It however insists that those considerations 
would still have to be grounded in formal sources of law (Weil 1983, Symposium on 
method, 1999: 306, 308).  
 
6.2 Positive law and politics in Thomas Hobbes’ philosophy 
 
The foregoing recognised relationship between law and politics is central to an 
understanding of Hobbes’ concept of a sovereign as a source of law and is critical for the 
analysis of the dilemmas inherent in article 7’s ambiguity concerning force used by state 
actors in riot control contexts.  
While Hobbes has been categorised as a natural law philosopher allegedly so much so that 
he is arguably mentioned in every natural law handbook, he is also recognised by some as a 
forerunner of legal positivism (Doliwa 2012: 95). It is beyond the aims of this study to 
investigate and conclude these conflicting claims or indeed to categorise Thomas Hobbes 
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under a specific legal tradition. However, the study takes the modest view that Hobbes’ 
main principles about sovereignty and the command theory of law can be aligned with 
positivist legal theory and it is on this basis that it adopts the Hobbesian sovereign as an 
agent of analysis alongside a positivist analysis of the law. Hobbes’ main point of departure 
from natural law theory lay in his observation that the law of nature or laws dictated by 
human reason were of no value without state sanction which enables them to function only 
once they have become part of positive sovereign law (Doliwa 2012: 97).  His concept of 
social contract in the creation of the state is founded on convention and is argued by some 
to be evidence of alignment with positivist theory as the first assumption of his philosophy 
(2012:98). According to Hobbes, laws of nature did not bind the sovereign and the 
sovereign could exclude them from positive law (2012:101-3).  
Contrary to classical positivism, in Hobbes’ understanding extra legal considerations such 
as politics are in fact central to the law. It follows that he was skeptical of law’s neutrality, 
which he perceived was about preserving the sovereign’s power. In this regard, state 
voluntarism has been linked to Hobbes’ theory (Fastenrath 1993: 324).  
However, it is pertinent to distinguish Hobbes’ skepticism of law’s objectivity from that of 
the critical legal theorists above. For while they critique law’s indeterminacy from a 
perspective which rejects status quo and which would question the justification and basis 
for the existence of the state, Hobbes’ approach reinforces the state as a necessity and the 
law as a functional means for its preservation. To Hobbes the interpretation of law is bound 
to be in the interest of the sovereign and the meaning of reason bound to be understood 
from the same perspective.  
 
These extra-legal considerations made Hobbes unattractive to positivists, but did not render 
him any less of a positivist to some scholars (Boyle 1987-1988: 393-4). His articulation of 
law as a command of the sovereign in Leviathan is well in line with the classical positivist 
tradition, as he stated in respect to civil law (Hobbes 1651, 311-312):  
 
Civill law, is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath 
commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make 
use of for the Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, 
and what is not contrary to the Rule.  
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In light of Hobbes’s approach to law, questions around what amount of force is reasonable 
or lawful under riot control contexts are bound to be answered from a state centric 
perspective at the national level and evoke defences grounded in state will and voluntarism 
at the international level. The definition and interpretation of lawful or unlawful force under 
law is also tied to the justification and preservation of the state. As detailed in the 
explanation below and as will be further propounded in an understanding of the Hobbesian 
sovereign, the state’s ability to use force without limitation is perpetuated through the open 
ended nature of the legal language on the subject. Hobbes’s main difference with positivist 
theorists and the reason for his rejection of the objectivity of law was because he articulated 
the meaning of law from the point of view of purpose, and his purpose was to tie the 
concept of law into politics. His concept of law was grounded in the justification of the 
state and of sovereign power and for this reason it was intricately tied to politics and power 
(Boyle 1987-1988: 397-8). To this end, Hobbes recognized the relationship between 
language and power and consequently, the importance definitions in law (Boyle 1987-1988: 
401, 425).   
 
This approach which recognizes the hybridity of law and power is central for the analysis 
of article 7 of the ICC Statute as it illuminates the tension that arises from article 7’s 
equivocal stance on the boundaries of culpability for conduct that might otherwise be part 
of law enforcement and as such, might be lawful under state law. As is further argued 
below, the ambiguous state of the law on use of force in riot control contexts prevents the 
constriction of state power in the exercise of a function that is at the core of its justification 
for existing. On the other hand, Article 7 of the ICC statute operates from a premise that 
requires a specific constriction of such power but provides no definitive scope for it and 
neither do the other sources of law upon which it may rely for such a definition. This 
impasse then presents an interpretation dilemma for the ICC which this study seeks to 
demonstrate. But first, the conflation of sovereign power and state use of force through the 
language of law is discussed in a more in-depth understanding of Hobbes’ concept of 
sovereignty below.  
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6.3 The Hobbesian sovereign 
 
Hobbes articulates his theory of the sovereign extensively in his book Leviathan (Hobbes, 
1651). He founds his sovereign in the conviction that human beings in their “state of 
nature” are prone to anarchy, domination and destruction which creates insecurity and as 
such, for the sake of their own self-preservation, they impose upon themselves restriction in 
the form of one common wealth or under a common sovereign, without whom every human 
being would rely on their own strength and use force to conquer the other for their own 
security or to satisfy their own natural passions. This, according to Hobbes would see 
humankind in a perpetual state of war (Hobbes 1651:103). The common wealth is 
established by virtue of mutual covenants wherein individuals covenant with each other to 
give up their power to one common individual or assembly of individuals who will 
thenceforth use the terror of this power and strength to execute their multiple wills on their 
behalf, be it by securing peace at home or protecting them from attacks by external enemies 
(Hobbes 1651: 106). This common individual is referred to as a sovereign. Hobbes further 
argues that since the sovereign’s objective is to defend and ensure peace and security over 
his or her people, that sovereign reserves the right to decide what would amount to a threat 
to peace and security whether internal or external, and to the means required to counteract 
these threats to his or her people, and is not to be accused of injury or faulted in his or her 
choice or actions (Hobbes, 1651: 109-123). In further espousing this concept, Hobbes lists 
as one of the things which weaken or may lead to the dissolution of the sovereign: the 
acceptance of that sovereign of less power than is necessary to ensure peace and security 
over his or her territory (Hobbes, 1651: 197).  This exposition of Hobbes’ sovereign sets 
the background for an understanding of the problem of the open-ended nature of laws 
concerning a state’s power to control violence within their territory, including during riots 
or violent protests as is further explored in the study.  
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6.4 The ‘force’ of law  
 
As is evident from the foregoing theory, the use of force has been recognized as 
instrumental in the creation and sustenance of the state, as a work of man and not just as a 
natural occurrence. By Hobbes’ theory, in any society there is the need to govern and the 
distinction inevitably arises between sovereign and subjects. However, in order to govern, 
the sovereign depends on force allied with right or with law as brute force alone is not 
sustainable in governance. Thus as Edwards points out, the use of force by state security 
institutions such as the police is made discretionary by law. It is often measured by the 
statements such as: ‘No more force than is reasonably necessary’ (2005:166) with the test 
of what is ‘reasonable’ relating to the circumstances pertaining at the time force is used. In 
Edwards’ opinion, such evidence is so subjective that any successful prosecution for 
excessive use of force might only occur in the most obvious of cases where blatant 
excessive force was applied (2005: 167). This concept of police discretion also ties in well 
with Bittner’s use of force paradigm which according to Brodeur envisages two basic 
propositions, one being the police’s ability to non-negotiably use force in urgent situations 
and the characterization of the typical circumstances in which police action is required. 
These benefits and complexities of policing position the institution well for unfettered or 
minimal regulations on use of force standards.  The subjectivity of use of force standards is 
rendered even more complex in light of the fact that policing structures and cultures tend to 
vary with different political backgrounds, and social-economic structures in different 
societies (Brodeur 2010:103).  
From the foregoing analysis, the framework around policing and by necessary implication 
the law around use of force in riot control contexts seems to remain largely within the 
clutch of sovereignty-power discourse. In his observation, Brodeur (2010: 339) reinforces 
that the law sets out to protect policing agencies through the use of phrases such as 
‘necessary force’, ‘reasonable grounds’, among others, so as to enable the policing 
machinery maintain law and order. It is no wonder, Brodeur argues, there is a reluctance of 
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people and even the courts themselves, to challenge the police as is evidenced by the almost 
non-existent prosecutions of police officers for excessive use of force (2010: 339).   
The foregoing insights into the law’s intricate connectivity to the state’s monopolization 
and justification of force as part of the law enforcement enterprise provide an effective 
standpoint from which to analyse and comprehend the ambiguities around the law on riot 
control and the contradictions and tensions that are bound to arise in an article 7 application 
to this area of the law. Hobbes’ sovereign provides the most suitable agent for this analysis 
because as indicated above, he links the theory of law to the fundamental and political 
question of the justification of the state. Other theories of sovereignty including those 
propounded by positivists such as Austin do not magnify this intricate connection between 
law and violence to the justification of the state. Other social contract theories foreground 
political questions of governance, democracy, the right to revolution among others and 
obscure the complex relationship between law, state power, and violence. As seen above in 
Hobbes’ approach, the justification of the state’s use of force is central to his functional 
understanding of the state and law.  The same justification is central to the question of law 
on the use of force in riot control contexts. Hobbes’ contrast with other theorists on this 
concept and thus his relevance for this study are briefly explained below.  
 
6.5 Why the Hobbesian sovereign and not other sovereigns?  
 
Jeremy Bentham and John Austin were prominent legal positivists who propounded the 
command theory of law which stated in essence that law is that which is laid down by a 
sovereign backed by a threat of sanction. The principle thus concerned itself with the 
source of the law rather than its substantive merits (Austin 1968, Merriam 2001: 67-69). 
However, both Bentham and Austin rejected Hobbes’ contract theory and adopted a 
utilitarian approach to the theory of sovereignty, maintaining that the reason for man’ 
submission to a sovereign authority was a natural occurrence which followed from man’s 
desire to attain the greatest level of happiness (Merriam 2001: 67-69, Austin 1968: 334-
336). Austin dismisses as absurd the idea that a heterogeneous and amorphous community 
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could agree on a determinate objective as to how they wanted to be governed and for such a 
contract to then bind subsequent indeterminate generations (Austin 1968: 334-336).  
It is here argued that while both scholars center the sovereign as a source of law, by 
rejecting the contract theory and adopting a utilitarian view of the sovereign, Austin and 
Bentham obscure discourse around the violent foundations of the state and the justification 
of state monopoly on force as a necessity for maintaining state law and order. Their 
explanations for the sovereign as a source of law do not offer a critical lens for how the 
sovereign makes law to facilitate its monopoly on violence and perpetuate its existence, 
which as stated above, is a fundamental aspect of this study. For this reason, both 
Benthamite and Austinian sovereigns are of limited analytical significance.   
One other contractarian theorist, Jean Jacques Rousseau upheld Hobbes’ contract theory but 
articulated it from a point of view which justified revolution. According to Merriam, 
Rousseau accomplished for the people what Hobbes accomplished for their ruler, as he 
rendered the people as the sovereign; an embodiment of the state and the government. His 
theory was the foundation for several constitutional expressions affirming the sovereignty 
of the people and as such, their right to revolution. By contrast, Hobbes’ sovereign 
swallowed up the state to the point of absolute government (Merriam 2001: 18), although 
as is indicated below, he denied that his theory propounded an absolute sovereign. Thus, 
while Rousseau’s legislator is founded in principles of popular sovereignty, democracy and 
general will (Ward 2014: 43, 50), the Hobbesian sovereign’s law making power as 
propounded above, is very state centric and aimed at ensuring the state’s monopoly on 
force, which is a major contention and stance taken by this study. Immanuel Kant adopts an 
approach similar to Rousseau’s also articulating the role of law and state as one aimed at 
securing the general will, although he too like Austin and Bentham, rejects the contract 
theory of the state (Merriam 2001, 234:  Madrid 2014). 
 
Other social contract theorists have articulated political justifications for the state but 
offered minimal legal articulations of the same. John Locke who also propounds the 
contract theory differs from Hobbes to the extent that he relegates discourse around law and 
order and violence by maintaining that before the formation of the state, man’s state of 
nature was not a state of war as Hobbes argues, but rather one where individual rights are 
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imperfectly secured. As such, the function of the state was to ensure access to the common 
good and secure these rights through law (Merriam 2001: 16, Leyden: 1956). By contrast, 
Hobbes’ functional approach to the state is hinged on the need to ensure security and take 
man out of the state of war, which is attained through that sovereign ruler’s monopoly on 
violence as analysed above. Moreover, Locke’s contract theory, while political, is also 
intricately linked to natural law theory. Locke believed political power was limited by 
natural law and men’s rights, especially to life and property, and that man was eternally 
subject to natural law (Leyden 1956: 26). As already noted above, this study is aimed at a 
positivist analysis of what the law is and renders natural law theories of no import. Other 
theories which focus on sovereignty and power like the Weberian sovereign are more 
focused on the bureaucratic aspects of power (Gerth and Wright 1948: 196,199,220-6), 
whilst the current study is narrowly focused on a legalistic and doctrinal analysis of a 
specific provision in the ICC Statute, which implicates questions of legal definition and not 
broader social political questions of bureaucracy.  
 
6.6 Rejecting an absolute sovereign 
 
The Hobbesian sovereign theory like the Austinian theory has met with allegations of 
propounding an idea of an absolute sovereign who is unlimited by positive law (Dewey 
1894: 32). These allegations of absolutism have however since been neutralized by 
arguments which point to the fact that both scholars recognize that the sovereign remains 
accountable to the people he or she governs and may have to defer to them on matters of 
governance (Dewey 1894: 36). Moreover Hobbes, it has also been pointed out, emphasized 
the role of the sovereign to protect his or her subjects and that if the sovereign failed in that 
objective, then there was no longer a need for the subjects to recognize him or her, 
effectively serving as a limit on that sovereign’s absolutism (Nagan and Haddad 2011-
2012: 444). As Larson and Jenks observe, the concept of sovereignty is pervasive but a 
review of contemporary scholarship indicates strong repudiation of absolute sovereignty 
(1965:463-465, Nagan and Haddad: 2011-12, 500). This study proceeds on the same 
premise, but maintains that that while the Hobbesian sovereign as referenced in the study is 
not an absolute sovereign, its political and functional nature enables it to propagate state 
50 
 
centric definitions and interpretations of the law on the use of force, even within states that 
might be considered highly democratic, as will be illustrated in chapter four.   
Of more critical significance from the foregoing understanding of the Hobbesian sovereign 
is the question whether a determinate limitation on force used in riot control contexts is 
achievable and more specifically, whether there is a clear limitation on such force upon 
which a prosecution under article 7 of the ICC Statute can be established. A critical legal 
approach as highlighted above would argue that such a standard is unattainable because of 
the highly political and by necessary implication, indeterminate nature of this question. The 
result of such an approach would be a dismissal altogether of the basis upon which the 
research question is founded. As counter argued, this study proceeds on the premise that a 
minimal standard of determinacy can be achieved, through legitimate processes of 
definition and interpretation. The aim of the study however, is to demonstrate that this has 
not yet occurred for the purposes of establishing culpability under article 7 of the ICC 
statute for force used in law enforcement contexts such as riot control. While this study 
does not proceed to prescribe how such a process is feasible, it is necessary to briefly 
discuss its feasibility and to demonstrate more clearly the study’s point of departure from 
critical legal theory.   
 
 
 
6.7 The Hobbesian sovereign, indeterminacy and legitimacy 
  
The intricate nature of law’s connectivity to state power on the question of use of force in 
riot control contexts renders the question of definition and interpretation a highly political 
and complex one (Stahn 2010: 5,Wilmshurst 2004: 96). Like the crime of aggression under 
the ICC statute, it is too state centric, and indefinite (Paulus 2010, Creegan 2012: 65). 
These attributes in the case of the crime of aggression have led some scholars to argue that 
defining the crime should be postponed until more consensus has been built around the 
crime’s scope and nature (Paulus 2010), while others have argued that it should never have 
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been codified in the Rome Statute as it is a political crime which should be addressed with 
political sanctions rather than criminal ones (Creegan 2012: 65).  
While this concern may be easily accepted for the crime of aggression, the position is 
different for law enforcement in riot control contexts. This is because although using force 
to quell a riot might be about preserving the state, it is also a question that inherently 
requires determinations around harming rioters or protestors and implicates both political 
and human rights considerations which the ICC must prosecute. This requires a certain 
level of determinacy for what conduct in riot control is prohibited under the ICC statute.  
Legal positivist theorists recognise the futility of absolute certainty of legal texts although 
as indicated earlier, they do not go as far as critical legal theorists to dismiss law’s potential 
to communicate a shared understanding of words and offer a predictability of conduct for 
states (Fastenrath 1993: 310). This approach by critical legal theorists has been critiqued as 
failing to account for the importance that is attached to words in legislation or treaty 
making processes (Fastenrath 1993: 310). Treaties do not constitute the end process of 
legislation thereby requiring mere implementation. Rather, they require conveyance of 
meaning in a way that minimises the level of misunderstanding through habitually used, 
commonly expressed and agreed upon linguistic conventions, which includes the extensive 
use of soft law to supplement treaty definitions (Fastenrath 1993: 312). As such, even in 
complex situations like the use of force under international humanitarian law, states have 
agreed on certain means and methods of warfare that are prohibited on account of being 
inherently indiscriminate or causing superfluous injury and the violation of these standards 
has resulted in various criminal prosecutions by international criminal tribunals (see 
generally, Sassoli and Bouvier, et.al. 2011). 
Admittedly, some level of indeterminacy and open-endedness in legal text may be 
necessary for achieving flexibility in interpretation and absolute certainty may actually lead 
to absurdities. However, indeterminacy may in certain cases compromise legal legitimacy 
as indeterminate normative standards compromise the predictability of required conduct, 
which in turn makes it easy to justify non-compliance (Franck 1990: 53, 68, 72).  
Determinate rules are less amenable to permissive interpretations and justifications (1990: 
53).   
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The concept of legitimacy has a plurality of meanings which makes it hard to systematize 
and which it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore in-depth as has been done by other 
studies (Thomas 2013: 5, Wolfrum and  Roben 2008). It has however been commonly used 
under international law scholarship to denote moral, legal and social legitimacy (Thomas 
2013: 7). While moral legitimacy is concerned with how power is exercised and justified 
and has featured in debates around why international law is worthy of compliance (Thomas 
2013: 11), legal legitimacy is concerned with signifiers of obligations to submit to a rule or 
system (Thomas 2013: 7, Wolfrum 2008: 6). Social legitimacy on the other hand, treats 
legitimacy as a question of fact and is concerned with an actor’s belief that a rule or system 
is morally or legally legitimate (Thomas 2013: 14).   
 
 
6.8 Legal legitimacy 
 
As indicated in the foregoing sections, this study adopts an analytical approach to positive 
law and as such moral and social legitimacy are of limited significance. The inquiry on 
which the study embarks; of article 7’s ambiguity and article 22’ legality requirements 
among other sources of legal interpretation, is one grounded in the concept of legal 
legitimacy. Franck defines legitimacy as a standard by which a given community 
establishes or measures the capacity of a rule to obligate the members of that community 
(1990, 206).  In particular, legal legitimacy is a process through which communities build 
up shared understandings on the objective of a certain definition in law, and ensure that 
such definition meets the specified legality criteria which must be reinforced through a 
continuous legality process (Brunnee and Stephen 2012, 55). Legal legitimacy in 
international law proceeds from the premise of international law treaties which are 
developed on a consensual basis (Wolfrum 2008: 7). The legitimacy of a rule requires its 
clear communication of what conduct is permitted and what is prohibited in such a way that 
the outer boundaries of its specificity have been established in a manner that limits self-
serving exculpatory interpretations (Wolfrum 2008: 56-7). A rule’s perceived legitimacy is 
achieved if its contents have relative transparency and can be determined easily and with 
53 
 
more certitude (Wolfrum 2008: 64). Where the rule is regulating a complex area of the law 
its determinacy and legitimacy becomes more dependent on the relevant community’s 
understanding of its complex content and on the legitimacy of the process by which the rule 
is applied. Where such a rule has low textual determinacy it can be filled through a 
legitimate process of determinacy, which Franck refers to as ‘process determinacy’, 
generally perceived by relevant community members as operating within their approved 
methods of legitimisation (Franck 1990: 80, 85, 88).  
As discussed above, the main contention of this study is that such a process of consensus 
building and a creation of shared understandings around the criminal limitations of force 
used by state actors in riot control contexts has not yet been attained. Article 7 obscures the 
complexity of the legal and political considerations it implicates while article 22 which 
regulates its interpretation is narrow and offers no ‘process of determinacy’ on which the 
ICC might rely for an interpretation without criticism for exceeding its interpretative 
mandate. This renders the article ineffective in criminalizing force used in riot control 
contexts 
7. Conclusion 
 
The question of under investigation in this study, namely the legality or otherwise under the 
ICC Statute of force used as part of law enforcement during violent protests, is particularly 
crucial considering the prediction of new types and environments for  conflict which are 
wont to present new legal challenges. Hopgood (2013: 21) has warned of new challenges 
for the ICC and the broader human rights project with the decline of traditional wars and 
the rise of diverse forms of political and urban violence which will expose areas where 
human rights have had no impact. Given the apparent disparity of state approaches to 
internal security threats and the disparate legal standards for riot control, this warning, 
when contemplated in light of the ICC Statute’s strict legality standard and article 7’s 
inadequacy is rather sobering.  
 
A positivist approach of analysis which recognizes the state centric nature of the law on the 
use of force in riot control is most suitable to explore to the full extent, the nature of the 
complexities and contradictions arising from the legal vacuum created by article 7’s 
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definitional inadequacies. Such an approach which acknowledges the role of power, force 
and politics in shaping law and which traces a link of this power to the necessity of the 
state, offers an insight into the fundamental omission of article 7’s definition of crimes 
against humanity without clarifying what aspects of state responsibility and law 
enforcement it does or does not implicate. As already indicated above, a natural law theory 
is prescriptive and would be best suited to answer the question with considerations of 
justice and morality. However, it would obscure the questions about article 7’s applicability 
to riot control contexts and its practicality as a basis for a criminal prosecution of state 
officials’ conduct in riot control contexts. Dworkin’s third theory of law is too insular and 
grounded in judicial interpretive considerations, thereby obscuring the problem of tactical 
considerations by law enforcement officials in riot control contexts. It is also articulated as 
a rights thesis and is thus of limited import in an ICC context designed to determine and 
punish criminal conduct rather than distribute rights. The Critical legal theorists’ approach 
dismisses law’s potential to embody shared understanding about legitimate or illegitimate 
conduct which is counter to the premise upon which this study proceeds; that such a level 
of predictable conduct can be achieved by the law and this is what is lacking for the 
question of force used in riot control contexts.   
 
The study adopts Hobbes’ concept of sovereignty, also referred to herein as the Hobbesian 
sovereign, as an agent which embodies the complex interconnectedness of law, force, 
power and politics regarding the question of force used in riot control contexts. It represents 
the centrality of the fundamental question of the necessity of the state in the study and 
offers a framework which magnifies the significant nature of article 7’s definitional gap 
when applied to riot control contexts. While positivism does not pretend at an absolute 
determinacy, the argument is maintained in this chapter that through legitimate processes 
and consensus building, law can communicate minimum legal standards based on shared 
understandings of state parties to a given international treaty, of the extent of their liability 
or otherwise there under.    
 
The main argument is however, that the definition of crimes against humanity under article 
7 of the ICC statute is ineffective in riot control contexts as it implicates the powers of the 
state to use force as part of law enforcement in such contexts and yet offers no guidelines as 
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to the boundaries of liability for such use of force. Moreover, the interpretive sources that 
would aid in clarifying these boundaries offer no remedy as they exist in the prescriptive 
realms of human rights and humanitarian law which have no specific prohibitive standards 
on which to base a criminal prosecution under article 7. In overall conclusion, the 
application of article 7 to riot control contexts is premature for an area of law which 
implicates state responsibility and for which there currently exists no shared understanding 
under international law on what conduct under state law enforcement processes would 
amount to criminal liability under article 7. The aim of this thesis is quite modest: to 
illuminate the nature and extent of this problem. This is demonstrated in the subsequent 
chapters three and four of the study. The broader question of how to remedy the problem is 
left to future much more ambitious research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE HOBBESIAN SOVEREIGN, AMBIGUITY OF THE ICC STATUTE AND ITS 
INTERPRETIVE SOURCES OF LAW. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The central argument in this chapter is that the ICC Statute’s main sources of law, namely 
the ICC Statute, the Elements of Crimes, applicable treaties and customary law are 
ambiguous and as such, inadequate to provide a framework for the application of crimes 
against humanity to prosecute excessive force used in riot control contexts. I argue that an 
exercise in judicial interpretation for such contexts is highly susceptible to criticism for 
violating the principle of legality which limits judicial discretion to the very minimal as 
opposed to large scale innovations in law. The chapter argues that this would be the result 
from applying crimes against humanity to riot control contexts, particularly in riot 
situations bordering on armed conflict. This dilemma is aggravated further by the ICC 
Statute’s legality standard which requires a strict construction of crimes and prohibits 
criminalization of conduct by analogy. The result of this state of affairs is that on the 
question of excessive force used in riot control as a crime against humanity, ICC judges 
lack a clear basis on which to ground their decisions. This legal vacuum is rooted in the 
concept of the Hobbesian sovereign explained in the preceding chapter, through whom the 
circularity of the law regulating the use of force in riot control contexts is maintained. I also 
argue that state parties to the ICC Statute never gave significant consideration to the 
application of crimes against humanity to law enforcement scenarios. This among others is 
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reflected for instance, by the hybridization of human rights law and international 
humanitarian law frameworks without reflection, exacerbating legal uncertainly particularly 
for ‘in between scenarios’ that are not quite easily identifiable as armed conflicts but are 
not clear cut law enforcement scenarios either.  
The main aim of this chapter is to illustrate this argument through four steps. The first step 
will be to analyse the principle of legality as a methodology for interpretation under the 
ICC statute. It will include a brief examination and comparison of the application of 
legality standards by selected international criminal tribunals. This will be done in part two. 
Part three will address the second step, which is to examine the application of the ICC 
statute’s legality standard to the definition of crimes against humanity under the Statute. It 
will include a brief examination of the antecedents of the relationship between the principle 
of legality and crimes against humanity. It will also examine the role of the Hobbesian 
sovereign in the shaping of this relationship at the international level. The third step under 
part four is to examine the application of the ICC statute’s legality methodology of 
interpretation to its main and supplementary gap filling sources of law, namely; the ICC 
Statute itself, the Elements of Crimes and the applicable treaties and the rules and 
principles of international law, as they relate to the interpretation of force used in riot 
control contexts as crimes against humanity. This section, like the previous one will 
examine the role of the Hobbesian sovereign in perpetuating the circularity of these 
provisions on the central question of establishing boundaries for measuring proportionate 
and therefore lawful force. Part five will entail the conclusion and will maintain that the 
interpretive sources offer no adequate framework for a basis of prosecuting use of 
excessive force in riot control as crimes against humanity.  
 
2. The principle of legality and ambiguity under the ICC Statute 
 
The central question this thesis seeks to answer is largely one about definition and 
interpretation in law. This section will rely heavily on Grover’s study of the interpretive 
challenges facing the ICC and in particular, her study of the principle of legality under the 
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ICC Statute with the caution that her approached is being used purely for illustrative 
purposes.  
It has been pointed out by Grover (2014: 1) that: ‘Interpretation is central to the practice of 
law. Sometimes a legal victory or defeat turns on the meaning a judge attributes to a single 
word in a legal text’. Thus one of the fundamental difficulties a court is bound to face in the 
process of interpreting and applying the law is the ambiguity of the words used in legal 
instruments. These difficulties are particularly amplified for the International Criminal 
Court (ICC), whose decisions will be critical for measuring culpability for some of the most 
serious international crimes. This court’s findings could also influence transitional justice 
efforts in situation countries and may encourage or deter states’ participation in the court’s 
international criminal law project (Grover 2014: 1-2).  Grover identifies some sources of 
interpretive problems which she anticipates the ICC judges will be faced with including 
linguistic issues, methodology, inherent indeterminacy and inter-treaty relationships, 
among others (2014: 9). While previous international criminal tribunals have faced similar 
challenges with the interpretation of crimes, they have maneuvered them without 
consistency and clear methodology. Grover analyses these interpretation challenges in light 
of the objectives and framework of the ICC statute to propose a methodology which the 
ICC can apply in manoeuvring them, with minimal risks of exceeding its jurisdiction.  She 
identifies the principle of legality as the ICC statute’s primary principle of interpretation 
and reconciles it with its human rights imperative with a view to achieving logical 
progression and rigorous interpretation (2014: 31-2).  
Grover’s proposed methodology is of somewhat limited significance for universal 
application to riot control as an area whose boundaries of legality are largely indeterminate 
and at whose core lies the Hobbesian sovereign’s discretion on violence as a means of law 
enforcement. Moreover, the ICC statute itself does not outline an interpretation 
methodology for the Court and as such Grover’s methodology remains but a proposal 
whose adoption by the Court is yet to be seen.  
However, even with these limitations in mind, I recognise that Grover’s proposal is 
developed under a comprehensive and contemporary study of the ICC statute’s legality 
framework and to this end provides a fitting lens through which to analyse the Statute’s 
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effectiveness in criminalizing excessive force used during riot control contexts. These 
arguments are analysed further below.  
 
 
2.1 Antecedents of the principle of legality under international law    
 
The principle of legality is embodied by two key maxims: nullum crimen sine lege and 
nulla poena sine lege which can be translated to mean that no person may be prosecuted 
and punished for conduct that did not constitute an offence at the time of its commission, 
and no person shall be punished in a manner not prescribed by the law at the time of 
committing a given offence (Lamb 2002: 733, Sadat 2002: 180). According to Lamb, these 
maxims begun to emerge on the international scene through their application in post-World 
War II case law and are now undoubtedly part of customary international law (2002: 733-
4).  However, their operationalization was met with criticism for arbitrariness and illegality 
which later paved the way for their more strict articulation under the ICC statute, as 
illustrated below. 
2.1.1 The International Military Tribunal of 1945 
 
Prior to the Nuremberg trials or World War II atrocities, discussions around the meaning 
and content of the principle of legality were obscure (Bassiouni 1999: 125).  After World 
War II, the Allied powers sought to punish what they called the major criminals of 
atrocities committed by German military officers and members of the Nazi party and to this 
end, signed an agreement and Charter establishing an International Military Tribunal 
(IMT). To the same end, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo 
tribunal) was established for the prosecution of Japanese officials.  The IMT’s purpose was 
to investigate and prosecute crimes against the peace, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity (IMT Charter art. 6). A major objection to the violation of the principle of 
legality was argued for the defendants, in relation to the indictment and prosecution for 
aggressive war. It was argued that as no country had defined or criminalized aggressive war 
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or provided a penalty for it at the time the defendants allegedly committed it, and that the 
IMT’s prosecution of the accused for the crime of aggression violated the principle of 
legality. In rejecting this argument the IMT (France et. al v Goring et. al: 219) stated: 
 
In the first place, it is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a 
limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is 
unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked 
neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances 
the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to 
punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished. 
Occupying the positions they did in the Government of Germany, the defendants, or 
at least some of them must have known of the treaties signed by Germany, 
outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of international disputes; they must 
have known that they were acting in defiance of all inter- national law when in 
complete deliberation they carried out their designs of invasion and aggression. On 
this view of the case alone, it would appear that the maxim has no application to the 
present facts.  
 
According to Garibian, a reading of post-World War II scholars reveals conflicting views 
about how the International Military Tribunal (IMT) applied the principle of legality. One 
school maintains that the IMT proceeded rightly in as far as it was applying law which was 
already recognized in treaties prohibiting aggressive war. Another school, while 
acknowledging that there was a violation of legality nonetheless proceeds to justify the 
IMT’s transgression on the basis that the tribunal was operating under natural law 
principles which are superior to positive law requirements. A divergent view maintains that 
the IMT proceeded unlawfully and in fact was acting politically and not within the law and 
yet another group contends that the principle of legality is a national law and not 
international law principle (Garibian 2007: 94-97). These arguments were not addressed 
comprehensively within the IMT trials but were eclipsed by a need to avoid the law versus 
morality debate, hence the adoption of more generalized approach using the principle of 
justice. This way, disregard for the principle of legality was justified on the basis that it was 
superseded by a higher principle of justice, namely the need to punish immoral conduct 
perpetrated by the defendants during the World War (Garibian 2007: 99-100). Bassiouni 
undertakes an extensive consideration of the merits and demerits of the IMT’s application 
of legality (1999: 123-173) which it is not the aim of this chapter or of this study to rehash. 
His views however, indicate the controversial nature of the legality question surrounding 
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the IMT decisions. While on the one hand he points out that the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
judges relied on their own sense of justice and an unarticulated higher law, which opened 
up their decisions to criticism for being arbitrary (1999: 146), he subsequently agrees that 
the conduct described in the IMT and Tokyo Charters was evidently mala in se and was 
already criminal in the major world legal systems. As such, he argues, the principle of 
legality could not be said to have been violated in respect of offenders who knew or ought 
to have known that their conduct violated international criminal law had it not been for the 
fact that their national law had purportedly legalized such conduct (1999: 162-3).  
The foregoing controversies raised significant questions for the meaning of the principle of 
legality under international law and paved the way for subsequent developments which 
adopted a more specific articulation of the principle. Under international treaty law the 
principle manifests in various forms under Article 11 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR), Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), Article 29 The Third Geneva Convection of August 12, 1949, among 
others    (Bassiouni 1999:168, Sadat 2002: 180). It is however noteworthy, that as 
international criminal law was still in its embryonic stages during and after the IMT trials, 
the application of the principle of legality remained controversial under international 
criminal tribunals as explored below.  
 
2.1.2 The Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals (Rwanda and Yugoslavia)  
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been a site for controversy 
surrounding the application of the principle of legality.  Both the ICTY and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) operated in an era of underdeveloped 
international criminal law and were left to craft their own methods of interpretation in order 
to execute their mandates. Neither tribunal’s interpretive approaches generated a systematic 
hermeneutic but rather both tribunals relied on random rules of interpretation including the 
literal rule, the purposive rule, logic, contextual interpretation, effective interpretation, 
drafters’ intent, progressive interpretation, fairness to the accused and consistency with 
62 
 
customary law (Grover 2014, 63). This lack of methodology is not surprising considering 
that neither the ICTY nor the ICTR Statute contains a specific legality provision. The 
closest both statutes come to embedding legality is through a mention of the presumption of 
innocence as a right of the accused under Article 21(3) for the ICTY Statute and Article 20 
(3) for the ICTR.  It appears that the approach to legality taken by the ICTY in particular 
was the same as that adopted by the IMT, namely, the argument that the tribunal was 
prosecuting conduct which was already recognized as criminal under customary 
international law and that the accused persons were already aware of the illegality of their 
conduct at the time of its execution. This approach was made clear upon the establishment 
of the ICTY in statement by the United Nations Secretary-General at the time, (Report of 
the Secretary General (1993) S/25704: Para 34) who maintained that: 
 
The application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege requires that the 
international tribunal should apply rules of international humanitarian law which are 
beyond any doubt, part of customary law.  
 
The foregoing stance manifested in the ICTY’s decision in Prosecutor v Tadic  regarding 
the question whether individual criminal liability could be imposed under the ICTY statute 
for violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions when no such liability had 
been prescribed in the said Conventions. Reminiscent of the IMT’s argument against strict 
legality in post-World War II cases, the Trial Chamber held that as common article 3 
provisions were undoubtedly part of customary international law their penalization under 
the ICTY statute did not violate the principle of legality (1995, ICTY-94-1: Para 72). This 
stand was upheld on appeal where the Appeals Chamber referenced the IMT tribunal’s 
arguments to maintain that the intention to penalize violations of common article 3 was 
evident in state practice and a penalization under the ICTY statute was well in line with the 
nullum crimen principle (Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1995, ICTY, IT-94-1-AR72: Para 128-137).  
A similarly liberal approach was adopted by the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Akayesu which 
conflated the provisions of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions as part of the 
‘serious violations’ of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, thereby elevating 
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them to customary law status and justifying their operation within the principle of legality 
(1998, ICTR-94-4-T: Paras 616-617).  
While the liberal approach to legality by the ad hoc criminal tribunals has been heavily 
grounded in justifications of already existing customary law, the difficulty remains that it 
sits uncomfortably with the nullum crimen principle which is based on legal certainty. It is 
no wonder therefore that some scholars have argued that the definition of crimes by the ad 
hoc tribunals was somewhat emotive and had a de lege ferenda quality (Lamb 2002: 745).  
It is apparent that with the foregoing controversy over the application of the legality 
principle by the ad hoc criminal tribunals, the drafters of the ICC Statute for a permanent 
international criminal court were insistent upon specifying the scope of the principle. 
However, as has been observed above, while the ICC statute was keen on specificity, the 
more complex considerations of how the highly restrictive legality principle was to be 
effectively applied to a still nascent and highly hybridized international criminal law regime 
were left unarticulated. This omission still fosters controversy over how the principle of 
legality will operate under the ICC statute.  
While several scholars have considered the principle of legality under the ICC statute 
(Lamb 2002:742-154, Sadat 2002: 180-187, Bassiouni 1999: 174), not many have 
comprehensively considered its methodological operationalization within the framework of 
the ICC as a permanent international criminal court. As indicated above, Grover (2014) has 
undertaken such an enterprise and even proposed a method for the ICC to apply in order to 
achieve consistency and systematization in interpretation. While this study relies on 
Grover’s methodological proposal for analysing the principle of legality and its application 
to riot control contexts within the ICC statute, it does not purport to be a comprehensive 
review of it. As stated above, the reliance here on Grover’s method is purely for illustrative 
purposes wherein it will serve as a tool for illuminating the nature of contradictions and 
complexities that may arise from the application of the ICC statute legality standard to the 
Statute’s sources of law and their subsequent application to riot control contexts. Grover’s 
proposed method and application to this study are explained further in the ensuing section.  
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2.2 Exploring a methodological approach to the principle of legality under the ICC 
Statute 
 
Grover proposes a methodological approach to ICC’s legality framework which is 
grounded in key interests namely: the separation of powers and rule of law interests. While 
recognizing that absolute legal certainty is an illusion, she proposes some guidelines which 
are aimed at minimizing criticism for arbitrariness in the ICC’s decision making process 
while avoiding the restrictions of the Statute’s rigid legality principle. In so doing, Grover 
offers some broad parameters within which judicial interpretation ought to occur while 
protecting legality’s interests. These include prohibitions against large scale innovation and 
avoiding public policy controversies. She however, does not offer further delineations for 
what these proscriptions mean or in what circumstances of legal interpretation they might 
occur. This minimizes the usability of her proposed methodology in riot control contexts 
where the Hobbesian sovereign’s discretion dissolves the boundaries of law in the 
application of force. Without further delineating parameters for her guidelines Grover’s 
proposed methodology remains of limited use in circumventing the ICC’s strict legality 
requirement in riot control contexts.  
2.2.1 Antecedents of legality under the ICC Statute 
 
The lack of consistency in the application of the principle of legality under the IMT and ad 
hoc tribunals’ regimes created a backlash against a liberal interpretation of the principle 
resulting into a highly codified outcome for the ICC statute in order to limit judicial 
creativity (Grover 2014: 13, 106, Lamb 2002: 742-6).  The more general description of the 
nullum crimen principle prevalent at the international level before the era of the ICC statute 
was less strict than the version applied at the domestic level and as such, custom as a source 
of international criminal law, albeit unwritten, was still found to be in line with the nullum 
crimen principle as evidenced by the foregoing practice of the IMT, ICTY and ICTR. 
Grover asserts however that these liberal approaches are not fitting to the ICC statute 
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framework whose approach to the principle of legality is much closer to the strict stance 
taken under domestic law than any other international criminal statute (2014: 135).  So 
critical was the definition of this principle to the ICC state parties that it was discussed 
early in the statute’s preparatory process between 1996 and1998. The principle was cited as 
a vehicle through which the International Law Commission (ILC) could drive the 
international criminal law codification process (Lamb 2002: 746).  In the initial draft of the 
ICC statute the ILC articulated the principle of legality in terms as a prohibition against 
conviction for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity if conduct that is the 
subject of prosecution was not a ‘crime under international law’ at the time of its 
commission (UN GAOR, A/49/10 (1994): art 39). However the subsequent Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of the ICC immediately pointed out that the principle of 
legality for purposes of the ICC statute needed to be defined specifically and a mere 
enumeration of crimes would not suffice (UN GAOR, A/50/22(1995) : paras 52, 57).  
According to Lamb, a major concern of the state delegates was that international law did 
not set out the elements of crimes with sufficient precision. As a result of the foregoing 
antecedents, the drafters of the ICC Statute desired a statute whose subject matter 
jurisdiction had been defined exhaustively within its constitutive instrument (2002: 750-1).  
I argue here that the concerns of the Hobbesian sovereign in this international criminal law 
making process played a major role in the approach to legality which was ultimately 
adopted under the ICC statute framework. Even though civil society groups were part of the 
discussions in the ICC statute’s drafting process and may have influenced the language that 
was finally adopted, it was also quite apparent that governments were conscious that they 
were designing a permanent institution which would have the potential to indict their own 
highest ranking officials. As such, they were keen to ensure that its jurisdictional powers 
were clearly demarcated (Lamb 2002: 751). To this end, they were guided by the principle 
of specificity and attempted to define all the cases which might possibly come under the 
ICC’s jurisdiction as lex scripta. The state parties’ ultimate goal was to exhaustively list all 
the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction so that they and their agents might know well in 
advance what the outer reaches of prohibited conduct were as well as their obligations 
under the statute (Grover 2014:106, 196).  
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2.2.2 ICC’s strict legality and the illusion of legal certainty  
 
The foregoing concerns yielded the strict legality principle under article 22 of the ICC 
statute which provides as follows: 
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the 
conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. 
2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by 
analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the 
person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted. 
3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under 
international law independently of this Statute.  
 
Articles 22(1) and (2) will be the main focus of this chapter and indeed for the subsequent 
chapter of this study as they relate to the interpretation and application of crimes within the 
framework of the ICC statute including crimes against humanity.    
For all the ICC Statute drafters’ desire to achieve specificity, Grover has warned that words 
as mediums of ideas are ‘intrinsically imprecise’ and that as such, even written laws cannot 
escape interpretive problems arising out of linguistic ambiguities (2014: 14). She warns 
against employing the illusion of legal certainty in critiquing judges for judicial law making 
(2014: 34).  Indeed some scholars have taken an especially damning stance to the strict 
legality version adopted by the ICC drafters, stating that it was ill suited for the 
particularities of international law which was largely founded in unwritten customary law. 
Further that the strict version had frozen customary law definitions and that the drafters had 
shown a deep mistrust of the judges in so enacting. Further criticism argues that in fact, 
such strict limitation on the ICC’s ability to suppress ‘future malevolent inventions’ is the 
Statute’s biggest weakness (Pellet 2002: 1056-59).   
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In seeking to circumvent the foregoing paradox of specificity amidst ambiguity, Grover 
(2014) has crafted an application of the ICC’s strict legality principle in a manner which 
she hopes can ensure the Court’s effectiveness in interpreting and applying the statute to 
complex conduct without falling into previous criticisms of judicial law making as were 
leveled against the IMT and ad hoc tribunal criminal tribunals.  I will argue however, that 
without sufficient pre-existing legal boundaries for use of force in riot control contexts, and 
without articulating certain highly evaluative edicts in her proposal, Grover’s methodology 
is of limited import for circumventing the strict legality principle and for application to riot 
control contexts. 
2.2.3 Grover’s ICC legality methodology 
 
Grover identifies legality as the primary principle of interpretation under the ICC Statute 
and recognizes the challenges of observing it while relying on international human rights 
and humanitarian laws as sources of interpretation. With these challenges in mind, her 
approach to legality is one that focuses on the essential interests which the principle of 
legality seeks to protect and the threats which might compromise its primacy (2014: 31). 
She identifies four interests protected by the principle of legality, to wit: Fair notice, the 
rule of law, separation of powers and prior law as the basis for punishment (2014: 134-
151). This section will address the first three interests with the considered view that the 
fourth interest on punishment as a basis for prior law is essentially similar to the fair notice 
interest. Grover uses the lens of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, being 
a principle frame work for judicial interpretation of treaties under international law, to 
generate what she refers to as ‘mandatory guidelines’ for interpreting article 6, 7 and 8 of 
the ICC statute (2014: 216-219). She notes that articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention are 
a reminder of the need for an interpretive guideline which balances open-endedness and 
flexibility on the one hand and strict interpretation on the other in order to avoid rigidity in 
the face of unforeseen developments in international law (2014: 188).  
As stated above, Grover’s guidelines still rest on subjective indicators which in the face of 
law’s ambiguity for riot control contexts, do not offer significant direction for effective 
interpretation.  The argument is repeated here that for the particular case of crimes against 
humanity in riot control contexts, without additional guidelines from the ICC statute’s state 
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parties themselves, an exercise in interpretation will remain largely indefensible against 
criticism for judicial law making and breach of legality.   
The requirement of fair notice under the principle legality means that the law must be 
knowable to those expected to abide by it.  However, Grover observes the futility of a 
‘knowable law’ where such law resides in unwritten customary law or scattered 
jurisprudence. She concludes that in light of the counter principle that ignorance of the law 
is no defense, fair warning on its own is unconvincing as a rationale for legality (2014: 
137). On this basis she links fair notice to the more significant interests, namely the rule of 
law and separation of powers.   Grover states that the rule of law interest is justified on the 
basis of the need to prevent arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion and on the need to 
ensure a court’s legitimacy.  She however, again cautions against the illusion of absolute 
legal certainty, noting that adherence to a rule of law is a matter of degree as no legal 
system can have fixed and clear mechanical rules. She adds that the main goal under the 
rule of law interest is to minimize arbitrariness and maximize certainty and that the key 
hereunder is to limit judicial discretion to the ‘penumbral zone’ or interstitial area’ is such a 
way that the law is certain in majority of the cases (2014: 142, 151). However, she offers no 
further engagement on the boundaries of this ‘penumbral zone’ or interstitial area’ or 
indeed what such a zone or area might look like in relation to a specific legal issue, 
rendering her guidelines limited by subjectivity.  
The further foundation Grover highlights is the interest of separation of powers. Grover 
views this interest as aimed at a restriction against ‘large scale innovation’ during legal 
interpretation so as to avoid ‘controversial public policy debates’. Further that it is meant to 
ensure respect for ‘considered legislative inaction’, which might otherwise give way to 
criticism for usurping the state parties’ intentions (2014: 148, 151). Yet again, Grover 
offers no further guidelines as to the nature of interpretation which might equate to ‘large 
scale innovation’ or what would be ‘controversial public policy debate’ in a specific legal 
issue. The same criticism made for the subjectivity of the rule of law interest lies therefore 
for the separation of powers interest.  
Having identified the key legality interests, Grover proceeds to suggest more specific 
mandatory legality guidelines which it is argued, offer a limited basis to gauge and apply 
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the ICC Statute’s legality standard as they too still operate within a framework of high 
subjectivity.  
 
2.2.4 Grover’s mandatory legality guidelines 
 
Grover’s mandatory guidelines are divided into what she identifies as the three main 
interpretive devises embedded in Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute, namely: The requirement 
of strict construction, the prohibition of analogy and interpretation in favour of accused 
person in case of doubt. This section will only consider the first two devises as they are the 
ones at the center of the question under study, namely, how to establish the boundaries of 
interpretation for crimes against humanity in riot control contexts. Interpreted in light of the 
Vienna Convention as referenced above, Grover argues that the devices form part of the 
similar imperative under article 31(1) of that Convention which requires the interpretation 
of treaties in good faith (2014: 400).   
Under the strict construction requirement, ten guidelines are stipulated, while under the 
prohibition of analogous reasoning, four guidelines are listed. In total fourteen of the 
relevant guidelines are extracted and summarized as follows: 
 The requirement of strict construction does not bar court from interpreting and 
clarifying elements of a particular crime. 
 Judges have been granted some law making power but which is limited to the most 
interstitial and minimal developments, with incremental and moderate 
interpretations being preferred to expansive interpretations and creation of new 
crimes. 
 The requirement of effective interpretation based on the object and purpose of a 
treaty as stipulated under the Vienna Convention article 31(1) is applicable only for 
the mischief of a specific criminal prohibition and not to the whole Rome Statute 
regime. 
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 Where an interpretation yields more than one outcome, the most modest as opposed 
to expansive outcome is favoured. 
 The interpretive outcome should be one that a reasonable law abiding citizen could 
have been expected to have been aware of when reading the relevant provisions of 
the Rome Statute 
 Interpretive outcomes that enhance certainty should be favored over those that do 
not resolve ambiguity within the law, or exploit it, or multiply the possible 
circumstances of its application 
  Reasoning should be guided by principles and not facts 
 Open textured language rebuts the strict construction imperative  
 Interpreting open textured provisions should where possible be accompanied by 
illustrative examples of prohibited or lawful conduct for future reference to enhance 
legal certainty 
 Strict construction requires liberal interpretation for exculpatory grounds 
 Analogous interpretation that leads to substantively new crimes is prohibited 
 Logical reasoning by analogy to facts of a previous case which is geared towards 
bringing the facts of a case within the treaty is permitted 
 Reliance on previous decisions of the court is not prohibited 
 Contextual reasoning based on the Statute, Elements of Crimes, or resort to 
applicable law for gap filling is permitted. 
 
2.2.5 Critiquing Grover’s mandatory guidelines 
 
As stated above, it is not the aim of this study to undertake a comprehensive appraisal of 
Grover’s proposed legality methodology.  To this end, only a modest critique of some of 
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the foregoing guidelines deemed most critical for the study is undertaken, with the view to 
teasing out the ambiguity issues which still persist within them.  As already argued above, 
Grover’s guidelines are based on interests whose parameters are undefined. This limitation 
is not cured by her mandatory guidelines. To some extent, the guidelines offer straight 
forward indicators for instance, that the use of open textured language rebuts the strict 
construction principle. Thus the inclusion of ‘other inhumane acts of a similar character’ in 
determining crimes against humanity under article 7 of the ICC statute is an indicator of a 
relaxed legality requirement.   Further direction is given with the requirement that decisions 
are to be made based on principles and not facts, that the object and purpose interests in 
interpretation should not be interpreted in light of the entire statute but rather in light of a 
narrower and specific prohibition, and that illustrative examples should be given in the 
interpretation of open textured provisions.  
However, the other guidelines offer an illusion of objectivity which on closer analysis fades 
back into the same subjectivity observed in the legality interests listed above. The 
guidelines for instance, provide no indicators for what would be beyond what Grover calls  
‘interstitial’ or ‘minimal’ law making power which has been granted to judges or what 
would be a ‘modest’ or ‘expansive’ interpretation venture. In making reference to a 
‘reasonable law abiding individual ’, her guidelines retain the presumption that the law is 
always knowable. This is especially critical for riot control contexts where, as will be 
argued, the Hobbesian Sovereign’s discretion maintains the boundaries of ‘lawful violence’ 
in circularity.  Regarding analogy, the guidelines do not engage further on when analogy 
might lead to ‘substantively new crimes’. This omission is especially problematic because 
interpretation by analogy is so close to making new law it often raises legality controversies 
(Lamb 2002: 753) and as such warranted further explanation.   In overall analysis, Grover’s  
guidelines still exist within the framework of the rule of law and separation of powers 
considerations above, whose content she does not adequately articulate and which, on 
application to the highly ambiguous framework of riot control, are of limited significance to 
ensure legality.  
While Grover’s intentions are that her proposed legality methodology guide judicial 
interpretation and shield the process from unfounded scrutiny for arbitrariness, she does 
acknowledge the highly ambiguous framework of crimes in the ICC statute (2014: 32) and 
even observes that in some cases, state parties retain vagueness and ambiguity within a 
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treaty provision deliberately in order to justify their actions on the argument that the 
provision in question supports their preferred interpretation (2014: 148).   
Noting the complexity of the ICC ambiguity and legality problem, Grover herself proposes 
that the ICC ‘s legislative body, namely the Assembly of State Parties (ASP), adopt a non-
binding list of conduct that does or does not meet certain elements of crimes proscribed by 
the statute (2014: 148). She recognizes that for the hard cases, the determination of 
boundaries of legality would have to turn back to the state parties themselves. As I argue 
above, and as will be argued further below, this may be the ultimate solution to the ICC 
legality dilemma as far as the question of force used during riot control is concerned. As 
this is an area of law in which the Hobbesian sovereign has retained discretion and 
monopoly, it would follow that a marking of criminal boundaries for force used in such 
contexts reverts back to that sovereign.   
In the absence of such legality indicators from the Hobbesian sovereign, even with the 
progressive legality framework Grover proposes, interpretation challenges under article 7 
of the ICC statute will persist on the critical question of when force used in riot control 
contexts amounts to a crime against humanity. As testament to this observation, the ensuing 
analysis of the ICC statute, Elements of Crimes and other sources of law indicates a 
pervasive legislative inaction and the ICC’s avoidance and conflation of legal boundaries 
on the question of force used in riot control contexts where the issue has come before it.   
3. The principle of legality and crimes against humanity under the ICC statute 
 
A brief review of the historical development of crimes against humanity demonstrates that 
under international law it is quite evident state actors never extended these crimes to law 
enforcement contexts. The development of these crimes was always linked to armed 
conflict contexts and was defined in a framework of victors’ justice. This meant that state 
actors never anticipated their application to their own internal conduct and this has kept 
matters of state use of force in riot control situations, outside the realm of crimes against 
humanity. Even where under the ICC Statute it was made clear that crimes against 
humanity apply in both armed conflict and situations of peace, I argue that the retention in 
that statute of references to an ‘attack against a civilian population’ is highly indicative of a 
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crimes against humanity framework which is yet to fully evolve from being associated with 
armed conflict scenarios, to a regime that can be effectively applied in law enforcement 
contexts. I further argue that this association with armed conflict contexts is maintained as a 
legal crutch in hard cases where riot control borders on armed conflict and is indicative of 
the undeveloped crimes against humanity framework in riot control contexts. These 
contexts have over the years been shielded from international scrutiny in the interest of the 
Hobbesian sovereign who is also a major actor under international law. It is indeed curious 
to note that while state parties to the ICC Statute were so particular in listing exhaustively 
conduct which would amount to crimes against humanity under article 7 and under the 
Elements of Crimes, there was legislative inaction in delineating the complexities of crimes 
against humanity of murder in relation to killings which are part of law enforcement in riot 
control contexts. In light of Grover’s own suspicions above, one might justifiably speculate 
that legislative inaction over such a complexity during the ICC statute drafting process was 
deliberate to perpetuate ambiguity in state parties’ interest. In the alternative, one might 
wonder whether it was genuinely never anticipated that the crimes against humanity regime 
would extend to law enforcement contexts away from the contexts within which theywere 
developed, or whether there was still some unconscious presumption that crimes against 
humanity would always occur in situations where they could be associated with armed 
conflict situations, even though there was no longer a legal requirement for a war nexus.  
Whichever speculation one might make, what remains clear is that the failure to delineate 
crimes against humanity in riot control contexts presents a challenge for complying with 
the legality requirement under the ICC statute. The inadequacy of the Statute and Elements 
of Crimes in this respect have led the Court to conflate armed conflict and riot control 
parameters, which avoids clarity of definition for critical concepts under article 7 such as an 
‘attack’, ‘civilian population’, ‘murder’ and ‘other inhumane acts’ in riot control contexts. 
This conflation of concepts and boundaries between armed conflict and law enforcement is 
especially detrimental for legality as it misses the critical difference between the types of 
protection afforded to civilians in armed conflict versus that accorded to rioters in law 
enforcement contexts which, conversely, yields a difference between liability for force used 
against civilians in armed conflict situations and force used against rioters in law 
enforcement contexts.   While the principle of distinction under international humanitarian 
law (IHL) offers an albeit imperfect legal boundary for establishing liability in armed 
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conflict for an “attack against a civilian population”, such a boundary does not exist for riot 
control in law enforcement contexts. This presents a complex challenge for ICC legality as 
further developed below.  
 
3.1 Crimes against humanity: antecedents of armed conflict and theoretical 
inadequacies  
  
Bassiouni traces the origin of the term ‘crimes against humanity’ to a 1915 joint declaration 
that was issued by the then governments of France, Great Britain and Russia as allied forces 
in World War I, denouncing the Ottoman government’s massacre of the Armenian 
population in Turkey as tantamount to ‘crimes against civilization and humanity’ (1999: 
62). The term was used again in the 1919 Report of the Commission on the Responsibilities 
of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and 
Customs of War (1919 Commission Report) but was excluded from the Treaty of Versailles 
(1919) which restricted its jurisdiction to prosecuting war crimes perpetrated by the 
German military personnel during World War I. The exclusion of the term followed an 
objection by the United States that unlike war crimes, the juridical content of ‘laws against 
humanity’ could not be defined and varied with each individual state (1919 Commission 
Report para 63-4, Bassiouni 1999: 63-5). Despite its exclusion from the legal text, the 
phrase was used continuously by the 1919 World War I Commission but there was 
persistent timidity by some governments over its use, which in turn weakened the 
normative legal development of the crimes (Bassiouni 1999: 63-7). This divergence of 
attitudes towards crimes against humanity saw its way into the post-World War II legality 
controversies as has been detailed above. What is apparent in tracing their history is that 
including the post-world war II Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and later to the ad hoc 
ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, tribunals, the development and prosecution of crimes against 
humanity under treaty law has occurred in connection with armed conflict contexts as 
opposed to situations of law enforcement during peacetime. By his observation, Robertson 
(2012), points out that although Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter criminalized crimes 
75 
 
against humanity perpetrated before or during the war, it still required that the acts be 
committed in connection with “any crime within the jurisdiction of the court” and that this 
suggested albeit ambiguously, that such crimes had to be connected to war crimes and the 
crime of aggression, which occurred within an armed conflict context. Subsequent 
developments in the ICTY and ICTR statutes followed similar patterns. The ICTY statute 
specified jurisdictional authority for crimes against humanity when “committed in armed 
conflicts whether international or internal” (ICTY Statute, article 5). Bassiouni speculates 
that maintaining the war nexus under the ICTY framework was aimed at avoiding the post-
World War II challenges to legality explored above, which plagued the Nuremberg 
Tribunal in the prosecution of crimes against humanity (1999: 195). On the other hand, he 
notes that the ICTR broke the war nexus by merely defining crimes against humanity as a 
“widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population” (ICTR Statute, article 3, 
Bassiouni 1999: 195). The same has been said of the ICC Statute’s article 7 definition 
whose threshold requirements similar to those of the ICTR, make no mention of armed 
conflict (Ambos and Wirth 2002: 22, Sadat 2002:154).   
Bassiouni further speculates that the exclusion of the “armed conflict” nexus under the 
ICTR Statute was due to the unwillingness of the Security Council to define the conflict in 
Rwanda as a non-international armed conflict as this fact would have been difficult to 
establish and would have required an assessment of the extent and nature of involvement of 
France, a member of the said Security Council, in that conflict (1999:196).  It is argued 
however, as has been argued elsewhere (Ambos and Wirth 2002: 22, Sadat 2002:154), that 
the reference to civilian population under the ICTR statute betrays a continuing armed 
conflict nexus even though the relevant treaty provision itself makes no express mention of 
an armed conflict. The same argument can be made with respect to the ICC statute’s 
provision as will be developed further below. It is thus submitted that a consideration of the 
ICTR jurisprudence in Prosecutor vs Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T, 1998: para 582) reveals an 
understanding that the application of article 3 crimes against humanity were occurring in an 
armed conflict context as can be seen from the tribunal’s application of an IHL definition of 
a civilian population in the following terms: 
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The Chamber considers that an act must be directed against the civilian 
population if it is to constitute a crime against humanity. Members of the civilian 
population are people who are not taking any active part in the hostilities, including 
members of the armed forces who laid down their arms and those persons placed 
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause.  
 
The foregoing description of civilians is further reinforced by that tribunal’s conviction of 
the accused for crimes against humanity of murder, having ordered the killing of 
individuals who were taking ‘no active part in hostilities’ (Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T, 1998: 
paras 649 -656 emphasis added). The said hostilities were evidently the armed conflict 
between the then government forces of Rwanda, The Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) 
and the armed opposition forces dubbed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as recognized 
by the ICTR (Akayesu ICTR-96-4-T, 1998: paras 621, 627).   
The foregoing briefly illustrates the novelty of the application of crimes against humanity 
independent of armed conflict parameters and more specifically, in contexts exclusively 
concerned with questions of law enforcement. I argue that this lack of independent 
discourse outside armed conflict contexts has greatly hindered the development of a 
normative framework for crimes against humanity in their own right (Ambos 2011: 
287,288). I suggest that this inadequacy informs to an extent, the challenges in extending 
the definition of these crimes to riot control contexts whilst avoiding implications for ‘large 
scale innovation’ enunciated under Grover’s legality methodology above. This concern 
moreover, is exacerbated when it is appreciated that the theoretical foundations of crimes 
against humanity as a concept are equally nebulous as briefly demonstrated below.  
 
3.1.2 The theoretical ambiguity of ‘crimes against humanity’ 
 
While this study is not an interrogation into the philosophical foundations of crimes against 
humanity, it is submitted that a brief appreciation of the theoretical problems underpinning 
the nature of the crime is warranted. Engaging with this question is necessary for an 
understanding of the nature of the ambiguity challenge plaguing crimes against humanity, 
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particularly with questions around measuring force and identifying the levels of force 
necessary to establish culpability under the ICC statute framework without negating the 
necessities of lawful state coercion by the Hobbesian sovereign.   
According to Macleod, there is no final philosophical account on crimes against humanity 
(Macleod 2010: 282). The problem arises when trying to establish the meaning of 
‘humanity’ and appealing to this ‘humanity’ (2010: 281). He concludes that no arguments 
about ‘human nature’ can provide philosophical meaning for the crime and instead calls for 
further research to build ‘a philosophical account of crimes against humanity’ (Macleod 
2010: 302). Arguably similar observations partly inform the call for a specialized 
convention defining crimes against humanity (Bassiouni 1999: 199). Yovel (2006) points 
out that arguments by some scholars towards an “essential humanness” as the basis for a 
theory of crimes against humanity were stuck in a metaphysical conundrum (2006: 53-55). 
The dilemma is also recognized by Luban (2004: 127) who observes that the lack of a 
single technical coordinated definition and philosophy for crimes against humanity is one 
of the crimes’ major definitional challenges. Vernon (2002: 243 -5) theorizes that crimes 
against humanity are about the rule of law, authority, the monopoly of force, and the 
inversion of the power accruing from it.  However, he also fails to offer a more specific 
theory which can distinguish crimes against humanity from any other theory of human 
rights violations.  
I argue that the lack of a single theory of crimes against humanity displayed above means 
that crimes against humanity depend highly for their clarity on specific statutory definition 
and the lack of such clarity opens them up for controversies under the principle of legality 
amplified by a wide range of conflicting definitions.  Historically, rebuttals to criticism for 
the violation of legality have been grounded in politics rather than law as enumerated 
below.   
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3.1.3 Crimes against humanity as victor’s justice 
  
The development of crimes against humanity was historically grounded in the context of 
victors’ justice. While the Nuremberg tribunal was able to offer a response and manoeuvre 
the legality challenges levelled against it by subsuming the principle of legality under the 
principle of justice, such justice has variously been critiqued as ‘victors’ justice’.  The 
criticism goes that the victorious allied powers flouted the rule of law and enunciated 
crimes against humanity under the philosophy of ‘might is right’, thereby creating new law 
based on the power which they derived from their victory of the second world war 
(Bassiouni 1999: 114, Robinson 1999: 43).   Indeed, Garibian argues that the real problem 
for the allied forces at Nuremberg was not legality per se, but the implications that applying 
crimes against humanity outside armed conflict might have for the principle of sovereignty 
(2007: 9, 101). He makes the following argument (2007: 101):  
 
Thus the doctrinal analysis that seeks to show that the problem of the legality of the 
Nuremberg Charter is a false problem also enables us to bring out the most 
important constraint put on the Tribunal: respect for the “sacrosanct” principle of 
state sovereignty, which implies non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
states. While such interference was deemed acceptable in the case of war crimes, it 
was still, in 1945, a source of embarrassment and uneasiness when the issue was 
interference for the purpose of repressing crimes committed in peacetime, such as 
the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Nazis before 1939. Nuremberg left 
the question of crimes against humanity in the strict sense “unresolved”; the 
Tribunal consistently linked such crimes to war crimes. In Elizabeth Zoller’s 
estimation, there is a simple explanation for this: the concept of a crime against 
humanity and the juridical regime that follows from it ‘virtually abolish the 
international legal order and the sovereignty that founds it.  
 
Basing on Garibian’s argument, I argue that in the interest of sovereignty, the allied powers 
adopted an approach to legality as a principle of justice because it was their justice that was 
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being applied against the losing powers, over conduct which occurred in an armed conflict 
that they had won. Applying the same principle of justice to Germany’s internal affairs 
would not have been based on the same moral authority that they derived from winning the 
war. Without the war nexus they would have implicated their own sovereignty over their 
internal law enforcement affairs.  It is quite apparent in this context, how the need to 
preserve the Hobbesian sovereign’s monopoly over internal affairs influences that 
sovereign’s actions at the international level.  
It has been argued that in contrast to the Nuremberg process, article 7 of the ICC statute 
proscribing crimes against humanity was not imposed by some sovereigns over others, but 
rather emerged after negotiations between over 160 sovereign states and is on this basis a 
firm foundation for the future prosecution of crimes against humanity (Robinson 1999: 43, 
57). I argue however, that while no allied powers had political control over the 
development of crimes against humanity in the ICC context, the principle of sovereignty 
which historically influenced the underdevelopment of crimes against humanity in internal 
law enforcement contexts is the same principle which delivered them in their current form 
under the ICC statute, where they are still without an independent grounding theory and are 
still heavily reliant on the crutch of armed conflict for definition.  
The inadequacy of crimes against humanity is brought to the fore in complex law 
enforcement situations of riot control. The underdevelopment of the crimes has sustained 
unclear parameters for international criminal responsibility in these contexts and has 
prevented the effective limitation of the Hobbesian sovereign’s discretion under article 7 of 
the ICC Statute. In these contexts, I argue that the definitions of the crime against humanity 
of murder and of other inhumane acts under the ICC statute and Elements of Crimes cannot 
satisfy the Statute’s strict legality standards. It is no wonder therefore that for the few 
situations which have come before the Court where crimes against humanity have been 
alleged in law enforcement scenarios, the ICC appears to have avoided a comprehensive 
analysis to distinguish between law enforcement and armed conflict contexts or as indicated 
above, has conflated the two concepts and collapsed law enforcement analyses under armed 
conflict analyses. Two such cases, both involving use of force in post-election violence in 
Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire respectively will be examined in turn in addition to an analysis of 
the Article 7 and Elements of Crimes framework, and the other sources of law for 
interpretation under the ICC statute.  
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4. The ICC Statute and Elements of Crimes as a source for defining crimes against 
humanity in riot control contexts  
 
As previously argued, the definition of crimes against humanity within the ICC framework 
is inept for identifying the unlawful use of force in riot control contexts.  This section posits 
that the definitions of the crime against humanity of ‘murder’ and ‘other inhumane acts’ in 
as far as they do not make reference to conduct which occurs in riot control contexts, only 
offer an illusion of legal certainty which unravels when applied to the still undefined scope 
of lawful killing by the Hobbesian sovereign in riot control contexts. This lack of definitive 
scope is maintained through the circularity of language used under the ICC Statute and 
Elements of Crimes. I also argue that the legislative inaction which occasioned this 
circularity is highly suggestive of the possibility of a deliberate omission by the state 
parties acting to safeguard monopoly over their internal law enforcement as Hobbesian 
sovereigns or suggests that a deserving consideration of context specificity was derailed by 
the inclusion of IHL language, namely ‘civilian population’, which created the illusion of 
legal certainty offered by the principle of distinction for establishing boundaries of lawful 
force in armed conflict situations. The latter suggestion plays out in the conflation of IHL 
and law enforcement language in Kenya and Cote D’Ivoire’s post-election violence 
situations which both came before the ICC for consideration. The section argues that as the 
main source of law and ‘proper law’ of the ICC (Pellet 2002: 1077), the Statute’s non-
articulation of the scope of crimes against humanity in riot control contexts is a 
fundamental omission indeed and it exposes the court’s interpretive process to a high risk 
of judicial innovation and public policy controversy in violation of the principle of legality. 
It is also indicative of a weak foundation for the other ICC Statute sources of law, namely, 
treaties and custom in delineating clear legal boundaries for contextualizing force used in 
riot control as crimes against humanity. 
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4.1 The ambiguity of ‘murder’, ‘other inhumane acts’ and the policy requirement  
 
The ICC Statute defines crimes against humanity under article 7 (1) in the following terms:  
 
For the purpose of this Statute, ’crime against humanity’ means any of the 
following 
acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: 
 
(a) Murder; 
… 
… 
… 
 (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering,  
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. 
 
Article 7 (2) proceeds to give a threshold definition for the foregoing crimes as follows:  
For the purpose of paragraph 1: 
 
(a) ‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any 
civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy 
to commit such attack; 
 
  
As far as defining crimes against humanity in riot control contexts is concerned, the 
foregoing article 7 (2) threshold requirements of ‘wide spread’ or ‘systematic’ do not 
present critical definitional problems. This is so because the ‘widespread’ scale of loss 
during a riot or the existence a plan to apply force to riot control contexts, do not on their 
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own demonstrate whether the substantive nature of such loss arose from murder within the 
ICC statute, or from a plan implemented pursuant to a ‘policy to ‘attack’ a ‘civilian 
population’. The starting point for determination which is also the critical point for 
establishing culpability, remains whether the manner and level of force used to control the 
riot were ‘lawful’ and where and how the parameters of such lawfulness are established. 
For riot control where the legal boundaries are largely ambiguous, the core definitional 
issues are not the peripheral threshold qualifiers but the fundamental issues concerning the 
lawfulness of conduct by law enforcement officials.   
There is agreement among some writers that the foregoing article 7 (2) threshold definition 
has the effect of creating a conjunctive but low threshold test, which according to Robinson 
(1999: 51) requires the proof of multiple acts and a policy to commit these acts before 
proceeding to the higher threshold where the option may be taken to prove whether the acts 
were either wide spread or systematic. Ambos (2011: 284) refers to it as the ‘widespread-
systematic’ test, reiterating that Article 7 obscures the otherwise clear disjunctive ‘wide 
spread or systematic test by replacing ‘wide spread’ with ‘multiple commission of acts’ and 
‘systematic’ with ‘a state or organizational policy’ and interconnects them in so far as the 
multiple commission of the acts in paragraph 1 must be based on a ‘Policy’. Thus in 
Robinson’s assessment, (1999:51) should the prosecutor opt to prove the widespread 
element, the conjunctive requirement of a state or organizational policy will minimize 
concerns about isolated acts being characterized as crimes against humanity, while if the 
choice is for the systematic approach, the concerns over the scale of the crimes will be 
addressed from the requirement of a course of conduct and the multiple commission of the 
acts in Paragraph 1. Indeed according to Lee (1999:97) during the negotiations on the 
Rome Statute, the inclusion of the “policy” requirement was essential in order to reach a 
compromise on crimes against humanity, as it was a means through which unrelated and 
isolated in humane acts could be collectively described as an attack against the civilian 
population. Triffterer (1999:13) also emphasizes that the requirement of a policy is 
essential to the ingredients of the crime.  From such an analysis, Ambos (2011: 285) 
concluded that ultimately, the policy requirement is mandatory to prove crimes against 
humanity under article 7. According to him, the concept of crimes against humanity as a 
political crime confirms the mandatory requirement of a policy as the only thing that can 
turn isolated acts of violence into crimes against humanity.  
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In light of these arguments, I reiterate that one can distil the crimes against humanity 
definitional concerns down to the nature of the state policy adopted to quell riots, 
specifically whether such policy aimed at committing ‘murder’ or ‘inhumane acts  of a 
similar nature’ and collectively, whether such a policy then amounts to an ‘attack’ against 
the ‘civilian population’.  These segments; ‘murder’, ‘other inhumane acts’, ‘attack’ and 
‘civilian population’,  which are each critical for a final basis for alleging culpability under 
article 7, are the major definitional challenges for riot control contexts as argued above and 
as will be explored in turn below. 
 
4.1.1 The State policy requirement dilemma 
 
There is some consensus among scholars on what amounts to a ‘policy’ to commit crimes 
against humanity. According to Bassiouni (1999: 249) ‘state action’ or ‘policy’ implies the 
use of public power and resources or of public or legal authorities acting under the law to  
perpetrate actions which if carried out by another person would be criminal. This definition 
seems to share common elements with the threshold requirement of a ‘systematic attack’, 
the exception being that the latter requires a higher degree of organization and substantial 
public resources (Robinson 1999: 50). Ambos (2011: 286) points out that the policy 
requirement differs from ‘a systematic attack’ , where one typically needs to show some 
guidance by the accused as to intended  victims of the attack,  while a widespread attack 
that is not systematic will require proof of a policy of deliberate inaction or acquiescence 
on the part of the accused. In other words, almost all state or organizational actions 
involving the application of public resources such as police or military personnel and 
weapons would logically require the application of the ‘systematic attack test’ which might 
very well go to prove the policy requirement.  
However, for all the foregoing unanimity, there isn’t a recognized distinction between ‘state 
policy of attack’ from law enforcement in riot control contexts where the use of public 
power and state resources are employed pursuant to a plan and on a wide scale. This 
omission yields what is here referenced as the ‘policy requirement dilemma’. The omission 
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is a dilemma because of the definitional challenges and political controversy bound to arise 
in drawing such a distinction. Bassiouni attempts a definition, stating that a state policy of 
attack can be established from a range of actions whose scale and nature requires the use of 
government resources acting under ‘arbitrary’ power. He then proceeds to state that such a 
policy can be perpetuated by an ‘absolutist’ government claiming the legitimacy of positive 
law and rejecting any discrepancy between law as an instrument of ideology and power 
(1999: 249-250). To this end he criticizes states which justify their excesses on the claim of 
necessity for the preservation of public order (1999:250).    
However, Bassiouni’s attempted definition is highly subjective and politicized and it cannot 
be said to have been contemplated within the jurisdiction of the ICC to determine ‘policy of 
attack’ in this way. Indeed any attempt at a similar assessment in the ICC interpretive 
process would almost certainly be a violation of the rule against large scale innovation and 
public policy controversy contrary to the principle of legality and Grover’s guidelines 
indicated above. As suggested by Bassiouni, the definition would require the ICC to make a 
pronouncement on whether the state or government in question was an absolutist or 
democratic government. This would divert from the ICC’s mandate which is restricted to 
individual as opposed to state responsibility and would certainly drive the court into 
political terrain. 
In order to gain a more legally grounded definition of the state policy in issue, it is pertinent 
to consider the segments referenced above, namely, ‘murder’, ‘other inhumane acts’, and 
attack ’and‘ civilian population. 
4.1.2 Murder and other inhumane acts 
 
Article 21(1) (a) of the ICC statute lists as main sources of law from which the ICC may 
draw for interpretation in the following terms: 
The Court shall apply: 
 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence; 
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The other sources listed include treaties and custom and will be considered under section 
four of this chapter.  
 
Article 21(3) further provides that: 
The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent 
with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse 
distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, 
age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, 
ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status. 
 
Pellet (2002:1077) observes that Article 21 stipulates the ICC Statute as the supreme 
interpretive source for the Court. He observes however, a controversy with Article 21(3) 
above, which he views as a super legality that might compromise the authority of the other 
sources of law listed under article 21 by broadening the scope of sources of law into the 
undefined and murky territory of ‘internationally recognized human rights’.  The latter, he 
observes, have not been defined by the ICC statute and would have to be defined by the 
Court (2002:1080). Pellet’s concerns clearly raise implications for the principle of legality. 
Grover has also warned that such a provision might be used as the basis on which to adopt 
broad interpretations of crimes under articles 6, 7 and 8 of the ICC Statute, using the broad 
objectives and purposes of human rights. However, she rightly suggests that in fact, article 
21(3) was arguably included specifically to safeguard the fair trial rights of the accused 
against nullum crimen violations. Failing in this, she further suggests, a super legality 
eventuality could be avoided for articles, 7 and 8 interpretation, through a side by side 
reading of the said article 21(3) and article 22(2) on strict construction. This way, article 
22(2) would operate as the lex specialis for the interpretation of crimes, while Article 21(3) 
lies in the background, thereby harmonizing the two provisions (Grover 2010: 562, 2014). 
The ICC statute’s interpretive scope for ‘murder’ and ‘other inhumane acts’ will ensue 
within this framework.  
As extracted above, article 7 (1) (a) and (k) lists murder and other inhumane acts causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health as examples of 
crimes against humanity. Other acts listed include: extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, torture, forced pregnancy, persecution, apartheid and forced disappearance. It 
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is submitted that while these actions may be perpetrated within a riot control context, they 
are not central to the question under study, which is concerned with the establishing what 
level of force can be lawfully used in riot control contexts. The most proximate conduct 
through which this inquiry can be guided is conduct that might amount to murder or the 
more generic inhumane acts causing injury and mental or physical suffering, which are the 
focus of this study.  
 
While the ICC statute itself offers no definition for murder and other inhumane acts of its 
nature, the Elements of Crimes do. Article 7 (1) (a) of the Elements of Crimes lists the 
elements for the crime of murder as follows: 
 
1. The perpetrator killed one or more persons. 
2. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
3. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be 
part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. 
 
The article contains a footnote explaining that the term ‘killed’ in paragraph 1 above is 
interchangeable with the term ‘caused death’. As suggested above, this definition is circular 
as it offers no contextual definition for murder or causing death. It is of limited import in 
riot control contexts where state policy permits the use of lethal force in riot control 
contexts moreover within the ambiguous discretion of the Hobbesian sovereign as will be 
further illustrated in the chapter and indeed the rest of the study.  
In his analysis of this subject, Bassiouni (1999:301) states that while the protection of life is 
a general principle, and all the major criminal justice systems include the offence of murder 
under their national laws, this does not automatically make murder an international crime.  
He traces (1999: 304) the formulations of murder as a crime against humanity under the 
London Charter and the Charters of the ICTY and ICTR and concludes that in his 
assessment, the definitions failed to fully address some major concepts of murder such as 
‘lawful justifications’ in otherwise unlawful killings. In analyzing the ICC statute, he states 
that this omission remains and as such, the ICC leaves unaddressed, the very questions that 
were raised under the ICTY and ICRT statutes.  Moreover, Politi and Nesi (2001: 82) also 
seem unsure about the exact scope of the offence of murder envisaged under Article 7 of 
the Rome Statute. They state that it is uncertain whether mental elements such as the ‘intent 
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to cause great bodily harm resulting in death’, ‘reckless’ or ‘negligent killing’ are also 
envisaged by the ICC statute, and point out that there is disagreement among some scholars 
on the issue. 
Concerning ‘other inhumane acts’, the Elements of Crimes are equally non comprehensive 
and provide a definition in article 7(1) (k) as follows: 
1. The perpetrator inflicted great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health, by means of an inhumane act. 
2. Such act was of a character similar to any other act referred to in article 7, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute. 
3. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the 
character of the act. 
4. The conduct was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against a civilian population. 
5. The perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be 
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population 
 
Like the provision offering a definition for murder, the foregoing definition is without more 
essentially a repetition of the already inept article 7 provision in the statute. It repeats the 
term ‘inhumane’ and does not offer it specific content. While this general provision might 
be assumed to be an indicator of a looser legality requirement as argued by Grover (2014: 
216-19, 398-403), it still is a cause for concern for the principle of legality (Bassiouni, 
2011b: 411). 
 
4.1.3 Legislative inaction and judicial innovation 
 
The legislative inaction over so critical an issue is highly indicative of a deliberate omission 
of certainty in order to perpetuate ambiguity to the benefit of the ICC state parties, in this 
case the Hobbesian sovereign, over the question of force used in riot control contexts. As 
stated by Grover, states do use vagueness and ambiguity to their advantage by advancing 
arguments that treaty provisions favour their version of interpretation of lawful conduct 
(2014: 148). In light of this argument, it is especially apparent that such an omission is a 
paradox given the general agreement by ICC Statute state parties to define with clarity and 
precision the crimes within the jurisdiction of the court and in particular, the intention of 
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the drafters of the Elements of Crimes to use these Elements to “give teeth to the nullum 
crimen” principle (Stahn and Van den Herik 2012, Grover 2014: 747, Pellet 2002: 1060). If 
indeed drafters of the statute intended to use a strict legality requirement to limit the court’s 
jurisdiction over their conduct and to ensure fair warning to themselves by extensively 
listing the crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction Grover (2014: 141) then culpability for 
murder or ‘other inhumane acts’ following force used in riot control by state officials ought 
to have featured prominently in the definition of crimes against humanity.  Instead the 
states parties made no mention of this complexity, yielding a highly and it is argued, 
conveniently ambiguous article 7 framework.  
Even if the omission was not deliberate on the part of state parties, it is suggested that the 
absence under international law of a framework clarifying lawful killing in riot control 
contexts may have negated any consideration of the application of article 7 to such 
contexts. In any event, the circularity of law on which the Hobbesian sovereign thrives to 
perpetuate discretion over force used in riot control contexts, also manifests in the 
circularity of the legal definitions of murder and ‘other inhumane acts’ as indicated above.   
Without a contextualized definition for murder and other inhumane acts, I argue that an 
attempt at interpreting crimes against humanity in riot control frameworks would lead the 
court into an arena of innovation already referenced in Grover’s legality guidelines, thereby 
opening the court up to criticism for a breach of the separation of powers doctrine of 
legality. As indicated earlier one of the tenets of the separation of power interest under 
Grover’s proposed methodology is that the court respects legislative inaction so as to avoid 
reproach that it has substituted its own intentions for those of the legislators (Grover 2014: 
148). However, as also critiqued above, Grover’s methodology contains no indicators for 
what kind of interpretive approaches would amount to legislative innovation which renders 
it impossible to anticipate how the ICC might circumvent the legislative inaction around the 
definition of murder and inhumane acts, apply it to riot control contexts and fulfil its 
interpretive mandate well within the principle of legality. This incoherence is indicative of 
the enduring dilemma of circularity posed by the Hobbesian sovereign’s monopoly over the 
law on force used in riot control.  
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The same dilemma arises with respect to defining a ‘state policy of attack against a civilian 
population’, with the main challenge for legality in this scenario being the demarcation of 
armed conflict parameters.  
 
4.1.4 ‘Attack’ and ‘civilian population’  
 
This section argues that the legislative ambiguity and inadequacy of article 7 for riot control 
contexts is also due in part to the inclusion of references to IHL which derailed a necessary 
consideration and delineation of parameters for a peace time definition and application of 
crimes against humanity. In particular, the inclusion of reference to ‘civilian population’, 
and ‘attack’ creates the illusion of legal certainty offered by the principle of distinction for 
establishing boundaries of lawful force in armed conflict situations. It is also suggested that 
this retention of armed conflict terminology is indicative of the fact that the state parties 
never gave significant consideration to the application of crimes against humanity to law 
enforcement scenarios. This implies that the ICC would have to venture into new territory 
to apply this framework to such contexts at the risk of a legality challenge. It is argued that 
this suggestion explains the ‘avoidance approach’ taken by the ICC thus far through the 
conflation of IHL and law enforcement issues  in the Kenya and Cote D’Ivoire post-
election violence situations which have come before it for consideration. This argument is 
developed further below.  
 
4.1.5 Elements of crimes and the circularity of defining ‘attack against the civilian 
population’  
 
As indicated above, the ICC statute contains no definition for ‘a State policy of attack 
against a civilian population’ yet the existence of such a policy is a foundational basis for 
establishing crimes against humanity under article 7. As the investigation of definitions for 
‘murder’ and ‘other inhumane acts’ have proved unsatisfactory, a consideration of the 
definitional scope for the other sections; ‘attack and civilian population’ are warranted. 
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Unfortunately, a review of the Statute and the Elements of Crimes reveals a similarly 
incomprehensive legal framework. The Statute and Elements’ reliance on the war nexus 
terminology creates confusion and opens up the statute to complex legality challenges. 
Article 7(3) of the elements of crimes in offering a definition states as follows: 
 
‘Attack directed against a civilian population’ in these context elements is 
understood to mean a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 
referred to in article 7, paragraph 1, of the Statute against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such 
attack. The acts need not constitute a military attack. It is understood that ‘policy to 
commit such attack’ requires that the State or organization actively promote or 
encourage such an attack against a civilian population. 
 
 
Yet again, the definition offered essentially reproduces the description provided under the 
Statute’s article 7(2) (a) and adds nothing except to mention that the acts enunciated under 
article 7 of the Statute need not be part of a military attack.  This addition offers no clarity 
of application of crimes against humanity to riot control contexts in peace time for it still 
concludes with the requirement that such an attack be against ‘the civilian population’ 
without defining the composition of such a population outside the context of an armed 
conflict.  
 
According to Ambos and Wirth (2002:22), the threshold requirement of ‘civilian’ in an 
‘attack against the civilian population’ is most likely a result of confusion based on 
common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 which offers protection to persons 
taking no active part in hostilities in non-international armed conflicts. The reason for such 
an assessment stems from the fact that Article 7 dispensed with the war nexus requirement 
and as such there is no logic to the ‘civilian-combatant’ distinction.  In her own 
consideration of this controversy, Sadat ( 2002:154) points out that if Article 7 evolved to 
dispense with the required application of the Geneva Conventions, the presumption should 
be that no one in a ‘conflict’ is a ‘non civilian’ for purposes of Article 7. In further probing 
the ‘civilian’ requirement, Sadat (2002: 154) alludes to situations of massacres and 
atrocities in contexts not deteriorating to the level of an armed conflict and which therefore 
do not trigger the application of war crimes provisions. She rejects the ‘civilian-combatant’ 
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distinction in such scenarios, considering a situation where Government soldiers and their 
family members might be part of or are victims of such a massacre. Sadat (2002:154) in 
fact points out that for a provision that was meant to fill the gap left by international 
humanitarian law (IHL), by the retaining this ‘civilian –combatant’ distinction the Rome 
Statute is in regression. Ambos observes that recourse to the IHL definition of ‘civilian’ 
during ‘peace time’ is not possible and recommends that the term should be deleted from 
the Statute as it cannot be reconciled with the ‘humanitarian character’ of crimes against 
humanity. He further suggests that maintaining the reference to ‘civilian’ under Article 7 
meant that its drafters still regarded crimes against humanity as an extension of war crimes 
and not a crime in its own right (2011:287,288).  
 
In all the foregoing discussions the main point of convergence appears to be that 
maintaining the ‘civilian’ element as part of the threshold requirement for crimes against 
humanity meant that certain members of the state forces might be left unprotected in 
situations not amounting to armed conflict simply by virtue of  their being part of the 
‘armed forces’. While Sadat (2002: 154) makes this argument with reference to ‘members 
of the Government forces and their families’, Ambos (2002:24) makes it with reference to 
‘any individual’ and later attempts to make it by reference to the police forces (Ambos 
2002:25) although he still does so within the context of an armed conflict 
 
None of the scholars however analyse their arguments within the ICC regime and within 
the context of law enforcement in riot control contexts.  It is no wonder therefore that the 
definitional challenges thrown up by these issues manifested only recently before the ICC, 
raising questions which are central to the tension between the ICC’s legality requirement 
and the Hobbesian sovereign’s discretion to use force to implement the law over its 
territory. That the ICC has thus far avoided a clear legal articulation of these contradictions 
is quite telling of the ineptness of article 7 in defining the scope of culpability for crimes 
against humanity in riot control contexts, as evidenced in the examples of Kenya and Cote 
d’Ivoire below.  
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4.1.6 The Decision pursuant to article 15 of the Rome Statute authorizing an 
investigation into the situation of Kenya (ICC-01/09, 31 March 2010).  
 
Following disputed presidential election results in 2007, Kenya erupted into violent protests 
and ethnic attacks which resulted in the death of over 1,000 people and the displacement of 
about 500,000. In a bid to prosecute the perpetrators of the said violence, the ICC 
prosecutor commenced criminal investigations for crimes against humanity before the ICC 
(BBC, 2010).  Judge Hans-Peter Kaul’s dissenting opinion in the request to authorize an 
investigation into the Kenyan situation (Kenya Situation 2010, ICC-01/09) warned against 
what he called the ‘downscaling of crimes against humanity into ordinary crimes’, which 
would be a possible infringement on state sovereignty (Kenya Situation 2010, ICC-01/09: 
para.10). He took a strict approach to the interpretation of crimes against humanity calling 
for recognition of their distinction from human rights violations (ICC-01/09: para 53).  The 
judge noted that the report of the Waki Commission which was constituted to investigate 
the post-election violence indicated that the Kenya Police had used excessive force in some 
instances to contain the violence, but also that in other instances the police had been 
overwhelmed and would not act to avert the violence. On this basis the Judge formed the 
opinion that the multifaceted information regarding police behaviour could not lead him to 
conclude that there had been an ‘attack against the civilian population’, let alone one that 
had been planned pursuant to a State policy or plan (Kenya situation ICC-01/09: para. 81-
2).  In his opinion, the police violence seemed to have been spontaneous, opportunistic and 
retaliatory in the course of events (Kenya situation ICC-01/09: para.119). This, even after 
observing that the police on their own admission fired live bullets into the crowd and 
opened fire without warning, as a tactic to push the crowd out of the towns and into the 
slums, actions which resulted in over 90 percent of the deaths in Nyanza province alone 
(Kenya situation ICC-01/09: para.118). The judge observed further that the Kenya police  
were operating in a context characterized by chaos, anarchy and collapse of the state, and 
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almost a total collapse of law enforcement agencies (Kenya situation ICC-01/09: paras. 
152-3).   
However, the majority of the Judges authorized the investigation of the police for crimes 
against humanity on the basis that their actions indeed amounted to an ‘attack against the 
civilian population’. I argue that this finding was based on an uncritical interpretation and 
application of article 7 of the ICC statute which resulted in a conflation of armed conflict 
and law enforcement scenarios and was a violation of article 22’s strict legality 
requirements. Going by Grover’s legality guidelines for the application of the said article 
22, the decision failed to address the ambiguities surrounding the foregoing concepts of 
‘murder’ and ‘attack against the civilian population’ and resulted in a decision which 
created more confusion than clarity concerning liability for force used during riot control. It 
was also a decision based on the facts of the violence as opposed to principles of law and as 
such fell short of Grover’s legality guidelines.  Moreover, in so conflating armed conflict 
and law enforcement scenarios, the decision also adopted an expansive as opposed to 
incremental approach to crimes against humanity in riot control contexts, also contrary to 
Grover’s ICC’s legality guidelines. The arguments are developed further below.  
 
4.1.7 ‘Attack against the civilian population’ 
 
To begin with, the judges  observed that the police allegedly executed over 500 members of 
Mungiki, a criminal gang which was perpetrating violence against opposing ethnic groups, 
and also allegedly killed members of the Saboat Land Defence Forces (SLDF), another 
criminal gang against whom the police used violence. The chamber then considered these 
deaths together with the alleged killings of unarmed women and children and refered to 
them collectively as an ‘attack against the civilian population’ (Kenya situation ICC-01/09: 
paras. 106-9). In defining the reference to an ‘attack’, the chamber acknowledged that the 
word itself was not defined in the statute, but that from the elements of crimes, it referred to 
a campaign or operation carried out against a ‘civilian population’ (Kenya situation ICC-
01/09para. 80). In defining what a civilian population is, the chamber simply offered that 
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they were ‘civilians as opposed to members of the armed forces and other legitimate 
combatants’ (Kenya situation ICC-01/09: para.82). It did not explain who legitimate 
combatants were and the circularity of the definition left unexplored the phenomenon of 
‘armed protestors’ in a civil disturbance-bordering on armed conflict. In the case of Kenya 
this phenomenon was embodied by members of the Mungiki and SLDF, who were armed 
and perpetrating violence and against whom the Kenyan Police were mandated to protect 
citizens, as part of law enforcement. It must be noted that the foregoing pronouncements 
were made despite the fact that the chamber had made no determination that the situation 
under investigation in Kenya amounted to an armed conflict.  
This obscuring of concepts was a missed opportunity for the court to begin exploring some 
of the definitional difficulties surrounding the ambiguities of article 7 explored above.  
Moreover, in the confirmation of charges decision in Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi 
Mutahura, Uhuru Kenyatta & Mohamed Hussein Ali (Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, 23 
January 2012) the court subsequently dismissed charges against the Kenyan Commissioner 
of Police at the time, on the basis that there was no identifiable course of conduct 
amounting to crimes against humanity by the Kenyan Police (Mohamed Hussein Ali ICC-
01/09-02/11: para. 422). There was no assessment whatsoever of the extensive allegations 
of excessive force by the police, which were the basis for the chamber’s initial 
authorization of an investigation. As such, there was no chance to measure whether such 
force amounted to a crime against humanity as had been alleged and questions about 
legitimate or illegitimate use of force by police in civil disturbances bordering on armed 
conflict were left unexplored.  
However, this question will very likely arise again for the court in the not so far future as 
already exemplified by the subsequent situation of Côte d’Ivoire which presented with 
similar events as occurred in Kenya.   
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4.1.8 The Decision on the confirmation of charges in the case of Prosecutor v. Laurent 
Gbagbo (ICC-02/11-01/11, 12th June 2014). 
  
As with the situation in Kenya, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire arose pursuant to disputed 
presidential election results which occasioned alleged crimes against humanity violations 
between 2010 and 2011. In the ICC confirmation of charges against the accused and then 
incumbent president, Mr. Laurent Gbagbo (Côted’Ivoire Situation 2014, ICC-02/11-01/11), 
it was observed that on 16th December 2010, anti-Gbagbo demonstrators who were 
advancing towards Radiodiffusion Television Ivorienne (RTI) were attacked by Defense 
and Security Forces (FDS) units with the support of militia and mercenaries, allegedly 
using gunfire and fragmentation grenades to kill some of the protestors and injure others 
(Côted’Ivoire Situation ICC-02/11-01/11: para.30). It was alleged that there were FDS 
elements with sniper rifles on roof tops who shot down at fleeing demonstrators and even 
pursued the demonstrators after dispersal, arresting and attacking them in the process 
(Côted’Ivoire Situation ICC-02/11-01/11: paras. 32, 34).  
In Mr. Gbagbo’s defense, it was agreed that violent repression was used, and resulted in the 
death of at least 45 people and injury to at least 54. It was however argued that the 
repression of these demonstrations did not occur in the context of a ‘civilian’ 
demonstration, but rather that it was part of an attempt by the opposition’s supporters to 
take over power by force (Côted’Ivoire Situation ICC-02/11-01/11:para.38). It was argued 
further that indeed on the very day of the alleged violations, there had been exchange of fire 
between the FDS who were the incumbent’s and government troops and the opposition 
armed groups, which had resulted in the deaths of FDS troops. It was also argued that in 
that context, these pro opposition forces aimed to use the demonstrators as a pretext to 
attack the RTI which was a key radio transmission center, and through it, facilitate a 
takeover of power by force (Côted’Ivoire Situation ICC-02/11-01/11: paras. 39).   
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However, the Chamber concluded that the events involving armed troops occurred in other 
locations outside the context of the ‘civilian demonstration’. It is here argued that whether 
the Chamber realized it or not, it did not examine the defense’s argument that the 
government perceived itself as being under an armed attack and that all opposition protests 
and actions within that context amounted to active support for an opposition armed group. 
Such an argument should have solicited an examination of the complexities underlying the 
question of when, how and by whom should contexts such as these be classified as armed 
conflicts so as to apply the principle of distinction to identify ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians’. 
This inquiry would have triggered a discussion of sub-issues regarding whether the 
demonstrators were ‘civilians’ in a law enforcement context along with a legal explanation 
for such a characterization, or whether they were civilians in an armed conflict context 
along with the foregoing interrogation as to who gets to declare the existence or non 
existence of an armed conflict. This inquiry would also have led to a determination of 
whether, the rioters by virtue of their alleged effort to oust the government, were part of the 
combatants and therefore legitimate military targets in an armed conflict scenario. A 
consideration of these issues was warranted as it was relevant to a determination of the 
legality or otherwise of the force which the defendant allegedly used against the said 
demonstrators. 
However, the Chamber continued to conflate IHL and law enforcement concepts in the 
alleged shooting of ‘civilians’ on 17th March 2011. Yet again the defense persisted in their 
argument that given the presence of combatants in Abobo, the alleged violations did not 
constitute an ‘attack against the civilian population’ (para. 62). The chamber counter argued 
that the presence of combatants in Abobo did not contradict the ‘civilian nature of the 
population’ which was targeted by the accused’s armed forces. The Chamber even went 
further to state that by using an ‘inherently inaccurate’ weapon in a densely populated area 
the forces orchestrated an ‘attack against the civilian population’.  The Chamber’s language 
strikingly resembles a finding of an IHL violation yet there was no prior attempt to consider 
at length the questions already highlighted above relating to the existence or otherwise of 
an armed conflict and the resultant application or otherwise of the IHL principles of 
distinction and proportionality (Côted’Ivoire Situation ICC-02/11-01/11: para. 63).   
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By avoiding a rigorous inquiry into the demarcation of IHL and law enforcement contexts 
in the foregoing scenarios, it is argued that the court did not establish concretely the legal 
basis for the confirmation of charges of crimes against humanity for the defendant.  
At this point it is important to caution that the forgoing situation of Côted’Ivoire is still 
before the ICC and the conclusions formulated may be somewhat premature. If these 
arguments resurface during trial, it will be interesting to observe how far the Court will be 
willing to engage on them.  
The foregoing examples illustrate how much legal uncertainly the ICC has to wade through 
for these ‘in between scenarios’ that are not quite easily identifiable as armed conflicts and 
are not clear cut as law enforcement in riot control scenarios either. Moreover, the trend 
seems to show that the Court will very likely have to deal with more of such scenarios in 
the not so far future.  
One other similar scenario under preliminary examination by the court is the situation of 
Ukraine. On 17 April 2014, the Government of Ukraine lodged a declaration under article 
12(3) of the Rome Statute accepting the ICC's jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed 
on its territory from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014. The Government’s 
communication before the ICC accuses the then Ukrainian President and law enforcement 
agencies of unlawfully using force in excess of their powers and duties. It further alleges 
that this violation was systematic and led to the killing of over 100 Ukrainians and other 
nationals. Among the specifics of the complaint was that the state used water cannons 
against peaceful protestors at an air temperature of 10 degrees Celsius, and that this 
occurred in the wider contexts of unlawful detentions, disappearances and torture using 
organised criminal groups. The case is pending the ICC prosecutor’s investigation but it 
will be interesting to observe how it progresses in light of the foregoing unanswered 
questions.  
This analysis of situations demonstrates the undeveloped and inadequate framework of 
crimes against humanity in law enforcement situations. I argue that as suggested above, the 
reference in article 7 to IHL terminologies is in fact reflective of  deeper structural issues 
concerning the independent and comprehensive development of  crimes against humanity 
as an international crime in its own right. This inadequacy is revealed above in how the 
ICC conflates law enforcement and armed conflict terminologies to confirm charges for 
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crimes against humanity without making an inquiry as to the application of these crimes in 
law enforcement contexts such as the riot control situations seen above. The result in both 
the Kenya and Côted’Ivoire situations has been an unclear and ambiguous broad based 
articulation of crimes against humanity in riot control situations which are grounded on 
facts rather than clear principles of law, and which create no certainty for the purposes of 
legality. As stated by Grover, a legality violation under the ICC statute can occur well 
before conviction, including during a determination of jurisdiction and during a hearing for 
confirmation of charges (2014: 190), which was the case for both situations reviewed.  
The ambiguity arising from the vacuum within the article 7 framework means that the 
critical question in riot control contexts of what level of force in unlawful as to amount to 
‘murder’ or ‘other inhumane acts’ as part of a ‘state policy to attack a civilian population’ 
remains elusive. This anomaly is not cured by the other sources of law from which the ICC 
can draw for interpretation. As already asserted, this perpetual ambiguity is because these 
sources also maintain circularity regarding boundaries of force the Hobbesian sovereign 
may or may not use in riot control situations. This is demonstrated in the ensuing section.  
 
4.2 Crimes against humanity and legality: applicable treaties, principles and rules of 
international law 
 
This section maintains that the vacuum within the crimes against humanity framework in 
article 7 of the ICC statute persists within the relevant international human rights treaties. 
This is due in part, to the open ended nature of such treaties whose objectives, unlike those 
of international criminal law permit broad interpretations to maximise protections for 
victims (Robinson 2010: 115,119, Stahn and Van den Herik, 2012: 23- 4). This problem 
within the ICC Statute is part of a more systemic problem of the uncritical supplanting of 
the more liberal legal regimes of IHL and IHRL into a more restricted regime under the 
ICC Statute (Robinson 2010, Stahn and Van den Herik, 2012). For the case of force used in 
riot control, I further argue that the relevant sources indicate a context specific approach to 
establishing whether force used was disproportionate and therefore unlawful, a detriment 
for the principle of legality which favors predictability and prospective application of the 
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law. The section traces the role of the Hobbesian sovereign in maintaining such ambiguity 
and deterring a universal application for proportionate force. The situation is especially 
critical for those riot control contexts bordering on armed conflict where state discretion 
supersedes legal constrictions and where the boundaries of civil disturbance or riots and 
armed conflict are unclear. These arguments are developed further below.  
 
4.2.1 Applicable treaties 
 
Article 21 (1) (b) of the ICC statute provides as an additional source of law, where the 
Statute and Elements prove inadequate for interpretation, the applicable treaties and 
principles and rules of international law. It states specifically as follows: 
 
The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict; 
 
The provision also includes general principles of law derived from national laws of legal 
systems of the world as a source of law, which will be examined in a separate chapter. For 
purposes of this section, attention will be given to ‘applicable treaties’ as a source of 
interpretation for the ICC while the final sub-section will attend to the rules and principles 
of international law.  
According to Pellet (2002: 1078) even though listed as a source of law, treaties are 
subordinate to the Statute which remains the main law of the ICC. It follows from this that 
whatever interpretations may be derived from the relevant treaties, they would have to 
comply with the Statute. Moreover, borrowing Grover’s argument that article 22 is the lex 
specialis concerning interpretation of crimes in articles 6, 7 and 8, it is maintained that the 
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applicable treaties referenced here cannot be a direct and independent basis for interpreting 
crimes against humanity in riot control contexts. The treaties as an interpretive source under 
article 21 play a gap filling role and as such compliment the Statute and Elements of crimes 
(Grover 2014: 262, Bitti 2009: 294).  
As previous discussions have demonstrated, the challenge of establishing a basis for 
culpability under article 7 in riot control contexts raises pertinent questions for the principle 
of legality. A survey of treaties reveals IHL and international human rights law (IHRL) as 
the two major regimes addressing the question of proportionate force in violent contexts. 
However, as some scholars have pointed out, such legal plurality within the ICC statute 
yields contradictions which present a challenge for interpretation and for legality (Stahn 
and Van Den Herik 2012: 23-4, 41, Robinson 2010). According to Watkin (2004:10), IHL 
and IHRL share the right to life as a common ground and as such share guidelines on the 
level of force that can be applied to limit this right. He further advances that (2004: 9) since 
the state is required to maintain law and order, it may be required to use force, although 
such power must not be ‘arbitrary’. He explains that such power may be used for purposes 
such as self-defense and defense of person and property, effecting an arrest, dispersing a 
riot, among others (2004:10). He proceeds to point out that IHL has not developed a 
comprehensive body of law for application in non-international armed conflicts and for that 
matter, situations may arise which call for a closer interaction between IHL and IHRL. He 
points to some such scenarios as including emergencies where the military may be called 
upon to perform internal policing duties (2004: 14), or where law enforcement forces are 
responding to a scenario bordering on an armed conflict (2004: 25), or where there is 
presence or potential presence of firearms within a rioting crowd, calling into question the 
possible application of several methods of riot control (2004: 33). Watkin further advances 
that the exact nature of the distinction between such scenarios and armed conflict may not 
always be clear considering that Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not 
offer a clear guidance on the conditions required before it can be invoked (2004:26). 
Sassoli and Olson (2008:610) also deal with similar questions in tackling the interaction 
between IHL and IHRL, pointing out that while IHL does not apply the principle of 
proportionality in relation to combatants, the IHRL principle of proportionality is applied 
more generally provided there is no ‘arbitrarily killing’. They point out that most IHRL 
treaties however, do not define what amounts to ‘arbitrary’ killing.  
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The foregoing uncertainties yield two critical challenges for legality in riot control contexts: 
the lack of what for purposes of this study I refer to as an ‘external boundary’ and the lack 
of an ‘internal boundary’ for establishing criteria for lawful use of force. I use the term 
‘external boundary’ here to refer to a reference point to determine the distinction between a 
situation of law enforcement and an internal armed conflict. The challenge posed by the 
lack of an external boundary arises from the inadequacy of IHL treaty provisions under 
Common article 3 and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions regarding the 
existence or otherwise of a non-international armed conflict. It emerges strongly in 
situations bordering on armed conflict, here interchangeably referred to as “threshold or 
borderline situations”.  
I use the term ‘internal boundary’ to refer to a reference point for determining when lethal 
force may or may not be used in a law enforcement scenario. The lack of an internal 
boundary arises out of the ambiguity of the IHRL treaty framework concerning the 
protection of the right to life in riot control contexts. It would arise in both high and low 
threshold situations of violence. These challenges are considered briefly in turn below.  
 
4.2.2 ‘Other situations of violence’ and the lack of an external boundary 
 
There is a paucity of comprehensive academic analysis of the challenge presented by the 
lack of an objective treaty definition for when and how a violent situation might exceed 
mere internal disturbance or riots and graduate to a non-international armed conflict.  
The originating IHL treaty reference to a non-international armed conflict is contained in 
article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and states in the following terms: 
 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be 
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: 
 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed 
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated 
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humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, 
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. 
 
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in 
any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture; 
 
The provision entrenches the principle of distinction in the specified type of armed conflict 
by protecting the life of ‘persons taking no active part in hostilities’. It however provides no 
further guidelines as to what ‘an armed conflict not of an international character’ is and 
how it may be established.  
A more specific provision entailed in Article 1(2) of Protocol II additional to the Four 
Geneva Conventions which was created to further enumerate the scope of IHL in non-
international armed conflicts. The provision states as follows: 
  
This Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar 
nature, as not being armed conflicts.  
 
A combined reading of both provisions still offers no clear guidelines as to when 
objectively an armed conflict may be established. A consideration of jurisprudence on the 
subject while progressive, is highly subjective and also offers no conclusive parameters on 
the subject. The leading decision on this is the ICTY’s Prosecutor v Tadic (Case No. IT-94-
1-T, 1997: para. 561-568), which defines a non-international armed conflict as follows: 
‘…protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.’ 
The decision’s criteria for drawing a boundary between ‘unorganized and short lived 
insurrections’ and armed conflicts are grounded in the intensity of the conflict and the level 
of organization of parties to the conflict (Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 1997: para 561). More 
insights are offered by The Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj in which the intensity of the conflict 
can be indicated by the state’s use of its military as opposed to police forces (Fatmir Limaj 
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Case No. IT-03-66-T, 2005: para. 84) while the level of organisation of the parties can be 
established by the existence of a command structure and the ability for the group to execute 
sustained military operations (Fatmir Limaj Case No. IT-03-66-T, 2005: para. 135-170).  
A commentary to the third Geneva Conventions by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) as a body charged with the development and dissemination of IHL (Statutes 
of the ICRC 2013, Art 4) offers a consolidated list of criteria for non-international armed 
conflicts as follows (ICRC Commentary, 1960: para.1, p.36): 
(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized 
military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate 
territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the 
Convention. 
 
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military 
forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the 
national territory. 
 
(3) (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or 
(b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or 
(c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes 
only of the present Convention; or 
(d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the 
General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a 
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. 
 
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the 
characteristics of a State. 
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over the population 
within a determinate portion of the national territory. 
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of an organized authority and are 
prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war. 
(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the 
Convention.  
 
The ICRC offers the foregoing as a ‘conducive list’ rather than hard objective criteria and 
emphasizes that they are not obligatory. The organization recognizes the vagueness 
surrounding the definition of armed conflicts not of an international character’ and even 
endorses the rejection of initial attempts at an objective definition (ICRC Commentary 
1960: Para 1 A). Moreover, even while offering the foregoing criteria, the ICRC (ICRC 
Commentary 1958, Para 1 A) discounts the suggestion that there is a clear cut boundary 
between armed conflicts and riot control contexts in the following statement: 
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Does this mean that Article 3 is not applicable in cases where armed strife breaks 
out in a country, but does not fulfill any of the above conditions? We do not 
subscribe to this view. We think, on the contrary, that the scope of application of the 
Article must be as wide as possible. There can be no drawbacks in this, since the 
Article in its reduced form, contrary to what might be thought, does not in any way 
limit the right of a State to put down rebellion, nor does it increase in the slightest 
the authority of the rebel party. It merely demands respect for certain rules, which 
were already recognized as essential in all civilized countries, and embodied in the 
national legislation of the States in question, long before the Convention was 
signed. What Government would dare to claim before the world, in a case of civil 
disturbances which could justly be described as mere acts of banditry, that, Article 3 
not being applicable, it was entitled to leave the wounded uncared for, to torture and 
mutilate prisoners and take hostages?  
 
While the foregoing liberal approach discounting the feasibility of an ‘external boundary’ 
for threshold situations may be beneficial for the broad protection of other fundamental 
rights such as freedom from torture and liberty, it is not conducive to law enforcement 
officials in such borderline situations when faced with the problem of measuring what level 
of force can lawfully be used against violent or armed crowds.  
The lack of an external boundary to demarcate armed conflicts from such borderline 
situations presents significant challenges for determining obligations in complex situations 
such as those in the Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire above. For the ICC regime which requires a 
high level of specificity to establish criminal liability, the IHL treaties’ inadequacy presents 
with minimal options against risk of large scale innovation during legal interpretation.  
 
4.2.3 The Hobbesian sovereign and the ambiguity of armed conflict and riot control 
boundaries 
 
The foregoing ambiguity when applied to riot control situations functions to the benefit of 
the state acting as a Hobbesian sovereign by privileging that sovereign’s discretion over 
clear cut principles of law which demarcate barriers around what persons are protected 
from lethal force as civilians and which ones are not. In riot control scenarios bordering on 
armed conflict, the absence of a clear principle of distinction acting as such a barrier only 
leaves the IHRL principle of proportionality as the basis for the use of force. However, as 
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indicated above, this principle is highly subjective and is as well devoid of objective 
markers here referenced as ‘internal boundaries’, for establishing when force is lawful.  
During the process of drafting the Geneva Conventions the delegates were well aware of 
the problem of the lack of such clear cut boundaries as it was indeed the major basis for an 
objection against the inclusion of the foregoing common article 3. Some delegates’ main 
argument was that the provision would encroach on their internal law enforcement powers 
as in that broad form the meaning of an armed conflict could be applied to any act 
committed by force, or in the context of anarchy.  It was on this basis that a proposal for an 
exhaustive list of situations where common article 3 would apply was made, but then later 
rejected as impractical (ICRC Commentary 1960, para 1A). It is here argued that the futility 
of such a list is exactly due to the highly discretionary an unforecastable nature of the 
Hobbesian sovereign’s power in matters of law enforcement. The effect of such a sovereign 
for riot control contexts is that establishing objective and exhaustive parameters of law for 
use of force is futile.  
An attempt has been made by the ICRC to realise legal objectivity for borderline situations 
which it has labelled under an all-inclusive banner as: ‘other situations of violence’ (OSVs).  
It defines  these as situations such as civil unrest, riots, state repression, violence in the 
aftermath of elections, gang violence and demonstrations in which the authorities often use 
extensive police or military force to maintain law and order. The ICRC has observed that 
while such contexts may not reach the threshold of armed conflict, their humanitarian 
consequences are serious (ICRC, 2012). However, the organization offers no further 
specific criteria for these OSVs nor does it develop legal standards of obligations that might 
follow from such a categorization. There is for instance no further engagement on what 
‘extensive police or military force’ is and whether or when it is legitimate.   
In an interview by a former head of the ICRC unit which counsels on the law applying in 
armed conflicts and OSVs, Kathleen Lanard refers to the foregoing suggested criteria for 
establishing an internal armed conflict as dependent on, among others: the intensity of the 
violence, the duration and gravity of the armed clashes, the type of government forces 
involved, the type of weapons used, the number of troops, the extent of damage, the level of 
organization of the armed group, among others.  She however cautions that each of these 
criteria are determined on a case by case basis weighing the factual indicators (ICRC, 
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2012). This further confirms the absence of a single objective standard referenced above. 
More critical however for the foregoing challenges, is the lack of an authority by which an 
objective pronouncement might be made regarding the existence or other wise of a non-
international armed conflict so as to trigger context specific legal standards.   
The foregoing vacuum in the law has had practical impact in borderline situations. In a 
paper inspired after she worked as a regional analyst in the first year of the 2011 Syrian 
crisis, Lee (2014) observed that the nature and patterns of armed conflict today are different 
from those which the Geneva Conventions and additional protocols were developed to 
address.  She notes that Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean are experiencing high 
rates of urban violence exposing more civilians to the effects of armed conflict and civil 
disturbances, electoral related violence and ‘Arab spring’ styled violence, given the use of 
explosive weapons in densely populated areas. She notes that the national laws, 
international human rights law, the principle of ‘humanity’ and the Basic principles on the 
use of firearms are all that exist to protect the likely victims of these types of violence. 
However, as already observed above in the theoretical inadequacies of crimes against 
humanity, the concept of ‘humanity’ without specific statutory definition is wrought with 
ambiguity.  
Lee observes that in 2011, there were 26,000 deaths following seventeen months of civil 
unrest in Syria before the ICRC decided to qualify the situation as an armed conflict.  The 
apparent reason for the delayed classification was that Free Syrian Army (FSA) the armed 
opposition group at the time, lacked the minimum level of organisation at that stage of the 
conflict to graduate the violence from a civil disturbance to an armed conflict.  The same 
position was taken by the UN Human Rights Council following a report of an independent 
commission of inquiry into the violence in Syria (UN Doc. Session 19/A-HRC-19-69: para 
108-109). 
Meanwhile, in a Hobbesian sovereign approach, the Syrian government took advantage of 
the ambiguity of the situation to promise reforms while justifying its attacks on the premise 
that the armed opposition were part of a foreign conspiracy against the Syrian government 
and that they as state security operatives, were targeting terrorists (UN Doc. Session 19/A-
HRC-19-69: para 14). Similar arguments were maintained by Syrian government officials 
in an earlier report, stating that elements seeking to destabilize the country were using 
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protests as a cover for a wider plot to overthrow the government and cause sectarian rifts. 
The officials sought to bolster their argument by evidence that over 260 members of their 
security forces had been killed and over 8,000 had been injured in by late June 2011, just 
four months after the protests erupted in March 2011 (UNHRC report 2011, UN Doc. A-
HRC/18/53: para 66). The government’s contentions may have further been bolstered by 
the fact at the time many of its own armed forces had defected to the FSA and there was 
also an increasing number or ‘armed civilians’ among the government opposition protestors 
(UN Doc. Session 19/A-HRC-19-69: para. 14). While no prosecution has yet been 
commenced to test these arguments, it is here argued that they demonstrate how the 
ambiguity of an external boundary in borderline situations might be manipulated for a 
justification by the Hobbesian sovereign to use force in a riot context without objective 
legal limitations.  With the benefit of such ambiguity, the boundaries for the protection of 
the right to life remain unclear and so does the basis for establishing culpability for their 
breach.  
Lee concludes that the ambiguity of the law in current civil unrest scenarios needs to be 
investigated further, particularly the nexus between IHL and IHRL in such contexts in order 
to fill the gap of the protection framework.  As Montenegro has observed (2013-2014: 5) 
the definition of an armed conflict as laid down by the ICTY in Prosecutor vs Tadic as the 
protracted armed violence between an organised armed group and the state and between 
such groups within a state, does more of amplify rather than clarify what an armed conflict 
is, because the crucial questions of the intensity of the violence and the organisation of the 
non-state armed group, remain highly controversial, especially in light of the nature of 
recent conflicts worldwide.   
For practical application of the foregoing challenges to the ICC framework, Robertson 
(2012) makes the closest albeit minimal connection between crimes against humanity and 
force used to control crowds. He refers to the 2011 political and security situations in Syria 
and Egypt before those countries’ descent into war and asserts that the state actions of 
violence characterizing those times were clear cases of crimes against humanity (2012: 
600, 604 emphasis added). However, at the same time, he ironically acknowledges that in 
both those countries the point at which lethal force was meant to be used lawfully remains 
unclear (2012: 605 emphasis added).  
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 The paradox in Robertson’s argument lies in the fact that even after admitting the inability 
to identify a clear standard for the unlawful use of lethal force, he proceeds to assert that the 
response by President Assad to the protestors in Syria was a crime against humanity. He 
appears to base this on reports that Assad deliberately used tanks, machine guns and snipers 
against unarmed crowds (Robertson 2012: 605, UNHRC report 2011, UN Doc. A-
HRC/18/53: paras 73-76).  He is also resolved in this conviction basing on the argument 
that the rules on the use of force and firearms during civil unrest were settled by the United 
Nations in 1990, namely, the Basic Principles on the use of Force and Firearms for Law 
enforcement officers (1990: 606). He argues further that in those rules even in violent 
demonstrations, lethal force is only to be used when strictly unavoidable in order to protect 
life, and that political instability cannot be invoked to waive these rules (emphasis added).    
What Robertson does not investigate however is how it is that even with these apparently 
‘settled rules’, he is still unable to identify at which point lethal force was lawful in both 
Egypt and Syrian contexts. His assertion is that the Basic Principles on Use of Force and 
Firearms are adequate to regulate use of force in civil unrest. By this assumption it would 
be easy to identify when force is disproportionate and consequently in light of the ICC 
statute, when such force amounts to crimes against humanity. However, this position 
remains unclear and thus the issue persists: when, in the control of violent protests is force 
disproportionate and tantamount to crimes against humanity? 
This question buttresses both lower threshold violence and borderline situations, and is 
further explored through an investigation of the application of the principle of 
proportionality under IHRL in the ensuing section.  
 
4.2.4 The absence of an internal boundary: proportionality of force in the protection 
of the right to life 
 
According to Bitti, internationally recognised human rights are likely the most important 
source of law under Article 21 of the ICC Statute, after the Statute itself and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence (2009: 300). Indeed the ICC has relied heavily on decisions from 
regional human rights courts such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter 
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American Court of Human Rights (Bitti 2009: 301). However, as observed above, the 
application of human rights law to the ICC Statute presents contradictions for the 
application of the principle of legality. The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) protects the right to life, providing that no one may be arbitrarily deprived 
of it (Article 6). However as already observed, the covenant does not define what 
‘arbitrarily’ means (Sassoli and Olson, 2008:610). Other human rights treaties which 
incorporate the right have been equally ambiguous. This section will consider the 
interpretation of the right to life in riot control contexts with a particular focus on the 
principle of proportionality as it relates to the use of force. The section builds on the 
argument that the lack of an internal boundary for establishing lawful force in riot control 
contexts is rooted in the ambiguous nature of the principle of proportionality. It is further 
argued that the context specific application of this principle is demonstrative of the earlier 
articulated impracticality of establishing a comprehensive objective standard of force for 
prospective application to riot control contexts. This lack of a framework within which the 
ICC might operate to establish an objective legal basis for culpability for crimes against 
humanity renders the interpretive process for such contexts highly innovative and in the 
alternative, highly factual and context specific rather than based on objective principles. 
These as indicated above are counter to Grover’s mandatory guidelines for the application 
of ICC legality.  The section also maintains the argument that the ambiguous nature of 
proportionality, just like the ambiguity of internal armed conflict threshold, is a reflection 
of the Hobbesian sovereign’s discretion which is counter to the concept of an objective 
legal standard. The demonstration of these arguments is delivered through an analysis of 
selected jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights and the American 
Convention of Human Rights, being regional courts before which questions of 
proportionality and protecting the right to life in law enforcement contexts have arisen. 
While these cases deal with state human rights violations as opposed to individual criminal 
responsibility, their interpretations on the question of proportionality as it relates to states’ 
protection of the right to life is relevant for advancing the analysis of the state centric nature 
of the laws regulating riot control, and the challenge this might pose for an individual 
criminal prosecution of a state official for using excessive force during riot control. In 
addition, as already highlighted, the ICC Statute recognises human rights treaties as an 
interpretive source. The caution of course remains that the distinct legal structures of both 
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human rights and international criminal law systems be kept in mind (Stahn and Van den 
Herik 2012: 54) 
 
4.2.5 McCann and others v. UK (Application no.18984/91 27 September 1995) 
 
 This was a decision by the European Court of Human Rights involving a suspected IRA 
terrorist mission and the UK police. Two police officers of the respondent state shot and 
killed all three suspects during a suspected terrorist plot. The testimony of the two officers 
showed that they had shot the victims under an honest belief that they were reaching for 
buttons on their person in order to set off a car bomb. During trial, the main issue of 
contention was whether there had been a violation of the right to life under article 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (European Convention).  The Convention 
recognizes a limitation of the right to life where it is absolutely necessary to use of force; a) 
in defense of any person against unlawful violence, b) to effect a lawful arrest c) to prevent 
the escape of a lawfully detained person, and for purposes of preventing a riot or 
insurrection.  
The UK police officers argued that it was necessary for them to shoot to kill the deceased 
suspects as it was the only way to remove the threat they posed.  
In deciding the reasonableness of their belief, the court observed that case law had 
established reasonableness to be determined according to the facts that the user of the force 
honestly believed to exist at the time. The Court added that this was a subjective test as to 
what the user believed, but that it was accompanied by an objective test as to whether the 
user of the force had reasonable grounds for his or her subjective belief (Application 
no.18984/91: para.134 emphasis added) 
The court referred to an old case of in AG for Northern Ireland’s Reference (1976) to 
summarize that the reasonableness of the force used depended on a determination whether 
the mischief could have been prevented by less violent means and on what could 
reasonably be anticipated from the disproportionate force used against the injury or 
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mischief which it was intended to prevent (AG for Northern Ireland’s Reference 1976: 
para135).  
The court also applied article 2 of the European Convention, pointing out that the content of 
the right to life had to be guided by the objective and purpose of the entire convention 
which was an instrument for the protection of individual human beings and had to be 
interpreted so as to make it practical and effective. In further analysis of article 2, the court 
made three key observations, namely:  a) That the convention does not delineate 
circumstances where it is lawful to kill, but rather circumstances where force which may 
result in unintended consequences involving the loss of life may be permissible,  b) that the 
use of the phrase “absolutely necessary” imposes a much stricter test of necessity than that 
applied by states in measuring necessary action in a democratic society and c) that as such, 
in a democratic society, the state must subject the deprivation of life to close scrutiny and 
not just considering the actions of the state agencies involved, but also all the surrounding 
circumstances such as the planning of the operation (McCann Application no.18984/91: 
para.146). 
In making a comparison with the domestic law of Gibraltar under which the respondent’s 
police officers had earlier been exonerated, the complainants argued that that law violated 
the European Convention as it contained a less strict standard for the use of lethal force, 
allowing force to be used where it was ‘reasonably justifiable’ in contrast to the 
Convention’s higher standard of ‘absolutely necessary’ (McCann Application no.18984/91: 
para.152).  The court dealt with this argument dismissively, stating that a difference in 
wording alone was not sufficient for a finding of an article 2 violation, and that the 
Convention did not require national laws to have exactly similar wording as it, provided the 
substance of the right was protected (McCann Application no.18984/91: para.158).   
I submit however that this argument warranted more scrutiny than the court accorded it, 
considering that earlier findings of the national inquest had found no wrong doing on the 
part of the respondents basing on the ‘reasonably necessary’ test. The disparity in findings 
of liability under both tests is indicative of the lack of universally objective standard on 
lawful use of force as stated above.  
As regards the subjective and context specific nature of measuring force, the Court found 
that the police officers honestly believed on the basis of the information they had been 
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given, that it was necessary to kill the suspects in order to prevent them from detonating the 
bomb (McCann Application no.18984/91: para 200). This remained true even though it was 
eventually found that there was in fact no car bomb to be detonated.  The court stated:  
 
The use of force by agents of the state in pursuit of one of the aims delineated in 
paragraph 2 of the Convention may be justified under article 2 where it is based on 
an honest belief which is perceived for good reasons to be valid at the time but 
where it subsequently turns out to be mistaken. To hold otherwise would be to 
impose an unrealistic burden on the state and its enforcement personnel in the 
execution of their duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and those of others.  
 
However, the court did find there was a violation of article 2 with regard to the planning of 
the mission (McCann Application no.18984/91: para. 213). The basis for the finding was 
that the officials should have opted to arrest the deceased persons and not given them the 
opportunity to enter into Gibraltar where the car bomb was suspected to be, and where the 
need to use lethal force was heightened.   
The dissenting opinion rightly cautioned that the court should not be taken up by the benefit 
of hindsight. It was here counter argued that the state could have opted to let the deceased 
into Gibraltar so that there was a stronger basis on which to arrest the accused and press 
charges as opposed to making an arrest without sufficient evidence linking them to the 
alleged plot, only to release them and run an even higher risk of retaliation (McCann 
Application no.18984/91: paras. 8, 11). 
The McCann Judgement reveals some critical points for legality under the ICC Statute 
which must be noted. In the first instance, the broad interpretation of the right to life 
adopted by the court takes into consideration the objective of the European Convention as a 
whole. This is however befitting for a human rights as opposed to an international criminal 
law statute such as the ICC statute. As observed earlier by Grover (2014), this difference 
between the IHLR and international criminal law regimes means that while the former will 
adopt broad based interpretations aimed at enforcing states’ human rights obligations, the 
latter takes a narrow based approach aimed at securing a conviction for individual criminal 
liability while being constrained by a strict legality requirement aimed at among other 
things, respecting the accused person’s fair trial rights and the presumption of innocence. It 
must here be recalled Grover’s mandatory legality guidelines which emphasize that only 
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the specific ICC statute provision under consideration and not the objective of the entire 
ICC framework ought to be applied in the interpretation of crimes under the statute. It 
follows from this that the European Court’s interpretation and application of proportionality 
to the police planning process in McCann is of limited practical significance for measuring 
liability under article 7 of the ICC statute. Moreover, as observed in the dissenting opinion, 
such an approach would be highly grounded in the benefit of hindsight and facts as opposed 
to objective principles upon which riot control planning might be assessed for legality well 
in advance of execution.  
The second point to note is one about context.  While the case articulates some standards 
for the use of force in high security cases, it does not deal with the use of force in situations 
of large scale sporadic violence such as manifested in Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt or Syria 
as briefly addressed above. It therefore serves a limited function as a framework of analysis 
for legitimate force in such contexts and it is submitted, should not be taken as a reference 
point for them either.  One of the key contradictions that can be anticipated is the 
requirement for advance planning to ensure limited violence. The police in this case had 
information about the deceased persons’ suspected plans and movements and arguably had 
a considerable level of control over the targets and the unfolding of events. This cannot be 
the same standard applied to the kind of sporadic violence by thousands of armed militia in 
Kenya or Cote D’Ivoire or Syria where the state forces may have no control over the 
trajectory of the violence. This point is further demonstrated in chapter four.  
The third observation relates to the subjectivity and objectivity tests proffered by the court 
and the dilemma these present for achieving objective criteria.  I argue that the subjective 
‘honestly believed test’ militates against the idea of a universal standard for an honest 
belief, while the ‘objective belief’ test which determines whether the user of force had 
reasonable grounds for his or her subjective belief would arguably be based on the court’s 
benefit of hindsight and in the comfort of the courtroom without the pressure of life and 
death considerations in violent riot control contexts.   
The foregoing arguments point towards the fact of a legal vacuum which was confirmed 
later in Nachora and others vs. Bulgaria where the European Court actually points to the 
lack of a universal standard on the use of force and notes that article 2 of the Convention 
calls upon states to delineate an appropriate framework outlining the circumstances in 
114 
 
which their law enforcement officers may use force and firearms in line with international 
standards (Nachora 43577/98 and 43579/98, 2005: para. 95).   
The application of the right to life before the Inter-American Court of human rights has not 
met with any greater specificity as demonstrated below.    
 
 
4.2.6 Montero Aranguren et al v. Venezuela (July 5 2006) Series C No. 150 
   
The case of Montero Aranguren et al v. Venezuela (Montero case, Series C No. 150) was 
brought under the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention) and 
involved a shooting at a prison following inmates’ attempted escape.  63 prisoners were 
killed, 52 injured and 28 disappeared. The evidence showed that they were shot at 
indiscriminately by the Venezuelan National Guard and Metropolitan Police using firearms 
and teargas. In discussing the use of force, the American Court of Human Rights (the 
Court) stated that force and coercive means could only be used where other methods of 
control had been exhausted or failed. Further that force was to be used only to the minimum 
extent possible and not exceeding what was absolutely necessary in relation to the threat to 
be repelled. In determining that the state officials used excessive force to respond to the 
escape, the court found a violation of article 4 of the American Convention on the right to 
life (Montero case, Series C No. 150: para. 70-71). The case did not expound on what was 
absolutely necessary use of force in these circumstances and what was not, leaving 
unexplored yet another opportunity for filling the foregoing gaps observed in the law.  
One case however, does make a modest distinction between the standards of liability for 
use of force under human rights law and criminal law. The case of Zambaro Velez et al v. 
Ecuador (Judgment of July 4, 2007. Series C No. 166). involves an arrest mission by the 
Ecuadorian navy, army and air force in a joint operation carried out under an emergency 
law. It engaged around 1,200 agents who used army trucks, bombs and helicopters. It was 
targeted at suspected criminals, drug traffickers and terrorists and resulted in the death of 
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the complainants’ relatives. The complainants argued against the state that the planning of 
the mission contemplated the use of excessive means and left little room for assessments as 
to proportionality and necessity of the force used on the mission (Zambaro Case Series C 
No. 166: para. 74). The court observed that since there was no evidence of the use of less 
lethal methods, the mission looked more like an attack and attempt to execute the suspects 
rather than prevent crime (Zambaro Case Series C No. 166: para.77).  
Two main points of interest can be observed in this case. The first is a distinction which the 
court makes between criminal liability and human rights violations. In trying to gain 
exoneration under the Convention, the state argued that under the Ecuadorian Criminal 
Code, the state officials would not have been culpable. The court stated that in order for a 
finding of a violation under the American Convention to be made, it was not necessary for 
there to be a finding of criminal liability under the said national law. It was sufficient to 
only demonstrate that state authorities permitted or allowed the actions which led to the 
violation of rights protected under the convention (Zambaro Case Series C No. 166: 
para.124). This is perhaps the first considerable attention which is given to the distinction 
between the levels of liability under criminal versus human rights frameworks. 
Unfortunately, the court does not discuss further the fundamental basis for such a 
distinction or how both liabilities relate to each other.  As such this decision too is of 
limited significance in establishing boundaries for legality under the ICC framework 
concerning proportionality of use of force. This argument, much like the one made in 
McCann above, also demonstrates the disparity of proportionality standards under domestic 
law and international law which is further explored in chapter four in an analysis of 
national laws on riot control.  
The Court also conflates IHL and IHRL principles in articulating a standard for the use of 
force, thereby failing to demarcate parameters for measuring force in contexts not 
amounting to armed conflict. In laying down what appear to be principles for the use of 
force in law enforcement contexts; necessity, humanity and proportionality, the court states 
that the principle of necessity justifies only the means of military violence that are not 
forbidden by international law and that are proportionate and relevant for the immediate 
subjugation of the enemy with the least possible cost of human and economic resources 
(Zambaro Case Series C No. 166: para.85). It offers no further explanation of the anomaly 
of applying the expression ‘military means’ to a law enforcement context. On the principle 
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of humanity, the court states that the principle’s role is to compliment and inherently limit 
the principle of necessity by limiting the use of violent means that are not necessary for the 
achievement of a ‘definite military advantage’. Yet again there is an unexplained conflation 
with armed conflict standards and no attempt to explain what the “military advantage” was 
in this specific context involving the arrest of suspected criminals.   
From an overall assessment of the foregoing regional court decisions, and IHLR treaty 
provisions the legal standards set for establishing proportionate force remain highly 
ambiguous and very specific to scenarios warranting arrest in controlled contexts, as 
opposed to the complex situations likely to confront state officials in riot control situations 
including those bordering on armed conflict, which might require reactive armed responses 
cutting across a magnitude of objectives.  As such, the interpretation at the human rights 
treaty level remains incomprehensive and not inclusive enough to avail a universal 
framework upon which the ICC might draw for an interpretation of crimes against 
humanity in a riot control contexts. This lack of a framework for measuring proportionality 
in use of force situations is briefly demonstrated below through an analysis of varied 
context approaches to the applications of the principle. 
 
4.3 The indefiniteness of proportionality and the challenge for prosecution: drawing 
from IHL discourse 
 
Clarke (2012) has analysed the challenge presented by the subjectivity of proportionality 
for a prosecution under the ICC statute albeit in respect of war crimes. However his 
analysis can be compared to similar challenges in riot control situations given that problems 
regarding tactical planning and foreseeability occur in both contexts. Moreover, it is the 
closest analysis yet of proportionality under the legality framework of the ICC Statute. 
Thus Clarke observes that operational decisions for the application of proportionality as 
codified under article 51(5) (b) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, vary in 
each context (2012: 81). He notes that while proportionality is an important element in IHL, 
considerable doubt still abounds as to the adequacy of lex lata defining its parameters due 
to the fact that rules concerning its interpretation and application are difficult to interpret 
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and are highly subject to politicization (Clarke 2012:82). In his assessment of scholarship 
on the subject, there are two main divergent views concerning the adequacy of lex lata on 
proportionality. The less critical view is that proportionality is a broad standard and not a 
rule. As such, it is incapable of further refinement and application as a strict rule of law. 
Proponents of this view argue that proportionality lex lata ought to be viewed as lex 
ferenda and is to be applied in good faith in order to deal with unforeseen situations.   On 
the other hand, the more critical view argues that proportionality as articulated in IHL 
treaty provisions is too subjective and difficult to apply. Further that its ambiguity only 
works in favour of the military as opposed to the civilian. At the same time however, some 
critical views argue that in fact the ambiguity is detrimental to the military as it offers no 
guidance to decision makers by failing to set absolute standards for combat operation 
results. As such, the criticism maintains, the ambiguity of the principle of proportionality 
fails to provide arbitration by its inability to offer clear guidelines for a defense to a war 
crimes prosecution or how to avoid one during military planning. To this end, the critics 
have called for a meeting of military and legal experts to revise the lex lata and provide 
more specific parameters for the principle of proportionality in IHL contexts (Clarke 2012: 
83-84).  Clarke observes that despite the abundant legal doctrine surrounding it, the 
substantive content and application of the principle of proportionality remains unresolved. 
He further observes that the lack of universal standard for the application of the principle is 
due to the divergent backgrounds and value systems of the various decision makers, which 
cannot be standardized.  
It is here worth noting that these observations regarding divergent backgrounds and context 
affecting the application of proportionality have been observed to influence law 
enforcement contexts as well. A 2008 study on how the police in the Netherlands, 
Germany, Australia, Venezuela and Brazil perceive the use of force, found that while all 
the participants were aware of legal standards regulating their use of force, the law 
enforcement officers from different jurisdictional backgrounds applied these standards 
differently in their unique circumstances (Waddington, Adang et al 2008: 112). Clarke 
notes that decision making challenges often arise in hard cases and that there is need for a 
guidance document to aid decision makers on the standards of proportionality (2012:87, 
89,122).  He highlights without further development some proposals towards such a 
standard, including numerical equations to assign value to the lives of combatants relative 
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to those of civilians and a rebuttable presumption of disproportionate force where civilians 
not taking part in hostilities are killed (2012: 93). Needless to say, both proposals are 
indicative of the fundamental nature of the legal vacuum underlying the principle of 
proportionality.  
The divergent liberal and critical views on proportionality in IHL contexts have played out 
in the case of Beit Sourik Village Council v. The Gov’t of Israel (The wall fence case HCJ 
2056/04, 2004) and The Public Committee Against Torture in Israel et al v. The 
Government of Israel et al (The targeted killing case HCJ 769/02, 2006). These cases are of 
particular interest because of their divergent approaches to proportionality and the 
difference of contexts to which the principle is being applied.  In The Wall fence case the 
Supreme Court of Israel considered whether Israel’s plans to build what it called a security 
wall cutting off Palestinian citizens from their farm lands was proportionate for the interests 
of Israel’s security. The court found that the route chosen for the wall would have a 
disproportionate impact on the lives of Palestinian farmers as they would be cut off from 
their land and from access to the olive trees thereon from which they derived their 
livelihood. Moreover, the court further observed, no alternative lands had been provided for 
them. The restricted access to their land which would fall on the other side of the wall 
would be a violation of their right to property and their freedom of movement. The Court 
further noted that Israel’s interests could still be secured by an alternative route (Wall fence 
case HCJ 2056/04, 2004: para. 60, 61).  
In the Targeted killing case, the petitioners challenged the Israel Army’s policy of targeted 
killings or assassination against people it suspected to be terrorists. They argued that the 
policy violated humanitarian law and human rights law.   The court found that armed forces 
may target terrorists when they take a direct part in hostilities, provided the principle of 
proportionality in such cases was observed. It further held that there was no clear basis on 
which to assert that targeted killings were permitted or prohibited under customary 
international law but rather that each determination of legality depended on the unique 
circumstances of each case. In discussing the balance between human rights protected 
during armed conflict and military necessity, Justice Barak noted that the balance between 
the two objectives was not fixed. In some instances, the military necessity may outweigh 
the needs of the local population and vice versa (Targeted killing case, 2006: para 22).  He 
pointed out that in armed conflict contexts a major principle that facilitates the process of 
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creating this balance is the principle of distinction, which permits the targeting of 
combatants and persons taking active part in hostilities and protects civilians for as long as 
they are not taking part in hostilities (Targeted killing case HCJ 769/02, 2006: para 23).  
Central to the implementation of the principle of distinction however, is the principle of 
proportionality, which he acknowledges as a general principal of law and a part of 
customary international law (Targeted killing case, HCJ 769/02, 2006: para 41). Justice 
Barak observes that the balancing of interests under the principle of proportionality is a 
complex ethical issue (Targeted killing case, HCJ 769/02, 2006: paras 45-6). He states in 
particular (para 58) as follows: 
Proportionality is not a precise criterion. Sometimes there are several ways of 
satisfying its requirements. A margin of proportionality is created. The court is the 
guardian of its limits. The decision within the limits of the margin of proportionality 
rests with the executive branch. This is its margin of appreciation.  
 
However, the clear limits of the margin of proportionality are not laid out as the Justice 
observes, a key limitation of judicial scrutiny to such cases is that it cannot be applied 
prospectively but rather retrospectively and differently according to each unique case (para.  
59). The court concludes (para 60) that: 
 
What emerges is not that a preventative attack is always permitted or that it is 
always prohibited…we cannot determine that a preventative attack is always legal, 
just as we cannot determine that it is always illegal. Everything depends upon the 
question whether the criteria of customary international law relating to international 
armed conflicts permit a specific preventative attack or not. 
 
From these two cases, I argue that while the court was more proactive with the 
interpretation of proportionality in the Wall fence case, even suggesting an alternative route 
for the wall, it was more cautious with identifying boundaries of lawful state conduct in the 
Targeted killing case, which deals with issues of a more tactical nature involving the 
application of the law in the spontaneous and volatile armed conflict contexts. This inability 
to apply a clear objective legal standard for prospective reference resonates with the 
foregoing observations and definitional challenges regarding the use of force in riot control 
contexts.  This state of affairs presents potential contradiction between state discretion and 
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judicial discretion in such contexts considering that the former is applied before judicial 
review and without clear objective standards of application while the latter occurs after the 
fact, but without prior clearly defined standards. In the ICC statute legality framework, such 
tension goes to the core of Grover’s mandatory guidelines regarding foreseeability of 
prohibited conduct and the guideline to avoid public policy controversy. 
 
4.4 Persistent ambiguity under customary law 
 
The foregoing vacuum within the ‘applicable treaties’ is indicative of an equivalent absence 
of objective standard within ‘principles and rules of international law’ as the other source of 
law listed under the statute’s article 21 (1) (b). There is a consensus among scholars that 
‘principles and rules’ of international law’ as stated above in fact refers to customary 
international law (Pellet 2002: 1070-1072, Grover 2014: 262, 263).   
While customary international law’s components under Article 38(1) (b) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) comprise general practice accepted as law among 
states, there is no consensus on how to determine these components. In particular, scholars 
disagree on what activity qualifies as state practice and with what duration and frequency it 
must occur before it qualifies as custom. The ICJ never established or maintained a 
methodology for deriving customary law (Talmon 2015: 417, Petersen 2007:276). 
Moreover, quantifying and qualifying the practice of over 200 states in the world in order to 
determine custom is impractical. As such, judicial interpretations based on custom are 
prone to criticism for arbitrariness (Petersen 2007: 276). Talmon points out that the process 
of arriving at customary law whether it be by analyzing state practice or opinio juris is 
highly subjective and selective. Indeed he argues that in the majority of its decisions, the 
ICJ has not examined state practice and opinio juris but has merely asserted the existence 
of certain rules as customary law (2015: 432, 441). Petersen has observed however, that the 
role of state practice in establishing custom is fast diminishing in favour of opinio juris and 
has been extended to ‘paper conduct’ which includes the conduct and pronouncements of 
international organisations (2007: 278, 280). Anaya observes that the activities of 
international institutions including statements and resolutions concerning human rights play 
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a role in shaping state conduct or may provide evidence of what states believe their 
obligations to be under customary international law (1998: 43).  
Regarding use of force in riot control contexts, I argue that uniform state practice and an 
agreed upon standard is nonexistent in light of the foregoing analysis. An analysis of 
national laws on the riot control in the ensuing chapter confirms the lack of a uniform 
standard to constitute the existence of customary law on use of force in riot control 
contexts. Furthermore, the existing UN pronouncements on riot control embodied in the 
Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms for Law Enforcement Officers (UN 
Basic Principles), are not universally recognized by all states. While the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions has lauded them as widely 
acknowledged among states and human rights institutions (UN Doc. A/HRC/26/36 2014: 
Para. 44, Amnesty International 2015: 11), He only cites Australia and Brazil as countries 
which have relied on them to guide domestic legislation. In the same document he does 
acknowledge that the principles are still unknown to important constituencies (UN Doc. 
A/HRC/26/36 2014: Para. 44- 45). Where they have been applied, the principles’ own lack 
of a clear operational framework and their ambiguity has facilitated fundamental alternation 
to suit different national contexts. The principles do not circumvent the foregoing challenge 
to provide external or internal boundaries within which proportionate and as such lawful 
force in riot control contexts including threshold scenarios can be determined (Amnesty 
2015: 11). These arguments will be enumerated further in Chapter Four as part of an 
assessment of the effectiveness of general principles from national law as interpretive 
sources under article 21 (1)( c ) of the ICC statute.  
5. Conclusion 
 
The main sources of law for the interpretation of crimes against humanity in riot control 
contexts, namely the ICC Statute, the Elements of Crimes, the Applicable treaties and 
customary law are inadequate to provide a frame work for an effective criminalization of 
excessive force used in riot control contexts. This is fundamentally due to the ambiguity of 
law on the use of force in riot control contexts through which the discretion of the 
Hobbesian sovereign is perpetuated. The existence of such discretion is so pervasive that it 
permeates into legal provisions in diverse treaty regimes which seek to establish boundaries 
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of legality to regulate it, ensuring their perpetual circularity. The result in the highly 
restrictive context of ICC legality is the lack of a framework from the ICC’s interpretive 
sources, on which to base a prosecution for crimes against humanity in riot control contexts 
without a high risk of legislative innovation or public policy controversy. While an attempt 
at a more lax legality standard is offered, it is still inherently wrought with subjectivity and 
in such a state cannot offer effective tools for circumventing the circularity of law 
surrounding the use of force in riot control contexts. The challenge to effective 
criminalization of such force under the crimes against humanity regime is also due in part 
to the under development of crimes against humanity as international crimes in their own 
right. The historical evolution of these crimes in armed conflict contexts has fostered their 
conflation with IHL parameters for establishing liability which has contributed to their 
inhibited articulation in riot control contexts.  
Specifically, state parties to the ICC Statute never reflected sufficiently on the application 
of crimes against humanity to law enforcement contexts and this shows through the legal 
uncertainty surrounding the question in actual riot control situations which have come 
before the ICC. While the Hobbesian sovereign’s role is also apparent in this 
underdevelopment, the judges of the ICC have also missed or avoided opportunities to 
foster the development of crimes against humanity in law enforcement contexts which 
manifested in the situations of Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire. These situations were also missed 
opportunities for the court to demonstrate how it can circumvent its strict legality 
restrictions in hard cases whilst effectively fulfilling its interpretive role and avoiding 
criticism for legislative innovation.  
In final analysis, absolute legal certainty is impractical and the highly subjective nature of 
and circularity of laws concerning riot control render an interpretation exercise seem 
illusory. In the context of the ICC where decisions may be highly politicized the objectivity 
and legality of such an interpretation process is even more challenging. The nature of cases 
involving state use of force in riot contexts as seen in the foregoing examples could arise in 
the wake of post-election violence, ethnic or other political violence. In such scenarios the 
Hobbesian sovereign is wont to draw on its monopoly on the use of force to justify its 
actions. The lack of an objective international framework upon which to measure these 
actions is a hindrance to effective criminalization of excessive force that may be used by 
state officials in riot control contexts. This state of legal uncertainty affirms the earlier 
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assertion that state parties to the ICC Statute have not engaged in consensus building and as 
such have not developed a shared understanding of the boundaries of liability under the 
Statute’s article 7, for force used in riot control contexts.  
Ultimately, there may be a need for State parties to engage in further negotiations and 
research with a view to setting out at the very least, a minimum set of universal parameters 
which might serve as shared understandings among them of what otherwise lawful conduct 
by state officials may be described as a crime against humanity under the ICC Statute. 
Without such a parameter, the highly state centric and discretionary law on riot control 
poses a significant challenge for a precarious balance of article 7 between judicial 
interpretation and legislative innovation. This approach would not be made with the claim 
of absolute certainty for all prospective riot control situations, but would at the very least be 
a foundation in which the ICC might ground a determination of culpability for crimes 
against humanity in riot control contexts. The alternative would be for the ICC to take a 
liberal approach to the interpretation of the statute’s legality restrictions but at the risk of 
undermining its own legitimacy.   
As is further demonstrated in the next chapter, the highly state centric nature of law 
enforcement forms the basis for disparate standards of use of force in national law contexts 
which then undermines the option of extracting general principles of law from these 
contexts for transposition on to the international level under the ICC statute. The restriction 
against judicial innovation to cure the interpretation gap under article 7 is magnified by an 
analysis of the disparate standards on riot control under national law where the Hobbesian 
sovereign enjoys even greater prominence.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES FROM NATIONAL LAWS AND THE UN BASIC 
PRINCIPLES ON THE USE OF FORCE AND FIREARMS.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The ICC Statute lists general principles of law obtained by the Court from legal systems of 
the world as one of the sources of law that can be turned to if the Statute itself, its Elements 
of Crimes and the applicable treaties, rules and principles of international law do not fill a 
gap in the ICC’s interpretation and decision making process. As a source of law general 
principles are plagued by a series of methodological and substantive criticisms which are 
further exacerbated under the strict legality requirements of the ICC Statute. In this Chapter 
I argue that the pervasiveness of the Hobbesian sovereign’s discretion on the question of 
use of force in riot control presents a particularly complex situation wherein the extraction 
of substantive general principles on the use of force in riot control, from inherently open 
ended national law provisions on the same, poses a challenge for filling the gap in the law 
without violating the principle of legality. I argue that while such a task might be achieved 
for lower thresholds of violence, it would be an illusory undertaking for the more 
borderline cases of violence such as those reviewed in chapter three above. The ensuing 
analysis of selected legal provisions illustrates fundamental differences between states’ 
standards on key pillars of necessity, precaution and means and methods of applying force 
in riot control contexts, which indicates the paradox in purporting to abstract general 
principles from them. Moreover, the residual discretion inherent in the riot control laws 
renders the very idea of an objective standard illusory. I argue that the intricate connection 
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between national standards on law enforcement and the discretion of the Hobbesian 
sovereign yields a situation where those standards depend ultimately on subjective 
determinations which are wont to be driven more by political and security considerations of 
the Hobbesian sovereign. This merger of law and sovereign is the basis for the enduring 
dissolution of law in the face of state violence and the resultant circularity in the language 
of law at national level. This assessment renders illusory the very concept of abstracting 
general principles from inherently abstract standards with a view to applying them at the 
international level under the ICC Statute framework.  
This chapter aims to illustrate this argument by analysing the substantive and 
methodological issues at play in the process of extracting and transposing general principles 
on the use of force onto the ICC statute to define crimes against humanity.     
The main objectives of the chapter are therefore to conceptualise general principles of law 
as provided under article 21 of the ICC statute and to analyse how the concept relates to the 
statute’s principle of legality under article 22. The next objective is to assess the 
methodological and substantive challenges of using general principles of law as a source of 
law under the ICC statute.  Under this objective, the chapter analyses and classifies certain 
national laws’ provisions on use of force in riot control with a view to identifying the 
challenges of abstracting general principles of law from them and assessing the 
effectiveness of such exercise under the ICC’s legality standard. The chapter will also 
analyse effectiveness of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officers as possible an alternative source of law under the 
ICC Statute for use of force standards.   
The Chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section is the introduction, the second 
section explores the background of general principles of law, the methodological and 
substantive issues underlying them as well as their application. The third section discusses 
the application of general principles by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and ad hoc tribunals such as the international 
criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. The fourth section analyses the methodological and 
substantive criticisms of general principles of national law under the framework of the ICC 
Statute. The fifth section analyses the extracted provisions of national laws on the use of 
force and firearms, and assesses their application as general principles under the ICC 
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Statute. The sixth section analyses the UN Basic principles on the use of force and firearms 
and their application under the ICC Statute. The seventh and final section contains the 
overall analysis and conclusion.   
 
2. General Principles of law as sources of law under international law 
 
In order to gain a clear concept of general principles of law as a source of law under Article 
21 of the ICC Statute, it is important to also understand their antecedents.  The earliest 
references to general principles can be traced to international arbitral decisions well before 
the adoption of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and they 
arguably influenced the foundations of international law (Giorgio 2014: para. 1, Pellet 
2006, 764).  The principles later gained prominence under Article 38 paragraph c of the 
PCIJ Statute as ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’. This wording is 
maintained under article 38 (1) (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
as a near duplication of article 38 (c) of the PCIJ Statute which it replaced (Giorgio 2014: 
para 1-4). Even at their earliest conception, there was no consensus as to the meaning of 
general principles of law (Crawford 2012:34, Pellet 2006: 764). Within the committee of 
Jurists who prepared the PCIJ Statute was a Belgian delegate who contemplated that 
general principles were equivalent to natural law principles, and had in his draft, referenced 
these sources as ‘the rules of international law recognized by the legal conscience of 
civilized peoples’. Another delegate from the United States perceived the phrase as 
granting the court powers to rely on subjective concepts of justice. Ultimately, a 
compromise position was arrived at which still left the court with enough powers to 
develop and refine the said principles of justice, while they retained a character of 
objectivity, hence the final phrase ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations’ (Crawford 2012: 34). More specifically, it has been clarified that the intention of 
the drafters was for the application of those laws that existed in domestic law (Pellet 
2006:768, Neha 2014: 19)  
 
It should be noted that under the Statute of the Permanent International Court of Justice 
(SPICJ), the main basis for providing general principles of law recognized by civilized 
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nations as a source of law was to ensure that after treaties and customs, the court might still 
able to refer to a source of law to fill a lacunae in the law. The problem the drafters sought 
to cure is called non liquet (Shaw 2008: 98, Wallace and Martin –Ortega 2009: 23, Grover 
2014: 179). This situation may arise during a decision making process where the court 
realizes that there is no law regulating a particular point under consideration under a statute 
or previous court decisions. In such a situation, the court may find itself having to rely on 
rules existing as general principles which may be derived from national legal systems, in 
order to reach a final decision.  Raimondo (2008: 7) observes that international courts and 
tribunals may turn to general principles of law to fill legal gaps, interpret legal rules and to 
reinforce legal reasoning. A non liquet scenario is particularly likely to manifest under 
international law, given the considerable underdevelopment of rules to regulate all the 
scenarios with which it might be faced (Shaw 2008:98). This has been said to be especially 
the case for the less developed branches of international law such as international criminal 
law (Raimondo 2008: 8). Shaw expresses confidence in the inclusion of this source under 
article 38 (1) ( c ) of the ICJ Statute as a cure for non liquet, observing that every 
international law problem can be settled as a matter of law even when there may not be 
obvious rules applicable to the situation under consideration (2008:99). He does note 
however, the failure of the court to make a non-equivocal pronouncement on a rule of 
international law on the use of nuclear weapons by a state in self-defense against an attack 
where its very survival was at stake (2008:99).  A critical point to observe is that within the 
PCIJ and ICJ statutory framework, general principles do not compete with treaty and 
custom as interpretative aids and are only to be referred to where a given treaty or custom 
does not expressly resolve the matter in issue (Grover 2014:360, Cassese 2005: 183). 
However, with that being said there is no formal hierarchy established between the sources 
of law under these frameworks and all three sources can be applied simultaneously, with 
the main function of general principles being to fill any gaps for the avoidance of non 
liquet. Through the interpretation process however, the general principles remain 
autonomous as a material and formal source of law (Raimondo 2008:36-9). This view 
remains prominent among scholars even with respect to application under the ICJ Statute 
(Raimondo 2008:20, 43).  
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2.1 Problems with methodology and substance 
 
Even though they are an autonomous source of law, general principles are plagued by 
methodological and substantive inconsistencies.  It has been observed that tribunals, in 
using general principles as a source of law, do not have a mechanical system they follow 
for applying national law principles from which they abstract these principles. The 
argument has been made that tribunals only adapt and edit modes of general legal reasoning 
and comparative law analogies from national legal systems in order to then arrive at a 
comprehensive body of rules which they can apply during the international law making 
process. As such the content they extract for application, while largely influenced by 
national law, is ultimately the court’s creation (Crawford 2012: 35). This observation 
correlates with a general of disagreement among scholars as to the correct definition and 
methodology for identifying general principles of law (Pellet 2006: 766, Ford 1994-5:47, 
Ellis 2011:959, Neha 2014: 19).  A general reading of the literature reveals a disagreement 
over two key issues, namely: the methodological approach to general principles of law and 
the process of abstracting content and transposition of general principles to international 
law. These are discussed briefly in turn below. 
 
2.1.1 Methodological disparities 
 
According to Ford (1994-5: 47) some scholars take a comparativist approach to the process 
of abstracting general principles of law while others take the ‘categoricist’ approach. The 
comparativists are insistent upon an extensive comparative survey of national laws for the 
extraction of general principles while the ‘categoricists’ disregard the need for a ‘universal 
domestic consensus’ as they believe that by their very nature as general principles the 
relevant rules are grounded in reason and are ‘part of the modern law of nature’. By this 
method, general principles of law would be discernible from even a single legal system 
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(Ford 1994-5: 50).  Pellet seems to take the categoricist approach, observing that the 
comparative approach is unrealistic and unessential considering the all relevant material 
cannot be available to the parties for judicial consideration. Further that, in his opinion, the 
majority of modern national laws can be categorized into legal systems which are coherent 
(2006: 770). On his part, Ford believes that both approaches are extreme as they undermine 
the judicial discretion which is central to the process of decision making. Comparativism 
would reduce the judge to jurisprudential poll taking, while the categorist approach 
encourages judges to take the path of least resistance and undermines the rigor that is 
required in decision making. He recommends a synthesis between these two extremes with 
judges applying comparative methods whilst centering their discretion to determine 
common principles (Ford 1994-5: 51).  
 
In opposition to Pellet’s categoricist approach, Ellis and Neha point out that the distinction 
of national laws into legal systems is not coherent. Neha observes that the existing 
classifications into common law and civil law among other legal families exist in private 
law and would hardly be suitable for categories such as administrative, constitutional and 
criminal law. Moreover, she argues, the categorizations operate on macro and opposed to 
micro comparisons on specific legal issues and as such, laws belonging to the same legal 
system may have different solutions to specific legal problems and the categoricists would 
overlook this detail (2014: 63). This danger of conflating legal issues under the categorist 
approach is also recognized by Ellis (2011: 957).  Ellis recognizes another danger with the 
categorist approach which touches the very legitimacy of general principles of law as a 
source of law particularly if applied under international criminal law. Her concerns are 
based on the realities of the heterogeneity of laws and imbalances in economic and political 
power under international law which may eventually affect the legitimacy of law making 
processes and institutions (2011:955-6). Ellis’ concerns are based in a voluntarist approach 
which places emphasis on the consent of states to be bound by rules and as such, much like 
the comparativist approach emphasizes the need for methodology that aims at a wide 
comparative study in order to achieve universal representation (2011: 955).  
 
Ellis concludes on a generally pessimistic tone, noting that while many scholars observe 
that the dearth of comparative law application in judicial decisions thus far is problematic, 
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there is a minority who still believe that extensive comparative approaches are not 
necessary. In her final analysis, the prevailing international law methodology in 
unsatisfactory owing to fundamental flaws in the categorization of legal systems (2011: 
957). 
 
 
2.1.2 Content and transposition of general principles of law  
 
According to Pellet (2006: 766) although international lawyers have never agreed on the 
definition of the ICJ Statute’s article 38 general principles, they are in agreement that the 
principles are unwritten legal norms, recognized in states’ municipal laws, and that they 
must be transposable to the international level.  He notes that there have been reservations 
about the possibility of extracting general principles from a diverse range of national laws, 
but dismisses the concern, pointing out that the principles thus extracted need not be 
detailed rules but rather, general principles which give ‘general guidelines’ to the court to 
reach its decisions (2006: 769).  This view is backed by Kolb who explains in more 
descriptive terms, that general principles are not rules whose legal content tends to be 
narrow. He explains that general principles are not defined so precisely the way rules are 
but concomitantly, they are not worded as broad political statements. To this end, they 
provide a middle ground between lex lata and lex ferenda, combining abstraction and 
concreteness. Their generality and flexibility renders them suitable for dynamic application 
in future cases, while their anchorage in law grants them that core certainty that guards 
against criticism of arbitrariness (2006: 9).  He proceeds to offer an example of the 
principle of proportionality around which he claims three legal ideas have coagulated in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, namely, the idea that a measure taken should be able to 
fulfill an aim searched for otherwise it would be disproportionate, secondly, the least 
onerous means of achieving the said aim should be selected and finally that the gravity of 
the means taken to achieve the aim should correlate with the facts giving rise to the means 
used (Kolb 2006: 8).   
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This conceptualization of general principles is critical for the process of transposing general 
principles from national to international law systems.  It is generally agreed among scholars 
that the process of transposing general principles from national law does not involve a 
whole sale application of those laws to the international level, ‘lock stock and barrel’, but 
rather involves a process, after abstracting the principles, of ensuring that they are 
applicable at the international level, considering that the conditions and institutions vary at 
both levels and that following this, rules which might be justified at the national level may 
be unjustifiable at the international level and vice versa (Pellet 2006:772-3, Ford 1994-5:49, 
Ellis 2011: 959). By way of example, Pellet considers courts’ jurisdiction in national law 
which is not dependent on state consent, while at the international level subjecting a state to 
court jurisdiction cannot happen without that state’s consent.  
 
However, the foregoing optimistic view is counteracted by a more critical approach by Ellis 
(2011), who argues that attempts to distill rules to essential core principles is a mechanical 
and ‘unidimensional process’ which would yield incomplete results, considering that the 
existence of a rule in several legal systems is not indicative of its content. In her view, rules 
depend largely on the context within which they operate and as such, similar rules could 
take on different meanings in different contexts of application. She argues therefore that 
rules should be seen as part of a larger and very complex narrative and not as parts of a 
machine to be transplanted mechanically from national law to international law (2011: 
971). Neha makes the same argument, stating that any consensus achieved by considering 
legal principles in isolation of their domestic contexts only yields an illusory conclusion 
(2014: 81). In her analysis of the methodological and substantive criticisms surrounding 
general principles of law, Ellis proposes an abandonment of the quest to find a universal 
standard of rules or concepts and recommends a more honest approach where national rules 
are considered simply as part of arguments that can be made before an international tribunal 
in order to secure a decision, rather than claim them as representations of some objective 
standard (2011: 960-971).   
 
Ellis and Neha’s arguments against transposition and categorist approaches to general 
principles of law are clearly rooted largely in concerns about state consent in international 
law making process. Olufemi and Chin (1997) downplay these ‘consent based’ concerns, 
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pointing out that consensual issues exist even with other sources of law including 
customary international law and as such, that they may arise with the application of general 
principles of law should not be an accepted justification of a threat to the stability of 
international law.   
 
I argue that this variance of approaches and attitudes in conceptualizing general principles 
of law as a source of law has been at the center of the trends of application of the said 
principles as sources of law in international tribunals, with the permanent tribunals 
adopting a more cautious approach to the general principles, while the ad hoc tribunals 
have been more experimental and liberal in their application. At a more general level, the 
unsystematic application of the general principles as a source of law even within the ad hoc 
tribunals is reflective of the disharmony that has surrounded them since their incorporation 
into the PCIJ Statute and has followed them into the ICC Statute framework.  This state of 
affairs is explored further below.  
 
3. General principles of law under international courts and tribunals  
 
A number of scholars have analysed how general principles of law have been applied by 
courts and tribunals and the consensus seems to be that the PCIJ and ICJ have been hesitant 
in their application of general principles of law from domestic law, while the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) has been the more creative of the other ad hoc 
tribunals. It has however not surmounted the foregoing methodological and substantive 
criticisms which appear to be inherent in general principles as a concept of law. The ICC on 
the other hand, has had only a limited opportunity to apply general principles as a source of 
law, even though the available decisions indicate a rather rigid and avoidance tactic similar 
to one adopted by the ICJ. This scenario is discussed briefly below. 
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3.1 The ICJ and PCIJ   
It has generally been observed of the ICJ and the PCIJ that they never made it clear how 
they were applying general principles of law recognized by civilized nations as a source of 
law in the making of their decisions (Raimondo 2008: 21, Ellis 2011: 956).  Some scholars 
have gone on to dismiss their methodology as unscientific and merely based on the judges’ 
hunches’ (Schlesinger 1957, 734-5). Other scholars have been more specific and pointed 
out that most of the time when those courts referenced general principles of law, they in 
fact were using natural law precepts or general international law norms  or customary law 
to arrive at decisions (Ellis 2011: 955, Giorgio 2014: para 32, Raimondo 2008: 22).  
Giorgio and Raimondo highlight some decisions by the PCIJ and ICJ and conclude that 
general principles of law have played a minimal role in the decisions of these courts and 
they have not based any of their rulings exclusively on the said principles (Raimondo 2008: 
22).  Raimondo highlights the Corfu Channel Case and the Jaworzina Case as examples of 
how the ICJ and PCIJ arbitrarily referenced general principles of law but never 
demonstrated how they were extracted. In the Corfu Channel case the ICJ accepted the 
principle of admissibility of circumstantial evidence in a dispute between Albania and the 
United Kingdom over damage to the UK’s royal navy ships and loss of life owing to mines 
in Albania’s territorial waters, for which the latter denied responsibility. In examining 
whether Albania knew of the mines, the ICJ noted the difficulties of gathering such 
evidence and thereby permitted circumstantial evidence as it was acceptable In ‘all systems 
of law’ (Corfu Channel, 18).  Raimondo observes that the ICJ did not clarify how it came 
to conclude that circumstantial evidence was admissible under “all systems of law” and 
only speculates that perhaps the court considered national and international arbitral 
procedures in making the determination (2008:29).  In Giorgio’s view, the reference to “all 
systems of law” was used in this case to confirm an already established principle in 
international law (2014: para. 10). A similar general reference was made by the PCIJ in the 
Jaworzina Advisory Opinion regarding a territorial dispute between Poland and 
Czechoslovakia which the Allied Powers had referred to a Conference of Ambassadors for 
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settlement. The PCIJ relied on the principle of textual interpretation to conclude that the 
language of that conference’s decision could not be outweighed by the letter Poland sought 
to rely on to undermine the conference’s decision. Raimondo observes that the PCIJ did not 
enunciate how it arrived at the principle of textual interpretation, but he speculated that this 
was probably because international tribunals had severally previously applied the principle 
(Raimondo 2008: 24). The other observation has been made that where the courts 
referenced general principles of law alongside other rules, they were simply used to 
validate the decision based on those other rules (Raimondo 2008: 27). In this case, the 
General Principles are used to reinforce legal reasoning that led to the decision. This was 
the case for the Factory at Chorzow Case, in which the PCIJ referenced the principle that 
no advantage may be gained from one’s wrong alongside the Geneva Convention 
concerning Upper Silesia to conclude that it had jurisdiction over the case. The PCIJ relied 
on decisions both of national courts and international tribunals without yet again 
belabouring the methodology of abstracting general principles of from national law.  
The foregoing discussion provides an indication of the haphazard manner in which the PCIJ 
and ICJ have approached general principles, availing limited systematic guidance for the 
subsequent courts and ad hoc tribunals. It has been suggested that the reason why the courts 
avoided a rigorous engagement with general principles as a source of law was to avoid the 
difficulty of engaging in comparative analysis and the issues of state consent and 
voluntarism that might arise from such exercise (Giorgio 2014: para. 16, Ellis 2011: 956).  
This observation warrants a discussion of how the ad hoc tribunals, specifically the 
international criminal tribunals have approached general principles of law.  
 
3.2 International Criminal Tribunals   
 
While ad hoc international tribunals have been more rigorous than the ICJ and PCIJ in 
showing how they apply general principles of law derived from domestic legal systems, 
they have mainly faced criticism over how they have abstracted the principles and how they 
have transposed them for application on the international scene and the implications this 
has had for the principle of legality.  
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Raimondo (2008) has done a comprehensive study into the application of general principals 
of law by international criminal courts and tribunals. This chapter relies heavily on his 
work because his arguments and approach to general principles as a source of law are 
aligned with this study’s arguments and approach to analysis of general principles under the 
ICC framework. Raimondo’s approach provides a framework through which this study 
illustrates the adequacy or otherwise of general principles as a source of law under Article 
21 of the ICC Statute. He notes that with the emergence of the more rudimentary 
international criminal law, international criminal tribunals relied more on general principals 
to fill the gaps where definitions of actus reus and mens rea were indeterminate (Raimondo 
2008: 73, Cassese 2005: 193). In his assessment when these tribunals apply general 
principles of law, they do so using two methods: the vertical move and the horizontal move 
(2008: 45, 175,177). The former is aimed at extracting legal principles from national laws, 
while the latter tests whether the extracted principles are recognized by the nations (2008: 
45). Through his analysis of selected decisions of the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (IMT), the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the 
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) Raimondo identifies the enduring 
misapplication of general principles as well as their methodological and substantive 
inadequacies.  This is expounded further below.  
 
3.2.1 The vertical move:  challenges with the substance of general principals of law 
under international criminal law 
 
In extracting a general principle of law from national laws, some of the misapplications 
Raimondo observes include the challenge of compliance with legality, alteration of the 
substance of the general principle and in some cases the fabrication of the general principle. 
One example given is the criminalization of the crime of aggressive war under the 
Agreement for the Establishment of an International Military Tribunal of 1945 (The IMT 
Charter). In the IMT trial of German major war criminals, counsel for the defense argued 
that prosecution for the crime of aggressive war was in violation of the principle of nullum 
crimen nulla poena sine lege (nullum principle) in as far as it would amount to an ex post 
facto application of the law contrary to the law of civilized nations, considering that 
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national legal systems had neither criminalized nor provided penalties for aggressive war 
before the IMT Charter. The Counsel emphasized that nullum crimen was a fundamental 
principle recognized in international and national law. The IMT rejected this argument and 
contended that the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege was a principle of 
justice rather than a principle limiting sovereignty and that as such, it would be unjust to 
leave unpunished those who waged aggressive war. Further that the IMT Charter was 
binding and decisive and it was therefore unnecessary to consider whether aggressive war 
had been a crime before its execution (2008:78).  
However, there have been scholars who agreed with the defense counsel and even state that 
the IMT violated the nullum crimen principle in deciding this way (Werle 2005, Sadat 
2002: 185).  Raimondo himself notes that the tribunal did not explain what it meant by 
saying that the nullum principle was one of justice rather than ‘a limitation to sovereignty’ 
(2008:78). It is submitted that the dismissal of the nullum crimen principle was a missed 
opportunity to analyse how a criminal tribunal might resolve tensions between general 
principles abstracted from domestic law which contradict a treaty provision.  
The other observation is of a decision by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Furundzija, where the 
tribunal, after reviewing a selection of national laws and failing to extract a principle to 
define rape as including forced oral penetration, reverted to international criminal law and 
international law to solve this dilemma. From there, it extracted the principle of human 
dignity, which it relied on to then classify forced oral penetration as rape on the ground that 
it was a humiliating and degrading attack on human dignity (Raimondo 2008: 112-3).  
Raimondo observes that the ICTY formulation of the actus reus of oral penetration as a 
crime of rape was patently broader than what the national law provisions provided (2008: 
113). In his view, it was a contradiction for the court, upon finding no such definition of 
rape in national laws, to then revert to international law in order to cure the anomaly. In his 
view the court by so doing violated the principle of strict construction of criminal statutes 
and further that in light of the doubts from assessing the general principals of law, then the 
issue ought to have been resolved in favour of the accused in line with the principle of in 
dubio proreo (2008:114). This criticism against the ICTY has been severally highlighted by 
Ellis (2011: 968-9) who suggests that the court reverted to human rights principles of 
dignity in order to avoid having to seek for a common denominator for the definition of 
rape from national laws. Neha (2014: 38) has also critiqued the methodology used by the 
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court, pointing out how it reverted to international law for a solution when it had initially 
found the same international law to be unhelpful. She finally concluded that the tribunal 
introduced new sources of international criminal law to make the decision.    
These contradictions in the application of general principles are not so surprising given the 
apparent lack of clarity and uniformity that has in some instances been displayed among 
judges on the ways in which they determine what general principles are. This state of 
affairs also played out in the ICTY case of Prosecutor v. Erdemovic where the judges in a 
majority vote of three to two decided that duress could not provide a complete defense to 
crimes against humanity and war crimes. The decision was arrived at using policy 
considerations of international humanitarian law and the objectives of international criminal 
law after the judges failing to come up with consistent principles on the defense of duress 
from national laws (Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Opinion of Judge McDonald and 
Judge Vohrah, para. 72). The judges considered the overall goal of international criminal 
law to protect the lives of innocent people and the importance of placing limits on 
commanders and combined it with liberal interpretations of the principle in common law 
jurisdictions to eventually deny the accused the defense of duress (Erdemovic Case No. IT-
96-22-A, Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, para. 75-89).  
In his dissenting opinion Justice Cassese contested the policy approach stating that it 
violated the principle of legality, and further that the decision relied excessively on 
common law approaches to the defense of duress (Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-A, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, para 11).  
 
 
Substance and transposing of general principles  
A major challenge with the vertical move that is discernible from the foregoing discussion 
revolves around the substantive nature of the general principle to be extracted and the 
process of transposing it to apply at the international level. These issues were at the center 
of the Furundiza and Erdemovic decisions. 
Regarding the substantive nature of rules to be abstracted, in Erdemovic, one judge felt that 
the extracts should be a concrete and consistent rules, while some others felt that they need 
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not be concrete, but rather a general principle that embodies the reasons for the creation of 
a norm was sufficient (Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge 
McDonald and Judge Vohrah para. 72, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen 
para. 63). Raimondo (2008) maintains that the latter view is the correct one, explaining that 
general principals of law are but abstractions of legal rules deprived of their particular 
elements, and that it is crucial in extracting them, to determine their legal justification and 
the fundamental principles common to given institutions within the different national legal 
systems. In the final assessment of a comparative study, he asserts, what must be extracted 
ought to be a general principle of law rather than a concrete and detailed legal rule 
(2008:103) and that small differences in the content of legal rules from the various national 
legal systems should not impede the extraction of a general principle.  Furthermore, he 
propounds that the exercise should not involve a technical looking for coincidences among 
the legal rules but rather should be aimed at observing a common denominator in the 
relevant laws (2008: 49).   
However, referring to other scholars like Akehurst, Kolb and Weil, Raimondo notes that in 
some cases, the general principles that are obtained themselves often exist at a high degree 
of abstraction where they are excessively abstract, making them too vague to be applicable 
by international courts and tribunals (2008: 49). He notes Weil’s observation that if the 
rules from which the general principles are being abstracted are themselves too abstract, 
then so will the general principles and they will be of no use at the international level, 
particularly for international criminal law, which is wrought with challenges of 
indeterminacy co-existing in tension alongside criminal law requirements of specific 
interpretation (2008: 49). This theme is especially important for the exercise of abstracting 
general principles of law from the inherently discretionary nature of the Hobbesian 
sovereign’s use of force standards, which as already illustrated in the foregoing chapter, is 
at the core of perpetuating the circularity of international law on the question of measuring 
illegitimate force in law enforcement contexts. 
Regarding the problem of transposing general principles,   Raimondo observes that 
international tribunals apply general principles of law by analogy and that criminal 
tribunals tend to take for granted the analogy between foundations for criminal 
responsibility at the national and international levels.  This is likely based on the perception 
that international criminal law obtains its legitimacy as criminal law based on the main 
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objectives of deterrence and retribution, which are basically a transposition from national 
criminal (2008:184). To this end, international criminal tribunals have applied analogies 
with respect to substantive criminal law without adjustment, on issues relating to the 
foundations of criminal responsibility, defences, penalties and the definition of crimes 
(2008:185). This issue was at the center of Cassese’s critique against the ‘practical policy 
considerations’ in Erdemovic which in his view is a doctrine that applies in municipal law, 
particularly in common law contexts. In his critique Cassese warned that the automatic 
analogy approach from national to international law would be mechanical and might lead to 
unforeseen consequences given the differences between the two systems of law 
(Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, paras 2- 5).  
As has been observed by Pellet (2006: 772-3) the process of transposition must be one that 
recognizes that rules which conditions at the national level vindicate may not be capable of 
vindication at the international level and vice versa. This is owing to the differences in 
conditions between the two systems. This issue is highlighted in Judge Cassese’s specific 
observations in Erdemovic (Case No. IT-96-22-A: para. 5) as follows:  
International trials exhibit a number of features that differentiate them from national 
criminal proceedings. All these features are linked to the fact that international 
criminal justice is dispensed in a general setting markedly different from that of 
national courts: international criminal courts are not part of a State apparatus 
functioning on a particular territory and exercising an authority of which courts 
partake. International criminal courts operate at the inter-State level. They discharge 
their functions in a community consisting of sovereign States. The individuals over 
whom these courts exercise their jurisdiction are under the sway and control of 
sovereign States…To lose sight of this fundamental condition, and thus simply 
transplant into international law notions originating in national legal systems, might 
be a source of great confusion and misapprehension. The philosophy behind all 
national criminal proceedings , whether they take a common-law or a civil law 
approach, is unique to those proceedings and stems from the fact that national courts 
operate in a context where the three fundamental functions (law-making, 
adjudication and law enforcement) are discharged by central organs partaking of the 
State’s direct authority over individuals. That logic cannot be simply transposed 
onto the international level: there, a different logic imposed by the different position 
and role of courts must perforce inspire and govern international criminal 
proceedings.   
 
The foregoing observation is endorsed by Raimondo, particularly as far as the absence of 
an international legislature is concerned, warning that general principals of law based on 
the idea of legislation cannot automatically be applied at the international level (2008, 189). 
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This observation is particularly critical for consensualists such as Ellis (2011) whose 
emphasis on the context specific nature of rules in domestic contexts resound with 
warnings against mechanical transposition, which practise she warns can lead to a rejection 
of the very legitimacy of general principles of law.  
 
The foregoing criticisms surrounding the application of general principles by international 
criminal tribunals have also been extended to how the tribunals have approached the 
horizontal process of abstraction as briefly discussed below.   
 
3.2.2 The horizontal move: challenges with methodology and representativeness 
 
The first observation made about the decisions Raimondo reviews is that the international 
criminal tribunals have not yet come up with a clear legal methodology for how they select 
countries from whose laws they then proceed to extract the general principles (2008:179). 
He notes that for a majority of the decisions, the tribunals applied the laws of North 
America and Europe and ignored laws from Asia, Africa and South America. He further 
notes that while the courts do not still apply the PCIJ statute’s standard of applying laws 
from so called ‘civilized nations’, the tribunals have not clearly indicated when they use the 
alternative terms,  what they mean by ‘all nations’, ‘community of nations’, ‘nations of the 
world’, among others. Moreover, he further observes that, the tribunals’ dominant use of 
North America and European laws still essentially represents the laws of what were 
regarded as the ‘civilized nations’ in the initial drafting of the PCIJ statute and which 
domination he equates to legal imperialism (183). In his view, what the courts apply in 
selecting the laws or legal systems from which to extract those laws is basically a 
mimicking of comparative legal study and not the actual application of it (183).  
To this end, Raimondo proposes that rather than maintain this hierarchy, a selection based 
on geographical representation would facilitate a more universal application of the law. 
Much like Ellis (2011) and Neha (2014) above, he argues that the division of countries into 
legal systems as common law or civil law traditions was for didactic reasons and is not 
significant in and of itself to a legal determination of culpability. He points out that in 
modern law, most of the legal families have merged and may not fall into obvious 
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categories, particularly for criminal law which has resulted in mixed criminal procedures 
where the distinction between the Romano-Germanic and Common law families following 
the inquisitorial and adversarial procedures respectively, is not clear. For practical 
purposes, he proposes that the geographical selection should include laws that are more 
developed on the issue under review (2008:56).  
While Raimondo does not analyse what this selectivity portends for the legality principle 
and the principle of strict construction of criminal statutes, it is submitted that the issue of 
representativeness and methodology in selecting the laws for abstracting general principles 
is critical for a determination of culpability under international criminal law, as it affects 
the argument of notice and foreseeability particularly for acts that are not mala in se and 
that are context specific as is the case for decisions on the use of force in riot control 
contexts. This argument is developed further below.  
Another observation on methodology which Raimondo observes is that whilst tribunals are 
expected to select the latest laws that were valid at the time of the alleged crime (2008: 43), 
in his analysis of their decisions, criminal tribunals rarely indicated that they were applying 
the laws that were valid at the time of the alleged crime. He notes that most of the time, the 
laws relied upon were those easily accessible to the judges via the internet, which is also 
problematic for legality considering that laws change constantly (2008:175).  
This observation foregrounds the challenge to foreseeability given the abstract and policy 
oriented nature of use of force standards in domestic contexts, which are highly susceptible 
to change. It will be argued that this problem which is part of the inherent nature of use of 
force legislation, poses significant methodological challenges for an objective construction 
of general principles regarding this area of the law.  
Raimondo offers these methodological and substantive challenges as continuing ones for 
international criminal tribunals of which the International Criminal Court is no exception. 
He however, does not extensively address them in light of the wider complexities they 
might present for a determination of legality in a highly indeterminate area of the law such 
as the use of force during riot control. An assessment of the substantive and methodological 
issues addressed by Raimondo would be warranted under the highly restrictive regime of 
the International Criminal Court in an indeterminate legal context such as the one under 
study. The ensuing sections map out the legality regime of the ICC and the dilemma all the 
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foregoing criticisms portend for the court in seeking to prosecute use of force in riot control 
contexts as a crime against humanity.  
 
 
4. The International Criminal Court: General principles of law, the use of force in riot 
control and the ICC legality dilemma 
 
Cassese (2005) has observed that states are often weary of general principles as these tend 
to restrict their freedom to act. To this end, he postures that states rarely invoke general 
principles of law except where they think it might be to their advantage to invoke them 
against a certain state in limitation of that state’s sovereignty (2005:188-9).  It is no wonder 
therefore that arriving at a consensus on general principles as a means of defining criminal 
conduct under the ICC statute was problematic. One of the challenges in crafting a 
permanent international criminal court statute was the disparity among legal systems on 
solutions to given problems and the lack of an extensive jurisprudence and experience on 
which to base a universal criminal code (Sadat 2002: 173). By way of example, while in 
principle, the drafters of the ICC Statute agreed on the importance of nullum crimen, there 
were disagreements on its details.  As discussed under chapter three, the most critical point 
of departure in the ICC Statute drafting process was the fact that the principle of legality 
was more liberal under international law compared to its more specific nature under 
national law systems (Sadat 2002: 181 & 186). Many state representatives were 
uncomfortable with the ICC applying law that was uncodified, especially given that judges 
of the court were likely to hold varying methodologies. Furthermore, as has been noted, 
some delegates wished to know with specificity and beforehand, what the elements of 
crime within the court’s jurisdiction were as they were aware that the ICC would 
potentially be trying high ranking state officials. To this end, it has been noted that the strict 
legality principle adopted in the ICC Statute was to provide certainty to states regarding the 
extent of their obligations under it (Sadat 2002: 182), and to safe guard their sovereignty 
interests (Grover 2014: 196). It was in this same spirit that the statute adopted neutral 
language not belonging to any particular legal tradition, but which probably also meant that 
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the ICC would have to engage in rigorous interpretation to clarify ambiguities created by 
the neutrality (Sadat 2002: 173). 
The ICC’s departure from the more liberal nullum crimen standards of international 
tribunals has been observed by Grover (2014: 198) and Lamb (2002), who state that the 
lack of state practice to guide earlier ad hoc international criminal tribunals led to the 
definition of crimes by those tribunals that has an emotive, de legeferenda quality where 
they are guided by the degree of offensiveness of certain acts rather than by law. Lamb has 
argued that going by this method, the tribunals were and will continue to be guided by the 
concept that the more heinous the act, the more it violates a moral principle of humanity. 
She concludes that this approach co-exists uncomfortably with the nullum crimen principle 
(2002:746).  
This approach would certainly pose a contradiction to the strict requirements of nullum 
crimen under the ICC Statute. Given the foregoing lack of specificity surrounding the 
nature of general principles as a source of law and their relationship to nullum crimen under 
international criminal law as applied by the ad hoc tribunals, a separate analysis of the 
nature of these principles under the ICC Statute is apt. As Lamb has noted, the ICC nullum 
crimen principle was structured in such a way as to forestall previous criticism against the 
IMT for violations of legality (2002:746).   
 
4.1 Strict construction, effectiveness and legality 
 
Grover (2014) who has done an extensive study into the interpretation of crimes under the 
ICC statute observes some imperatives that are critical for upholding legality under the 
Statute among which are; the imperative of strict construction, the prohibition of analogy, 
and the principle of effective interpretation (2014:186-217). When analysed in light of the 
enduring circularity of standards on the use of force in riot control contexts and the 
foregoing criticisms against general principles of law, this trio magnify the legality 
dilemma facing the ICC for requiring so high a standard of specificity in a field where the 
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law largely dissolves into discretion on the use of force under the Hobbesian sovereign 
conceptualized in chapter two.   
 
4.1.1 Strict construction and general principles as a source of law under the ICC 
Statute 
 
The ICC statute recognizes general principles of law as an interpretive source under Article 
21 (1) (c) as follows: 
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national 
laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of 
States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those 
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and 
internationally recognized norms and standards. 
 
The general principles of law as referenced above are clearly no exception to the 
prohibition against retroactivity and legality even as they abide by their purpose to remedy 
cases of non liquet (Grover 2014: 184). The Statute is itself clear in the hierarchy it lays out 
under article 21, wherein the general principles are only to be applied where the Statute 
itself, the elements of crimes, and the applicable treaties and principles as explored above, 
remain silent on the issue under investigation. Raimondo suggests that this relegation of 
general principles under the Statute means the drafters perceived a narrow conception for 
the role of general principles in the ICC decision making process (2008: 150). On this 
basis, and in light of the stringent legality requirements under the ICC Statute, it has been 
stated that arguments that general principles give a defendant notice of novel interpretations 
of international criminal law must be strongly rejected (Grover 2014: 179). While general 
principles may come so close to judicial law making (Grover 2014: 179), under the ICC 
Statute judges are prohibited to expand the court’s jurisdiction using treaties, customary 
law or general principles to find conduct criminal when it is not set out as such under the 
Rome Statute. This spirit of strict construction under the ICC Statute is in line with the idea 
that it is the proper role of the legislature and not the judiciary to resolve complex policy 
issues which may arise from laws (Grover 2014: 190,193).  
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However, even with so strict a requirement under the ICC statute, Grover (2014) observes 
that article 22 does not ignore the need to balance between the imperative for strict 
construction with the principle of effective interpretation, which requires that a treaty be 
interpreted in good faith, while considering its objects and purpose (2014: 198). The critical 
issue with ensuring this balance for purposes of this study remains whether such a balance 
can be achieved under general principals of law to secure a definitive standard for excessive 
force used during riot control as a crime against humanity under Article 7. 
 
4.1.2 Effective interpretation, analogy and strict construction 
 
Grover (2014) notes that it was not the intention of the drafters of the ICC Statute to take 
positivism to the extreme (2014: 189) and that the ICC Statute indeed does leave a vast 
reservoir for judges through the principle of effective interpretation, although such reservoir 
is considerably reduced compared to other legal regimes. She warns that while this 
principle may be applicable, it should not be used so liberally and through teleological 
reasoning as to swallow the principle of legality whole (2014:184, 198). This warning is 
reminiscent of Judge Cassese’s rejection of automatic transposing of domestic based policy 
considerations to the international scene in the Erdemovic decision above. The principle of 
effective interpretation as Grover observes, might not always be consistent with the 
subjective intentions held by parties to a treaty as these often seek to limit their obligations 
and as such, tend to use language in a treaty so as not to concede to that treaty the full 
reserve to realize all of its inherent potential and purposes (Grover 2014:198).  To this end, 
effectiveness is a matter of degree and under the Rome Statute, the reservoir left for judges 
is considerably reduced and is limited to only the most interstitial and minimal 
developments of the law under the Statute (Grover 2014: 198-9). It is argued that this 
limited reservoir would have to be diligently exercised even in the filling of open ended 
phrases such as ‘other inhumane acts’ under Article 7 in defining crimes against humanity.  
The foregoing presents a complex challenge in light of the requirement of general 
principles to have a ‘reasonable degree of legal certainty’ when interpreting open textured 
statements such as ‘other inhumane acts’ (Grover 2014: 204). In this context the balancing 
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act it seems must happen with a view to achieving some legal certainty but at the same time 
not violating the principle of legality. The complexity is highlighted by Grover (2014) who 
notes that an interpretive outcome from such a balancing act ought not to foster the open-
endedness of a criminal prohibition but at the same time should offer some more 
predictable parameters for future application by for instance, providing some criteria or 
inclusive examples of the conduct that is prohibited under the relevant statute provision. To 
arrive at such a decision, reasoning should not be largely fact driven but rather should be 
based on principles (2014: 204). Grover warns that interpretations that fail to resolve the 
relationship between the requirements of strict construction and effective interpretation 
would lead judges to engage in ‘fact specific case by case criminalization’ which would 
send a potent message that there are no fixed limits of official coercion and that the 
‘suggestion box for such limits remained always open’ (2014: 200).  
The foregoing discussion is reflective of the controversy noted earlier surrounding the 
nature of principles to be abstracted, that is, whether they ought to be specific rules or more 
flexible principles. As observed, the consensus is that the general principles abstracted from 
domestic law need not be so rigid but rather a balance between lex lata and lex ferenda, 
having just that degree of ‘abstraction and concreteness’ all at once so as to be ‘dynamic yet 
also have specific meaning’ (Kolb 2006: 9). This balancing act has thus far not been 
employed by the ICC. In fact, the evidence available so far indicates a rather restrictive and 
avoidance approach, similar to the one taken by PCIJ and ICJ to general principles. In the 
Situation of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Judgment on Application for Extraordinary 
review of the Pre-Trial Chamber I, the Court rejected the Prosecutor’s argument that a 
general principle could be abstracted from national legal systems, which allowed the review 
by higher courts, of lower courts’ decisions denying appeals to a higher court. In rejecting 
the prosecutor’s argument, the court noted that no such alleged general principle existed as 
for all the legal systems analysed, the modalities for the right or otherwise of review varied 
from one national system to another (Situation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Appeal Case No.: ICC -01/04, paras 27-29 and para 31).  
Although the Court went on to state that the ICC Statute exhaustively defines the right of 
appeal and as such there was no lacunae to fill, the decision is indicative of a nascent rigid 
approach to the content of general principles.  Raimondo has argued that the court’s finding 
was wrong as it was based on a lack of uniformity of rules yet general principles only 
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require the extraction of principles (2008: 155). This tension between specificity and 
flexibility of general principles in the context of the ICC Statute thus far indicates favor 
towards specificity.   
The complexity of the balancing act expected from the foregoing discussion is accentuated 
when applied to the use of force standards during riot control, considering the apparent lack 
of specific indicators for illegitimate force.  The dissolution of law under Hobbesian 
sovereign state violence is apparent even under national law as argued in chapter two 
conceptualizing this sovereign and as the ensuing analysis will show. The ability of courts 
to extract legal principles that would offer a degree of certainty which meets with the 
requirements of effective interpretation without going beyond their jurisdictional powers is 
particularly tested on the subject of riot control. Courts in undertaking such a venture would 
have to ensure that their interpretive outcome does not expand the scope of crimes against 
humanity to include new classes of conduct and new contextual circumstances, or less 
rigorous mental elements than are required for the offence. Or indeed to ensure that it does 
not create an offence where none is expressly provided for in domestic law.  
The ICC Statute augments these prohibitions by proscribing the use of analogy in the 
interpretation of crimes. It must be noted that using analogous reasoning to define a crime 
is clearly accommodated under the ICC statute’s proscription of ‘other inhumane acts of a 
similar character’ under Article 7 (1) (K), with a list of crimes to which such acts can be 
compared for this assessment. The criticism remains however, that the Statute does not 
avail the legal standards to apply in identifying these ‘inhumane acts’ (Grover 2014: 213).  
The Statute’s silence on how to approach this open textured provision in one of its 
‘criminalizing articles only serves to further complicate the challenge of differentiating 
between interpreting law and making new law in hard cases (Grover 2014: 215). Moreover, 
for the ICC Judges Grover (2014) warns that if they are to observe strict construction, they 
must consider, firstly, that they are not usurping the authority of the Assembly of State 
parties and as such must construct conduct bearing in mind the legislative choices of state 
parties and avoiding unfair surprise for ‘an ordinary law abiding person in the actor’s 
situation’.  
Grover argues that in measuring the ordinary law abiding person’s standard of notice of 
criminal liability, ICC judges should consider whether that person ought to have obtained 
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legal advice prior to them acting (2014: 203). It is submitted that this consideration offers 
no remedy for the ICC’s legality dilemma because even with this consideration, the 
circularity of laws concerning force in law enforcement in other states is so pervasive and 
avails limited if any objective guidance for specificity even to a legal advisor of another 
state. Moreover, for riot control contexts, use of force actions are part of law enforcement 
and are not mala in se particularly in “threshold situations”. Determinations of legality in 
such contexts are wont to dissolve into tactical considerations limiting the significance and 
practicality of notice of culpable conduct.   
 
4.1.3 Methodological criticisms 
  
Considering the high level of competition between Hobbesian sovereigns and the high level 
of resistance against external control particularly on matters of internal security, the 
foregoing dilemma feeds into ICC’s article 21 (1) ( c ) methodological inadequacies on the 
particular question of use of force standards. As earlier observed the provision indicates 
that the court should consider ‘national laws derived from legal systems of the world’ and 
further makes reference to ‘laws of states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime’. Pellet (2002) suggests that the provision only requires the court to consider the 
‘principal’ legal systems of the world which he reduces to a small category of countries 
from civil law, common law and Islamic law (2002:1073). As discussed above, this 
categoricist approach has been criticized by consensualists who have pointed to the 
negative implications of a non-representative selection of laws in light of the imbalance of 
political and economic power between the states under international law (Ellis 2011).  
For the ICC context, Raimondo (2008: 151) has observed that the test the Court will apply 
in selecting national laws for comparison remains an open question, suggesting that this is 
yet another approach to Article 21 that can only be revealed as and when the Court 
considers more cases requiring it to apply general principles of law.  In the interim 
however, I argue that for the context of riot control legislation, Pellet’s interpretation is 
inadequate. While the ICC cannot be expected to apply all the laws of all the countries in 
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the world, limiting itself to the laws of a few countries from the three legal systems Pellet 
suggests would be an inadequate means to examine laws of countries whose context 
specific provisions on the use of force are significantly disparate as is demonstrated below. 
Moreover, considering the foregoing substantive criticisms against general principles, a 
‘categoricist’ approach to methodology would only further undermine the process of 
abstracting general principles on a micro analytical rather than macro analytical basis which 
opens them up to closer comparison.     
As was earlier noted in Raimondo’s observation, basing on legal systems to extract general 
principles of laws is of limited significance in light of the hybridity that has emerged 
overtime between these systems. A geographical consideration with specific attention to 
laws with more developed provisions on the subject under study would be more apt 
(Raimondo 2008: 3, 56). It is argued, that this approach particularly bodes well for the 
question of use of force standards, considering how closely linked it is to the very 
foundation of the Hobbesian sovereign and the attendant level of protectiveness over these 
standards that can be expected from states, thereby requiring a more diverse approach of 
comparison.  
These arguments relating to the substantive and methodological challenges above are 
further developed through an analysis of selected national laws categorized in three tables 
below.  
5. National laws on the use of force in riot control 
 
The ensuing analysis of national legal provisions is based on three tables: A, B and C. 
Table A is a collection of relevant provisions extracted from selected laws on riot control. 
The provisions are grouped according to their degree of specificity basing on the three 
pillars critical to the determination of legitimate force, namely: the justification for force, 
the precautions taken before implementing the force and the means and methods allowed 
for applying the force. Table B is a coded representation of the disparity of standards within 
these pillars and Table C is a main point summary of the indicators of disparity on these 
three pillars of measuring force.  The analysis of the provisions reveals a continuity of the 
methodological and substantive challenges of general principles under the ICC Statute 
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discussed above.  This section will consider the methodological challenges faced in the 
process of analysis, the contradictions of abstracting general principals from the disparate 
provisions and the implications these have for the transposition of standards onto article 7 
of the ICC Statute.  
 
5.1 Methodological challenges 
 
As indicated by Raimondo (2008: 151), the test for selecting national laws for comparison 
under Article 21 (1) (c) of the ICC Statute remains an open question. However, in line with 
the foregoing argument for a more representative approach, the provisions used for 
comparison were selected with considerations of substantive relevance. A total of forty nine 
laws were reviewed based on considerations of relevance owing to how developed their 
provisions on the use of force are. The provisions extracted are emblematic for the various 
standards on the justification, precaution and means and methods of force. Laws that were 
silent on how state police or military forces should use force but merely stated the fact that 
they had powers to use force were not considered.  The laws were taken from the following 
countries: Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Fiji, South Africa, Mexico, 
Argentina, Nicaragua, Canada, Australia, Finland, Iceland, Germany, India, Pakistan, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, China, Philippines, 
Bhutan, Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Russia, Timor Liste, Brunei, 
Azerbaijan, Croatia, Bhutan, Georgia, Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, St. Lucia, Malta 
and Latvia.  
A key methodological challenge to be highlighted relates to accessibility of all relevant 
laws on the standard of force and the susceptibility of the laws to amendment. The laws 
referenced were extracted from the online database compiled by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Extra Judicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions (Special Rapporteur). As is stated on 
that platform, the database is only a collection of the laws that are within the Special 
Rapporteur’s possession and the site is open to receiving updated information on their 
amendment. This reflects the key methodological criticism mentioned above by Raimondo 
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characteristic of general principles from national laws as sources of law and the 
susceptibility to constant amendment (2008: 175).  
Following from this limitation, I caution that the data used in the tables ought not to be 
taken as a final indication of what the latest legal provisions from the respective national 
laws are. With that being admitted, it is pertinent to point out here that this methodological 
challenge offers some insight into the paradox of expecting state actors to have notice of a 
universal standard on the use of force based on general principles from national laws, when 
such national laws are not always readily available to the public and are wont to change 
according to each a state’s sovereign objectives.  This inaccessibility of documents on use 
of force standards has been observed by the Special Rapporteur himself (2014: paras 35-40) 
and by Amnesty International (2015: 13) particularly in respect of the more institutional 
documents such as operational procedures, internal regulations and training manuals, with 
some countries reportedly classifying such documents as protected documents which are 
not accessible to the public (Amnesty 2015: 13).  I argue therefore that from the outset, 
given the inaccessibility of standards on the use of force and the susceptibility of these 
standards to change, presumptions of notice and foreseeability for the principle of nullum 
crimen cannot be taken for granted as the conduct in question is not mala in se. This 
limitation reinforces the challenge for strict construction on the question of use of force 
standards as crimes against humanity.  
 
 
5.2 Method of categorizations: TABLES A, B and C   
 
As explained earlier, the relevant provisions of the selected laws fall in three major 
categories which correlate with significant pillars regulating the use of force, namely; the 
justification of the use of force, the precaution for the use of force and the means and 
methods of force. Under those categories, the provisions are grouped according to whether 
they are highly structured, fairly structured or unstructured.  The highly structured 
provisions are those that provide clear references to specified laws for specified actions and 
steps to be taken at each stage of using force, and make reference to the relevant authorities 
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from whom permission for the said action is to be obtained. They also include provisions 
that list the weapons that are restricted or prohibited. Ultimately these laws provide limited 
discretion for use of force in law enforcement contexts. Under the coded representation in 
table B (Annex), these laws are colour coded as green.  
The fairly structured provisions are those that make vague references to some laws or 
procedures for steps to be taken and use the language of reasonableness as the main guiding 
principle for actions to be taken. Thus they may mention the need for precaution or 
weapons that may be used, but ground these provisions in conditionalities of 
reasonableness. These avail moderate discretion for use of force and are colour coded as 
orange on table B.  
The unstructured category are those provisions which do not prescribe parameters for 
action, highly refer to  the use of discretion and use open ended declarations about human 
life, necessity among such other open indicators. They also make no mention of what 
weapons may be used or how to use them. These provisions avail a high discretion for the 
use of force. They are colour coded as red on table B.  
It is argued that ultimately, these distinctions in the levels of discretion allowed by the law 
in the selected provisions yield fundamental disparities on the question of determining 
culpability for the use of force, which translates into a real challenge for the process of 
extracting general principles for universal application. The ensuing section will present an 
analysis of all the tables A, B and C which will be referenced here for purposes of the 
discussion but are availed in the Annextures for practical considerations of space.   
 
 
5.3 Analysis of tabulated laws  
 
The nature of the legal provisions as analyzed from the tables in the Annextures indicates 
the endurance of the Hobbesian sovereign’s control over the question of how force can be 
used in the maintenance of law and order, and this portends significant challenges for 
extracting general principles of law to attain an effective definition for an “attack against 
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the civilian population” which does not violate the requirements of strict construction under 
the ICC Statute.  This state of affairs is discussed further below under sections assessing the 
extraction of principles through vertical move and establishing a commonality between 
standards through the horizontal move, and finally assessing the process of transposition in 
light of the ICC’s requirements of strict construction.    
 
5.3.1 Fundamental disparities of standards 
 
Whereas Kolb (2006: 8) highlights some core content for the principle of proportionality in 
the use of force which can be summed up as; ends must be achievable using the least 
onerous means and to a degree commensurate with the reason for those ends, it is submitted 
that this content for the issue under investigation is meaningless unless applied in specific 
contexts. Testament to this argument is evidenced by the apparent disparity of standards 
between the national laws reviewed in Table A and as graphically represented on Table B. 
The coded representation indicates blocks of standards that can be divided into highly 
structured, moderately structured and unstructured standards on the use of force. These are 
color coded as green, orange and red respectively. The translation in practical terms is that 
law enforcement officers in red states enjoy by law, high degrees of discretion when 
determining why, when and how to use force, with the implication of very a limited basis 
for culpability, While the orange states enjoy moderate discretion and a higher possibility 
of culpability and the green states have highly restricted discretion with higher possibilities 
for culpability.  Observed in this light, these disparities are fundamental as they represent 
disparate implications for legality in each context. On this basis, it is argued that the 
fundamental nature of these disparities is not one that can readily be ignored and collapsed 
under an abstraction of general principles. Moreover, as already argued above, while it may 
be too early to be of real significance, the ICC’s insistence in the Situation of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo on uniformity of rules at the national level before a claim 
can be made for general principles amplifies the significance of such fundamental 
disparities in use of force laws in affirming this position.    
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In particular, a reading of Table C summarizing the nature of disparity reveals specific 
disparities and generalities which further complicate attempts at consolidating the various 
rules and abstracting general principles from them. Some of these are identified as follows:   
 Some laws draw a distinction between using force and using firearms, others 
conflate these issues or do not mention the difference at all 
 Some laws regulate use of force only in situations of arrest, while others make a 
distinction between arrest and crowd control situations, and yet others simply 
generalize on the use of force for all cases 
 Many laws do not limit the use of firearms  to defense of self and others but extend 
it to property 
 Many laws are unspecific as to the justifications for the use of force. 
 Some prohibit the use of explosives in crowds, others do not 
 Some are more specific on how the shooting should happen, i.e. into the crowd, at 
the most violent section of the crowd, when one can identify the armed people in the 
crowd, for dispersing the crowd or not, while others simply make blanket 
statements allowing the use of firearms 
 Some require a judicial pronouncement on the unlawfulness of an assembly, others 
leave this to the police officer’s discretion 
 All agree that a warning may be discarded where it is deemed impractical. 
However, there is no specific consensus on when the warning may be impractical. 
While some state when it may be unnecessary, others do not specify and leave it 
largely in the discretion of the officer. Some provisions differ on the nature and aim 
of the warning and the contents of it. What should the warning say? Should it 
mention exit routes? The type of force about to be used and how and the effects it 
might have on the crowd?  
Ignoring these highly context specific disparities to proceed and abstract general principles 
not only portends a high risk of violating legality, but would eventually be an exercise in 
circularity. This is due to the circular nature of standards that is inherent in all the three 
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categories of extracted provisions. In fact, if any common denominator can be extracted 
from the laws analysed, it is that in each category of laws, there is a residual discretion for 
the law enforcement officer to control the use of force, even in the highly structured green 
states. It is submitted that this denominator is a reflection of the inherently discretionary 
power of the Hobbesian sovereign as discussed above which perpetuates the circularity of 
law where it meets the sovereign’s violence. As argued under chapter two, national laws are 
the fundamental basis through which the Hobbesian sovereign discretion is preserved.  It is 
therefore not surprising that attempting to extract a common standard from different 
national contexts by which Hobbesian sovereigns are expected to comply would present 
with challenges related to legality. The latter statement itself may seem paradoxical 
considering the abstract nature of the national laws on the use of force, but recalling the 
merging of law, power and violence under the Hobbesian sovereign, it becomes apparent 
that the principle of legality in this context is intrinsically linked to the Hobbesian 
sovereign’s power to use violence. This argument focuses the ensuing discussion on the 
challenges that the residual discretion would portend for the process of abstracting general 
principles and eventually of transposing them to the ICC Statute.  
 
5.3.2 The vertical and horizontal moves: extracting general principles and the 
requirement of effective interpretation 
 
From the analysis of the extracted provisions, the challenge of achieving a balance between 
concreteness and effective interpretation without ‘swallowing the principle of legality 
whole’ as cautioned by Grover (2014) is at the center of the process of distilling general 
principles of law for universal application to riot control contexts. 
As observed above by Raimondo (2008) general principles need not be extracted in the 
form of detailed rules and minor differences between laws should not hinder the extraction 
of a basic principle. In his view, the basis for generating these principles would be in 
establishing the fundamental principles common to relevant institutions and to define their 
legal justification.  
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However, in light of the foregoing arguments on fundamental disparity and circularity of 
the standards, it is submitted that this exercise when applied to use of force standards is one 
deeply plagued by legal paradoxes and tensions which render it especially impractical. Two 
competing principles, concreteness and the residual sovereign’s discretion present major 
challenges for the process of abstraction as analysed further below.   
It must be recalled the warning made by Grover and Weil as observed by Raimondo 
(2008:49), that even in extracting the general principles, the outcome must be applicable as 
a determinate principle and not something that will simply offer further abstraction and 
ambiguity. It is argued that such would be the case for riot control standards. Whereas some 
general principles might be extracted as common denominators among the various laws 
selected, they would still be very abstract statements around how force used must be 
reasonable and proportionate and how officers must take precautionary measures to ensure 
minimal loss of life, thereby still falling short of providing the degree of certainty that 
would provide the level of predictability required for a prosecution for crimes against 
humanity under the ICC Statute.   
In order to overcome the foregoing challenge and achieve useful concreteness, the 
principles would run into a challenge of nullum crimen. They would have to be a bit more 
specific and reflect some standards on how and when force can be used, how graduated 
force should be used, how and where to shoot, when to shoot, the basic principles around 
issuing of warnings, principles around dispersal, what weapons are inherently 
disproportionate and indiscriminate. On close observation, of Table C such “principles” 
would arguably resemble the indicators in the highly or moderately structured category and 
would portent as new law for the unstructured category. On this consideration, as already 
indicated above, they might attract criticism for violating nullum crimen principle.  
It is apparent from the foregoing challenges, that a major dilemma for regulating conduct 
on the use of force is that it encompasses a wide variety of context specific actions and 
decisions but for which specific rules for each specific context cannot be laid down in 
anticipation. It is an open ended scenario for which concreteness cannot truly be achieved 
and as such that desired balance between the concreteness and open endedness that is 
expected of general principles cannot be attained. This suggests rather strongly that it may 
very well be one of those situations that Raimondo (2008) mentioned cannot be regulated 
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by general principles.  The problem it seems is that the abstraction within the laws 
themselves is too high for further abstraction. As Raimondo himself observes (2008: 49), 
the general principles will be abstract and of no use under international law, if they are 
abstracted from rules that are already abstract.  
It is submitted that from the laws reviewed, even the legal provisions categorized as 
specific still retain a high level of abstraction where ultimately, the decision whether or not 
to use force remains in the discretion of the concerned officer of the law, to decide 
according to the specific circumstances of the situation at hand. This phenomenon is here 
dubbed the residual discretion. From an analysis of the highly structured indicators under 
table C, it is evident that statements of residual discretion exist even where specific 
standards are purportedly set. By way of example, one provision on the use of weapons 
provides as follows:  
 
The following are prohibited or restricted during crowd management operations: (a) 
the use of 37 mm stoppers (prohibited); (b) the use of firearms and sharp 
ammunition including birdshot and buckshot (prohibited); and (c) the use of rubber 
bullets (shotgun batons) (may only be used to disperse a crowd in extreme 
circumstances, if less forceful methods prove to be ineffective.  
 
This provision while apparently concrete is not absolute as the law enforcement officer may 
flout it once in his or her determination, it would be ineffective for law enforcement in that 
context.  
Another provision from the restricted column provides:  
 
In order that the decision to open fire may be acted upon without loss of control or 
confusion, the responsible officer shall, as soon as it appears likely that the use of 
fire arms will be necessary, tell off a detachment of armed police to be held in 
readiness. When fire is to be opened, the responsible officer shall decide the 
minimum volume necessary to be effective in the circumstances, and shall give 
precise orders accordingly, as to the particular men or files who are to fire and the 
number of rounds to be fired and whether volleys of independent aimed shots are to 
be fired. And shall ensure that his orders are not exceeded.  Whatever volume of fire 
is ordered, it shall be applied with maximum effect.  The aim shall be kept low and 
directed at the most threatening parts of the crowd. 
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Other such similar provisions are discernible from the highly structured categories under 
Table C and the more detailed table A.  
I argue that what this demonstrates is that ultimately, the law offers an illusion of standards 
particularly for ‘threshold scenarios’ where, it is meaningless when left to the discretion of 
whoever is given power to use force depending on the practicalities of the situation.  It is 
argued that this dilemma is indeed an indication of the inherently discretionary nature of the 
Hobbesian sovereign that is the very foundation of that sovereign’s monopoly on force as 
pointed out in chapter two. This phenomenon perpetuates the dissolution of law once it 
comes into contact with that sovereign’s violence which explains the circularity of language 
on standards of force under international law as seen under chapter three and four.  
As the same sovereign operating at international law acts under national law, such 
circularity is wont to endure there as well.  What this implies in the overall assessment is 
that, regarding the question of regulating use of force for riot control contexts, the quest for 
concreteness under the prevailing legal framework is a contradiction as by their very nature, 
the rules are designed to be abstract and adjustable to deal with context specific situations.  
Two examples of how this phenomenon has played out in contemporary post-riot contexts 
are briefly examined below. It is argued that the scenarios demonstrate the illusion of law 
as an objective standard for use of force in riot control contexts.  
 
5.3.3 The enduring circularity of law on the use of force in national application  
a) Report of the Marikana Commission 2012 
The Marikana Commission (The Commission) was appointed in 2012 by the South African 
President under Constitutional mandate following a miners’ uprising at Lonmin mine in 
Marikana Province. Police intervention in the uprising of over 3000 rioters armed with 
machetes, sticks, bows and arrows, resulted in the death of 44 people, injuries were 
sustained by more than 70 people, and approximately 250 people were arrested (Marikana 
Report 2012: 1, 343). In considering whether the police used proportionate force, the 
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commission, in spite of the already quite detailed provisions on proportionate force, 
interestingly found that no unit in South Africa was in a position to deal effectively with a 
crowd situation such as was encountered at Marikana which was armed with sharp weapons 
and firearms. It proceeded to recommend (Marikana Report 2012:547) that a panel of 
experts be appointed, including senior officers of the legal department of the South African 
Police Services (SAPS) and police officers with extensive experience in public order 
policing at both the local and international levels ‘who have experience dealing with 
crowds armed with sharp weapons and firearms’ to: 
a) Revise and amend the country’s standing order 262 and other prescripts relevant to 
public order policing 
b) Investigate where public order policing methods were inadequate and study other 
countries’ best practices and measures available without relying on weapons 
capable of automatic fire.   
It must here be recalled that under the table of laws reviewed, South Africa presented 
highly structured provisions for the justification, the precaution and the means and methods 
of force. Yet for all its detailed provisions including specific instructions on the adequate 
weapons and the stages of intervention, the Commission failed to define the lawful 
approach and standard to be successfully applied in the specific context of the Marikana 
uprising. Instead the Commission noted that there was need for a specific law to regulate 
specific riot control contexts where a crowd is armed. This despite the fact that order 262 
was arguably enacted to deal comprehensively with matters relating to crowd gatherings 
and assemblies (Marikana 2012: 353). In this specific regard, the Commission (para. 1034) 
stated:  
 
 … [t]he failure of the standing order to 262 to make any provision at all for the use 
of sharp ammunition invites a response from the SAPS that standing order 262 is 
therefore not applicable in operations with crowds that are armed and potentially or 
actually violent . This in turn leaves space open for argument as to what prescripts, 
if any, apply in such situations with regard to preparation of written plans, briefing, 
debriefing and generally the issue of ‘spontaneous events’.  
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Interestingly, despite this observation, the commission proceeded to find that there was 
excessive force used during the riots and recommended the implicated police officers for 
further investigation and prosecution by the Director of Public Prosecutions. It will be 
interesting to see, if that trial proceeds, whether and how the court will deal with the 
ambiguity or the lack of a clear standard for situations such as the one in Marikana and the 
standard that will be applied as a basis for the prosecution.  
It is argued that this search for specificity of law even where it apparently already exits is 
an exercise in futility precisely because of the nature of the Hobbesian Sovereign for whom  
decisions to use violence ultimately depend on tactical discretion which cannot be 
objectively regulated by the law. This phenomenon further manifested after the 2011 riots 
in London and similar conclusions were made, despite the detailed provisions on 
proportionality in UK police training manuals.  Two reports are considered briefly to 
illustrate this point. 
 
 
b) 2012 Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Report of the Strategic Review into the 
Disorder of the August 2011 London riots 
 
The riots in August 2011 in London occurred after a peaceful protest against a police 
shooting of a young man turned violent. Two people lost their lives, 3, 931 offences 
including arson and robbery were recorded, and 4, 019 arrests were made (MPS Report 
2012: 14).  The riots saw police come under attack with police cars being set on fire in 
some areas and missiles being thrown directly at the police in others. According to one 
chief inspector, the police faced unprecedented levels of spontaneous life-threatening 
violence. Reports also indicated that in some cases crowds attacked police using petrol 
bombs and knives (MPS Report 2012: 42-3).  The report notes that while the officers who 
intervened during the riots applied the techniques they were trained to do, there was a need 
for those techniques to be adapted to the situation that the officers found themselves faced 
with in order to deal with the unique challenges in those circumstances (MPS Report 2012: 
118).   
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This is yet another indication of the context specific nature of the decisions on actions to be 
applied in riot control contexts, particularly those that are spontaneous and may not be 
easily managed with a step by step specificity. True to the pattern followed by the Marikana 
Commission, the MPS report reveals that after the riots, a committee was established to 
review the UK’s public order tactics, including the use of firearms, to make them more 
adaptable to fast changing pace of violence during protests such as were witnessed in 
August 2011 (MPS report 2012: 118).  It is argued here as well, that this exercise is a quest 
for an elusive objective standard on the use of force.  
 
c) Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) Report into the London Riots of 
2011.  
The same foregoing observations were maintained in the report made by Her Majesty’s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC 2011 Report), in which it was observed that even 
though the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) Manual of guidance; Keeping the 
Peace, extensively sets out Police tactics on the use of force during riot control, including 
guidelines on various policing methods and the weapons to be used, the manual still does 
not address the real challenges of spontaneous flash rioting (HMIC 2011: 61). In observing 
the unrealistic nature of the guidelines based on for training (HMIC 2011:61), one 
observation in respect to some officers who were interviewed for the report is quite 
significant: 
 
All six forces reported that even where training was provided, frequently it was not 
sufficiently realistic. Some officers did not, for example, train in full kit, which 
meant that training did not prepare them for the rigours they experienced for real. 
Some commanders and officers interviewed also expressed the view that training 
has become sterile; it focuses largely on practicing the delivery of rehearsed tactics 
in pre-determined scenarios, e.g. taking a junction where rioters disperse when 
challenged. They pressed HMIC to recommend opportunities which would allow 
them to use their judgement, dynamically, to problem solve, and combine tactics. 
The accent, they said, should be on encouraging officers to be flexible and reactive 
to emerging threats.  
 
The foregoing augments previous arguments which maintain the context specific and 
highly discretionary nature of riot control contexts. Indeed the HMIC noted that the ACPO 
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manual was developed as a ‘living document’ to be developed according to new policing 
needs (61). It also warrants specific observation here that indeed, because of the 
fundamentally discretionary nature of use of force in riot control contexts it is no surprise 
that some standards on the use of force such as in the case of the UK are contained in a 
training manuals as opposed to statutory provisions. This would facilitate changing them to 
suit specific circumstances as the need arises.   
Another key observation to note from the HMIC report is that it had previously dealt with 
similar recommendations three times, twice in 2009 and then in February 2011, each time 
noting that the existing police rules were not sufficient and required further reform for 
clarity (HMIC 2011:76).  This observation suggests very strongly a vicious cycle of 
searching for an elusive legal certainty through legal reform whenever new challenges 
present in violent protests yet Police officers are simply required to use their discretion to 
contain the violence, particularly in those cases not specifically covered within precise legal 
boundaries. 
 
The foregoing analysis illustrates the challenge of aiming to generate substantive general 
principles based on national laws on the use of force, for which the very foundation is the 
Hobbesian sovereign’s discretion to maintain monopoly on force. This is particularly the 
case for threshold contexts where law enforcement officials may have little to no control 
over the intensity and momentum of violence from a rioting crowd.  It is apparent from the 
foregoing examples that while the illusion of specificity of standards may hold for lower 
thresholds of violence, it is wont to disappear with higher thresholds of violence where the 
sovereign’s monopoly on force is threatened. As argued under chapter three, these 
threshold situations are the ones most likely to come before the ICC considering the scale 
and intensity of violence they present and their closeness to armed conflict. With the 
disappearance of specific standards and the centring of the sovereign’s discretion in these 
contexts, the search for a legal basis on which to found a prosecution becomes highly 
complex and susceptible to criticisms relating to judicial law making.  It indeed arguably 
becomes an illusory quest.   
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This interconnectedness between national law on the use of force and the Hobbesian 
sovereign means that arguments regarding ‘state necessity’, ‘Maintaining public order’ 
‘protecting life and property’ take on highly subjective meanings that are interpreted from 
the point of view of the Hobbesian sovereign. This relationship between law, sovereign and 
violence portents a specific challenge for the process of transposing use of force standards 
onto the international scene as crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute.  This 
argument is developed further below.  
 
5.4 Transposing use of force standards: analogy and strict construction: Attack, 
murder and inhumane acts 
 
The combined effect of the elusive nature of law on the use of force and the fundamental 
disparities in the core elements for measuring force as analysed above, signify a major 
challenge for the process of transposing the already abstract standards on the use of force 
into the definition of crimes against humanity envisaged under Article 7. More importantly, 
this challenge is grounded in the Hobbesian sovereign’s monopoly on force under national 
law, which is perpetuated through its residual discretion in use of force contexts as argued 
above.  
It follows that in the absence of a clear standard, the question of what amount of force 
qualifies as murder under national law so as to amount to an ‘attack against the civilian 
population’ remains dependent on highly subjective indicators that are determined by the 
Hobbesian sovereign.  This observation it is argued, is supported by the apparent duality of 
legal systems relating to murder and manslaughter.  
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5.4.1 The duality of law enforcement laws and criminal laws 
  
An observation can be made from a survey of the Special Rapporteur’s data base that of the 
provisions analyzed, most are not regulated under criminal laws. Majority are extracted 
from Police Acts, Public Assembly Acts, Riot Control Acts, Public Order Management 
Acts, and Use of Force Standing Orders among others. The police actions on the use of 
force are evidently being regulated as part of law enforcement activity and not as criminal 
activities.  
 
By way of example, from Table A, of all the laws previewed, only two legal provisions; the 
Criminal Code of St. Lucia (2004: S. 43, 46) and the Criminal Code of Canada, (2013: S. 
32) regulate the use of force in riot control contexts within criminal codes and even then, 
they do so as provisions empowering officers to prevent riots criminalised in the statutes. 
They do not even define what levels of force used in stopping such riots would amount to 
murder or manslaughter under the very criminal codes criminalsing murder and 
manslaughter.  
 
Other provisions on the use of force expressly exclude criminal liability for force used in 
riot control contexts. Examples of these are extracted as follows: 
 
-Uganda Police Act, Section 35: the police officer, may do all things necessary for 
dispersing the persons so continuing assembled, or for apprehending them or any of 
them, and, if any person makes resistance, may use all such force as is reasonably 
necessary for overcoming that resistance, and shall not be liable in any criminal or 
civil proceedings for having by the use of that force caused harm or death to any 
person 
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-Fiji Public Order Act as Amended by Public Order Decree:  Section 9 (3 )…may 
use such force as he or she considers necessary, including the use of arms, to 
disperse the procession, meeting or assembly and to apprehend any person present 
thereat, and no police officer nor any person acting in aid of such police officer 
using such force shall be liable in criminal or civil proceedings for any harm or loss 
caused by the use of such force. 
 
-Public Order Security Act Zimbabwe: Section 29 
If a person is killed as a result of the use of reasonably justifiable force in terms of 
subsection (1), where the force is directed at overcoming that person’s resistance to 
a lawful measure taken in terms of that subsection, the killing shall be lawful. 
 
Where criminal liability for excessive force is referenced as in the case of Sri Lanka, there 
is still no express indications of what would amount to excessive force, as the 
determination what force to use is highly discretionary. The relevant provision merely 
provides that:  
 
A police officer is entitled to fire upon a mob to protect life or property (Sri Lanka 
Police Ordinance: department Order No. A/ 19, s. 4).  
 
The provision contains no accompanying parameters for how the fire ought to be used, 
except to state that the officer should consider whether immediate action is necessary or 
whether mere armed presence of an armed party will be sufficient to cause the crowd to 
desist from violence.  Such circularity offers no apparent objective indicators for criminal 
liability for murder or manslaughter in such contexts.   
 
 
5.4.2 Implications of duality for transposing standards on the use of force 
 
Basing on the foregoing observations of duality, the earlier cautions by Cassese, Ellis and 
even Pellet on the significance of observing the fundamental difference between domestic 
and international contexts before transposing domestic law principles to the international 
level are hereby recalled.  In particular, as Pellet (2006:773) observed: 
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…conditions at the international level are very different from what they are at the 
domestic, and …rules which the latter’s conditions fully justify may be less capable 
of vindication if strictly applied when transposed onto the international level.    
 
 
On the basis of this caution I argue that the foregoing duality of legal regimes for murder as 
a crime under national law and killing as part of a law enforcement process is highly 
indicative of the fact that there are two separate standards for assessing violence which 
results in killing by the state on the one hand and killing by non-state actors on the other. 
While the former is subject to rules hinged on tactical and highly subjective context specific 
considerations, the other is determined based on moral and law and order standards. This 
distinction of standards reinforces the state centered nature of use of force for riot control 
contexts as intrinsically linked to the Hobbesian sovereign’s functions of law enforcement. 
Thus the content of these standards is clearly highly under the control of context specific 
processes that are functional for purposes of law enforcement. Such considerations do not 
exist under international law. This duality combined with the foregoing argument on 
residual discretion and the illusion of legal certainty for riot control standards present a 
strong challenge to transposing these standards as indicators for murder or ‘other inhumane 
acts’ as crimes against humanity under article 7 of the ICC statute.  
 
In light of these arguments, attempts at such transposition would have no basis in specific 
domestic law standards and are bound to yield decisions based either on analogy, which is 
prohibited under the article 22 requirements of strict construction under the ICC Statute. 
Such a scenario is especially aggravated by the fact that by the very nature of the conduct 
under review, the Hobbesian sovereign’s monopoly over force and power would be under 
judgement. Thus a highly contentious situation would arise of a clash of discretions 
between state discretion in matters of law enforcement over its territory and the judge’s 
discretion in applying the law. As earlier pointed out by Ellis (2011), such criticisms 
concerning power are critical to the very legitimacy of general principles as a source of law 
and indeed to the adjudication project under international law (2011:956).      
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In overall observation, the highly abstract realm of use of force in riot control contexts is a 
symptom of the Hobbesian sovereign which manifests through the illusion of law by 
purportedly regulating force within legal provisions but which ultimately operate on the 
basis of the law officer’s discretion. This fact is often exposed in cases of higher thresholds 
of violence when the sovereign’s monopoly on violence is threatened.  This state of affairs 
renders it impractical to extract substantive general principles of law from national laws on 
the use of force in riot control contexts in order to apply them to a definition of crimes 
against humanity under the ICC Statute. As has already been observed, the specificity 
requirements under the Statute are higher than those of ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals, and the role general principles as a source of law under it is highly subsidiary. 
That the process of extracting them for criminalizing riot control contexts is a highly 
complex balancing act susceptible to criticisms for want of legality and encroachments on 
sovereignty further diminishes their effectiveness as a tool of decision making by the ICC.  
I submit that the use of force in riot control scenarios is highly indicative of one example of 
areas of sovereignty that state parties to the ICC Statute wanted to ensure were inaccessible 
to the court via liberal powers of interpretation. As observed by Grover (2014: 187) some 
of the main reasons for so restricting the principle of legality for the ICC was the 
fundamental implications that the court’s jurisdiction had for states, considering that most 
crimes under its purview had a close nexus to state activity.  Controlling riots is a core state 
activity which as earlier explained is an intricate part of the very functioning of sovereign 
states under their law enforcement and security mandate.  
There are some scholars who believe that the ICC might have to make decisions in a way 
that ensures it is not beholden to so restrictive a standard of legality which state parties 
imposed on it (Pellet 2002: 1053). It remains to be seen how this will manifest and what 
implications it will have for the relationship between the Assembly of State Parties and the 
ICC.  Until then however, jurisdiction over riot control contexts remains ambiguous and 
ridden with several and fundamental contradictions as observed above. This remains the 
case even with the existence of principles which have been developed under the auspices of 
the United Nations to guide law enforcement officials on the issues discussed above. The 
significance of these principles as soft laws warrant an assessment of their applicability to 
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the foregoing dilemma including an examination of their place under Article 21 as an 
interpretive source for the ICC.  
 
6. UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms as a source of law for the 
ICC 
 
The foregoing discussion on general principles warrants a consideration of the UN Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms (UN Basic Principles) and their relationship to 
the national laws discussed above.   
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extra Judicial Summary and Arbitrary Executions has noted 
that the UN Basic Principles are considered to be authoritative sources of law for some 
states such as Australia and Brazil (UN Doc. A/HRC/26/36, 2014, para. 44) and are indeed 
listed by some states as reference point for standards on the use of force. The UN Basis 
Principles remain categorised as soft law as noted in the report of the Special Rapporteur 
(UN Doc. A/HRC/26/36, 2014: para. 43).  
According to Detter, soft laws are rules that emanate from multiple sources including 
unilateral acts and bilateral agreements (1994:212). Boyle and Chinkin (2007:211-2) refer 
to them as simply a variety of legally non-binding instruments used in international 
relations and they most notably manifest in the declarations or resolutions adopted by states 
at international conferences or at United Nations General Assembly.  They are merely 
supplemental to international hard law, namely treaties and customary law, and are not in 
themselves binding.  
However, it has been argued that even when non-binding, soft laws may entail legal 
consequences for states (Detter 1994: 212-3). Detter observes that in some cases they 
merely reflect obligations already existing in hard law, but in other cases, they may result 
into legal obligations (1994:213).  It has been observed (Boyle and Chinkin 2007: 212) that 
the interplay between soft law on the one hand, and treaties, custom and general principles 
of law on the other is significant to the law making work of international organizations, of 
which the ICC is one. Soft laws may be derived as general principles not taken from 
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national law, but intended for application by courts or states in the interpretation of the law. 
They cannot override treaties or custom, but their importance is derived from the influence 
they can exert on the interpretation and application of other law (Boyle and Chinkin 2007: 
223).  
The strict prescription of sources of law under Article 21 of the ICC Statute undermines the 
role of soft law in the ICC’s decision making process. In fact, the Statute does not mention 
soft law specifically as a source and the ambiguous reference to ‘principles and rules of 
international law’ under sub article 1 (b) has been suggested to mean either decisions of ad 
hoc criminal tribunals or as customary international law (Grover 2014: 262, Pellet 2002: 
1070-72, Neha 2014: 51-2). Moreover, the highly definitive hierarchy of sources where the 
Statute and Elements are the main source followed by treaties and customary law and lastly 
by general principles of law strongly indicates a closed list which does not envisage the 
relevance of soft law sources.    
Nonetheless, considering the recognition by Grover of a judicial reservoir left to ICC 
judges even under the strict construction limitations (2014: 198) and also considering the 
prediction by Pellet that ICC judges might have to work towards freeing themselves from 
such strict prescriptions (2002: 1059), the importance of soft law on the issue of use of 
force in law enforcement and ‘borderline’ contexts warrants consideration. It is on this 
basis that this section proceeds to examine the UN Basic Principles and assess whether they 
provide a remedy for the circularity that has persisted through the analysis of the ICC 
statute, the Elements of Crimes, the applicable treaties and international principles to the 
general principles of law derived from national laws on the question of specificity in the 
use of force.  Given their nature as soft law, the UN Basic Principles’ provisions are open 
ended and offer no solution to the dilemmas of circularity in the foregoing analyses. This is 
discussed briefly below.  
 
6.1 The enduring circularity of use of force standards under the UN Basic Principles  
 
The UN Basic Principles were adopted by the 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders which was held on 27th August –September 7th 1990. From 
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the very onset, the principals themselves betray a lack of bindingness and circularity by 
urging states in clause 1 to adopt and implement their own rules on the use of force and 
firearms but to keep these standards ‘constantly under review’.  This is reflective of the 
illusion of specificity of law explored in the cases of the post Marikana and Post London 
riots inquiries discussed above. Moreover, as already analysed, the national laws on the 
subject themselves remain ultimately based on the state’s discretion. The principles 
themselves are not without some other criticisms on circularity particularly for borderline 
cases of violence. For instance, clause 4 directs states to use nonviolent means first before 
they resort to using force and firearms. There are no subsequent specific directives on what 
stage the situation warrants a resort to force or to firearms. The presumption is that such an 
assessment is to be left to the discretion of the state forces themselves. This only serves to 
confirm previous criticisms on residual discretion and the challenges of circularity flowing 
from it.   
The other provisions of the Basic Principles raise the same pattern of tensions and 
circularity.  Clause 5 directs states that where lawful use of force and firearms in inevitable, 
law enforcement officials should exercise restraint and use force in proportion to the 
legitimate objective to be achieved. The issue immediately arises that in riot control 
contexts, it is states that determine what these objectives are and also determine at what 
point the said objectives would have been achieved. With these considerations, it can be 
expected that political and security considerations would be conflated to serve the 
Hobbesian Sovereign’s interests. A judicial engagement with such open ended state centric 
questions in a prosecution for crimes against humanity would be open to criticisms for 
objectivity and occasion the clash of discretions referenced above.  It would lead the court 
directly into the arena of political considerations, which would have grave implications for 
its legitimacy.  
Clause 8 which provides that internal challenges such as political instability or any other 
public emergency may not be invoked to justify any departure from the Basic Principles is 
already being circumvented by states which had otherwise opted to refer to the Basic 
Principles as guidelines for their use of force standards. According to the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extra Judicial Killings, the threat of terrorism is being invoked by states as a 
basis for lower thresholds for use of force during riots (UN Doc. A/HRC/26/36, 2014: para. 
32). This has also been observed in Amnesty International’s guidelines to the interpretation 
171 
 
of the UN Basic principles, which notes that states’ legal reforms are being done in such a 
way as to blur the lines between military and law enforcement operations and the applicable 
legal standards on the use of force (Amnesty International 2015: 11).  It is submitted that 
this observation reflects precisely the inherent nature of the Hobbesian sovereign’s 
discretion on the issue of internal security and is at the core of the foregoing challenges to 
legal specificity on the question of use of force in riot control contexts. It also demonstrates 
the Basic Principles’ limitation as non binding standards.  
Clause 9 limits the use of force to cases of: self-defense, defense of others against imminent 
threat of death or serious injury, to prevent the commission of ‘a particularly serious crime’ 
involving grave threat to life, to arrest a person presenting such danger or resisting 
authority, but all must depend on whether less extreme measures are insufficient to achieve 
the objectives. Further, it provides that the intentional lethal use of firearms is to be made 
only when ‘strictly unavoidable’ to protect life.  These considerations are inherently 
discretionary and are bound to lead back to questions around interpretation and context 
specific decisions already explored above.   
Under article 13, the principles provide for the dispersal of unlawful but nonviolent 
assemblies, by avoiding the use of force, but that where this is not practicable, may use 
force ‘to the minimum extent necessary’.  Regarding violent assemblies, state officials may 
use firearms only when ‘less dangerous means’ are impracticable and only to the ‘minimum 
extent necessary’. As already observed, the terminology used offers little in the way of 
substantive standards.   
There has been an attempt by Amnesty International to offer interpretative guidelines for 
the principles but these too perpetuate circularity and are not without unresolved questions 
and false presumptions about the different states’ national standards. A consideration of 
what they offer is warranted in this light.  
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6.2 Amnesty International’s guiding principles to the interpretation of the Basic 
Principles on the use of Force and Firearms  
 
The guidelines start by acknowledging that law enforcement officials operate in highly 
sensitive circumstances which require instant decisions and difficult judgments to be made 
in very dangerous, highly stressful circumstances (Amnesty International 2015: 9). They 
however proceed to augment the argument made earlier about a lack of universality by 
admitting that law enforcement practices differ from country to country depending on the 
country’s security situation, political, legal and administrative set up, the size of the 
country’s economic, logistical, and cultural issues.  Further that as such, each country 
should develop its own necessary legislative and operational framework on the use of force 
and firearms, provided these are established in a manner that they are compliant with 
international human rights law and standards in general and Basic Principles in particular 
(Amnesty International 2015: 12).  As already established under chapter three, these human 
rights standards are themselves ambiguous and can only be given content in the specific 
contexts in which force has to be applied as part of riot control. This purported guidance 
through the human rights standards and the UN Basic Principles therefore is but another 
exercise in circularity in the quest for a uniform standard for purposes of legality under the 
ICC. 
Moreover, on Amnesty International’s own admission, the guidelines themselves could not 
be made on a geographically representative level as some countries qualified their 
documents as protected and thereby inaccessible to the public, including material such as 
internal police regulations and training manuals (Amnesty International 2015: 13). This re-
echoes the tensions that have already been referred to about the Hobbesian sovereign’s 
discretion.  
Regarding legality, the guidelines state that the use of force ought to serve a legitimate 
objective as established by law and that the force ought to be used for a lawful law 
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enforcement purpose (17). This guideline meets with the same challenge of the circularity 
of law as analysed above. The objectives for which force may be used are prescribed in 
open ended terms, including: self defense, defense of life and property law, dispersing 
crowds, ensuring public safety, preventing crime, among others. These objectives, while 
provided for in the law, are ultimately determined in scope and urgency by the law 
enforcement officers and by the state.     
On the question of necessity, the guidelines note that states should only use firearms if 
other means are ineffective or if there is no promise of achieving an intended result 
(Amnesty 2015: 18).  The explanation offered for this guideline is that states should make 
the assessment at two stages; the qualitative and quantitative stage.  Under the qualitative 
assessment, states should consider whether force is necessary at all or whether it is possible 
to achieve their legitimate objective without resorting to force, while the quantitative 
assessment is to be made on the basis of how much force is needed to achieve a given 
objective, in which case the force ought to be minimum but effective and temporary in that 
it ought to stop once the objective has been achieved or is no longer achievable. 
Furthermore, on the question of proportionality, the guidelines advise that clause 5 of the 
guidelines which cautions against excessive force means that state officials may have to 
accept at some point that their legitimate objective is unachievable.  
The decisions anticipated in borderline scenarios involve considerable political and tactical 
judgments which may be rather specific and in conflict with the generalised approaches 
such as those proposed in the guidelines. An example may be given of the direction to stop 
using force when an objective is no longer achievable. If applied in contexts where 
governments are threatened by unconstitutional overthrow from power, the practical 
question arises on would be the arbiter as to when such states ought to give up defending 
their post. Ultimately, this would have to be a decision that only the sovereign can make 
and without external intervention, it is not feasible to prescribe an objective set of standards 
by which states must comply to determine when their objective becomes unattainable. Such 
decisions like several others related to the use of force in law enforcement, remain largely 
contextual.  
The guidelines proceed to expound on proportionality stating that the principle also means 
that law enforcement officers may only have to put a life at risk if it endangers another life 
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(Amnesty International 2015: 18). As already pointed out, questions of self-defense and the 
grounds permitting the use of force differ in various countries and in some of the 
provisions, are much broader than the grounds envisaged here, extending into defense of 
property, state security, defense of the peace, among others. 
Regarding the dispersal of violent assemblies, the guidelines provide that state intervention 
should be guided by the principle of facilitating the assembly and should not anticipate 
violence right from the start of the assembly. The guidelines proceed to state that security 
personnel should aim at specific violent individuals but should not use the violent actions 
of a few individuals to respond to the entire assembly with violence (Amnesty International 
2015: 147).  Again, as already highlighted, this approach presupposes a relatively organised 
and controllable assembly but does not address largely violent and armed crowds engaging 
in sporadic violence. The methods required to deal with these kinds of scenarios may not 
always be straight forward as presumed by the guidelines.   
On the question of the means and methods of force, the guidelines offer some considerable 
specificity as to what weapons qualify as legitimate for use in law enforcement processes 
and how they ought to be used. However, these guidelines are limited to kinetic impact 
projectiles, tear gas and water cannons as the weapons. They provide that kinetic projectiles 
should not be fired randomly at the crowd but are to be aimed exclusively at the people 
engaged in the violence and should only be used when other means to stop the violence 
have failed. More specifically, the guidelines state that they should be fired at the lower 
part of the body to minimize injury, they should never be used in skip fire, by bouncing off 
the ground. Further, the guidelines state that teargas may only be used when there is more 
generalized violence to disperse the crowd and only when all other means have not been 
successful. They further state that firearms should never be used as tactical weapons in the 
management of public assemblies (Amnesty International 2015: 148).  
 
While the foregoing guidelines on firearms are quite specific, by Amnesty International’s 
own observation, there is a large scale misuse of these weapons and there are no specific 
standards on their legitimate use of by law enforcement agents (Amnesty 2003: 58). While 
this finding was made before the writing of these guidelines, it is quite apparent going by 
the analysis of the laws tabulated in the annexure that the absence of a universal standard 
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on the acceptable weapons as well as their use still persists. What this portends is that with 
respect to the means and methods of force used in riot control, the guidelines may be of 
some significance in aiding interpretation, but for want of universality, they would very 
likely invite a legality challenge as lex ferenda, based on the strict construction rule of the 
ICC Statute. As Detter (1194: 250) points out, soft law may serve as support for a future 
binding treaty, but for the sake of preserving the principle of security of the law, soft law 
provisions must not in themselves be interpreted as evoking obligations per se. 
In the overall analysis, the UN Basic Principles and the guidelines for their implementation 
do not circumvent the circularity of the law on the question of a universal standard for the 
use of force in riot control contexts. While in some aspects concerning the weapons and 
methods of using those weapons the guidelines offer a considerably high degree of 
specificity, the absence of their application universally limits their significance in the 
interpretive process under the strict legality conditions of the ICC Statute. The other aspects 
of both guidelines remain wrought with the same challenges of ‘open-endedness’ which 
effectively defers decision making and judgements on the necessity, precaution and means 
and methods of force, back to the law enforcement officials engaged in the actual law 
enforcement process.   
 
7.  Conclusion  
 
While general principles of law from legal systems of the world are meant to be a final 
resort for gap filling in hard cases, the controversy surrounding their methodological and 
substantive application renders them susceptible to criticisms ranging from want of 
certainty, objectivity and representativeness. It has been suggested that the PCIJ and ICJ 
avoided them for precisely these reasons. While the ad hoc criminal tribunals have been 
more active in the application of general principles, they have done so in a manner that has 
maintained rather than cured the inadequacies and contradictions which continue to plague 
general principles as a source of law.  
Under the highly restrictive standards of the ICC Statute, these criticisms are further 
magnified. The highly abstract nature of standards on the use of force in law enforcement 
176 
 
contexts such as riot control, render the process of distilling general principles from such 
standards a very complex undertaking in which several contradictions would have to be 
reconciled. An analysis of selected legal provisions illustrates the practical methodological 
inadequacies of applying general principles for a universal use of force standard. The 
fundamental differences between states’ standards on key pillars of necessity, precaution 
and means and methods of force indicate  the paradox in abstracting general principles from 
these standards, while the residual discretion inherent in the laws render the very idea of an 
objective standard illusory. As argued above, the intricate connection between national 
standards on law enforcement and the discretion of the Hobbesian sovereign yields a 
situation where those standards depend ultimately on subjective determinations which are 
wont to be driven more by political and security considerations of the Hobbesian sovereign. 
This intricate interconnectedness is what explains the apparent dual legal system for 
killings under law enforcement processes and for killings by non-state actors. This merger 
of law and sovereign is the basis for the enduring dissolution of law in the face of state 
violence and the resultant circularity in the language of law at national level.  
In final analysis, this assessment renders illusory the very concept of abstracting general 
principles from inherently abstract national standards on riot control and transposing them 
onto international law under the strict legality framework of the ICC Statute. A purported 
application of them in light of all these considerations is highly susceptible to criticisms of 
making new law, and applying law by analogy which are contrary to the strict ICC legality 
requirements. Moreover, they would also open the process up to criticism for applying 
political considerations.  
While the UN Basic Principles offer some degree of certainty for prohibited means and 
methods on the use of force, these too like the highly structured national law provisions are 
only useful for lower level thresholds of violence and are wont to dissolve into 
considerations of sovereignty in cases of ‘borderline’ violence when the Hobbesian 
sovereign’s monopoly on force is threatened as discussed above. Moreover, they are soft 
law sources whose application under the ICC Statue’s strict sources provisions is still 
uncertain.  
In conclusion, the foregoing analysis of laws on use of force riot contexts demonstrates an 
area of sovereignty over which the states retain a high level of control and for which clear 
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boundaries of force continue to be an illusion. A prosecution under the ICC Statute based 
on general principles from these standards is wont to be highly politicized and criticized for 
want of legality.   This is ultimately due to the fact that State parties to the ICC Statute as 
argued earlier, have not arrived at a shared understanding on what aspects of their 
otherwise lawful conduct in law enforcement would open their officials up for such a 
prosecution. As the concept of the Hobbesian sovereign demonstrates, states are prone to 
jealously protect their prerogative to use force including over a matter of internal 
jurisdiction such as riot control. The process of ‘internationalizing’ this fundamentally 
internal exercise by way of international criminal law has not been yet occurred and an 
application of Article 7’s ICC statute would be premature.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
This study set out to answer the main question whether article 7 of the ICC Statute 
effectively criminalises the use of force in riot control contexts as crimes against humanity. 
It also set out to investigate how the Hobbesian sovereign as an agent of analysis can help to explain 
the legal inadequacies and contradictions arising from the application of article 7 to riot control 
contexts.  
The study did not consider specific riot control situations as case studies but rather adopted 
a general approach using various examples of laws and judicial decisions to explore the 
question of how states’ response to violent protests is justified by law and whether criminal 
liability for such force can be established effectively as a crime against humanity under the 
ICC Statute. The study undertook this task through doctrinal analysis and positivist theory. 
It juxtaposed these sources of law against the strict legality requirement of the ICC Statute 
to explore the extent and nature of contradictions arising from the definition of crimes 
against humanity under Article 7.  
 
In order to demonstrate the extent of these complexities and contradictions the study used 
the Hobbesian view of the sovereign to illuminate the state centric nature of the law on the 
use of force in riot control. This view of sovereignty was used to lay emphasis on the role 
of power and politics in shaping law and to link this power to the necessity of the state. It 
offered an insight into the fundamental omission in the definition of crimes against 
humanity under article 7 in as far as the article fails to clarify what aspects of force used by 
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state officials in riot control it criminalizes. The Hobbesian view of sovereignty 
demonstrated that the internationalization of internal riot situations is premature given that 
international law is dependent on the community of sovereign states which jealously protect 
their prerogatives to use force, whether against international enemies or internally against 
opponents. The study has done so by depicting the circularity of language in laws 
regulating states’ use of force in riot control contexts.  
 
The main finding of this study is that article 7 of the ICC Statute does not effectively 
criminalise the use of force in riot control contexts as crimes against humanity. It is based 
on the fact that the definition of crimes against humanity under article 7 implicates state 
force used in riot control contexts but offers no guidelines as to what force would be 
legitimate as part of law enforcement processes and what force is criminalized. This in turn 
defeats the application of the ICC Statute’s strict legality standards to the abstract and circular 
standards on the use of force in riot control contexts as perpetuated under the Hobbesian sovereign 
state structure. Moreover, the interpretive sources that would aid in clarifying these 
boundaries offer no remedy as they exist in the prescriptive realms of human rights and 
humanitarian law which have no specific prohibitive standards on which to base a criminal 
prosecution under article 7.  
 
In particular, chapter three of the study found that the main sources of law for the 
interpretation of crimes against humanity in riot control contexts, namely the ICC Statute, 
the Elements of Crimes, the applicable treaties and customary law are inadequate to provide 
a frame work for an effective criminalization of excessive force in riot control contexts. 
This is fundamentally due to the ambiguity of law on the use of force in riot control 
contexts through which the discretion of the Hobbesian sovereign is perpetuated. The 
existence of such discretion is so pervasive that it permeates into legal provisions in diverse 
treaty regimes which seek to establish boundaries of legality to regulate it, thereby ensuring 
perpetual circularity on the standard of liability for force used in riot control contexts. The 
result in the highly restrictive context of ICC legality is the lack of a framework from the 
ICC’s interpretive sources, on which to base a prosecution for crimes against humanity in 
riot control contexts without a high risk of criticism for legislative innovation or public 
policy controversy and without breach of the strict standard of legality stipulated under 
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article 22 of the ICC Statute. While the study notes an attempt by Grover (2014) at a more 
lax legality standard, her proposal is still inherently wrought with subjectivity and does not 
in its proposed state offer effective tools for circumventing the circularity of law 
surrounding the use of force in riot control contexts. The study applied it for illustrative 
purposes with acknowledgement of this limitation.   
 
The study also found that, the challenge to effective criminalization of state mandated force 
as crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute is due in part to the under development of 
crimes against humanity as international crimes in their own right. The historical evolution 
of these crimes in armed conflict contexts has fostered their conflation with IHL parameters 
for establishing liability which has contributed to their inhibited development in riot control 
contexts. The ICC has also missed or avoided opportunities to foster their development in 
law enforcement contexts as was manifested in the situations of Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire 
which have been brought before it. These situations were also missed opportunities for the 
court to demonstrate how it can circumvent its strict legality restrictions in hard cases such 
as riot control contexts bordering on armed conflict, whilst effectively fulfilling its 
interpretive role and avoiding criticism for legislative innovation. It remains to be seen how 
the Court will manoeuvre this question in the future.  
Chapter three of the study maintains that absolute legal certainty is unachievable and the 
highly subjective nature of and circularity of laws concerning riot control render their 
interpretation under the ICC’s strict legality requirement a paradox and a particularly 
challenging, almost illusory undertaking. In the context of the ICC where decisions may be 
highly politicized the objectivity and legality of such an interpretation process is even more 
complex. The nature of cases involving state use of force in riot contexts as seen in the 
foregoing examples could arise in the wake of post-election violence, ethnic or other 
political violence. In such scenarios the Hobbesian sovereign’s monopoly on the use of 
force is entrenched within legal frameworks which offer no clear limitations on its actions. 
The chapter argues however for a bare minimum of parameters agreed upon as universal 
standards and a foundation against which to measure state actors’ conduct in riot control 
contexts. This would be an initial step towards a clearer legal basis for the criminalization 
of riot control conduct under the ICC Statute framework.  
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Chapter four of the study found that while general principles of law from legal systems of 
the world may be an avenue for gap filling in hard cases, their methodological and 
substantive inconsistency renders them susceptible to criticisms for want of certainty, 
objectivity and representativeness. Under the highly restrictive standards of the ICC 
Statute, these criticisms are further magnified. The highly abstract nature of standards on 
the use of force in law enforcement contexts such as riot control, render the process of 
distilling general principles from such standards a very complex undertaking in which 
several contradictions would have to be reconciled. An analysis of selected laws on use of 
force in riot control contexts has illustrated the methodological inadequacies of applying 
general principles for a universal use of force standard. The fundamental differences 
between states’ standards on key pillars of necessity, precaution and means and methods of 
force indicate  the paradox in abstracting general principles from these standards, while the 
residual discretion inherent in the laws render the very idea of an absolute and objective 
standard illusory. The intricate connection between national standards on law enforcement 
and the discretion of the Hobbesian sovereign yields to a situation where those standards 
depend ultimately on subjective determinations which are wont to be driven more by 
political and security considerations of that sovereign. This merger of law and sovereign is 
the basis for the enduring dissolution of law in the face of state violence and the resultant 
circularity in the language of law at the national level, which is then replicated at the 
regional and international levels. This assessment renders illusory the very concept of 
abstracting general principles from inherently abstract standards, as argued in chapter four. 
A purported application of general principles in light of all these considerations is highly 
susceptible to criticisms of making new law, and applying law by analogy which are 
contrary to the strict ICC legality requirements.  
While the UN Basic Principles offer some degree of certainty for prohibited means and 
methods on the use of force, these too like the highly structured national law provisions are 
only useful for lower level thresholds of violence and are wont to dissolve into 
considerations of sovereignty in cases of ‘borderline’ violence as discussed above. 
Moreover, they are soft law sources whose application under the ICC Statue’s strict sources 
provisions is still uncertain.  
The study’s analysis of laws demonstrates an area of law over which states retain a high 
level of control and for which clear boundaries of legality continue to be an illusion. The 
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study argues that given the historical development of crimes against humanity and states’ 
significant monopoly over the use of force laws analysed above, state parties to the ICC 
Statute never intended the application of crimes against humanity under the Statute to riot 
control contexts. As such, the application of article 7 to riot control contexts is premature 
for an area of law which implicates state responsibility and for which there currently exists 
no shared understanding under international law as to what conduct under state law 
enforcement processes would amount to criminal liability under it.  
A way forward as indicated earlier may require extensive negotiations and consultations 
with state parties and experts towards a minimum set of standards as a basis for criminal 
liability under the Statute. Such a standard, without claiming to aspire towards absolute 
certainty could set out what weapons are agreed upon as inherently indiscriminate and as 
such, prohibited, and what methods of riot control might be inherently considered an 
‘attack’. The political challenges and legal complexities of these suggestions as well as the 
modalities of how they would be implemented are beyond the scope of the study. However, 
they are significant enough to warrant further independent research.  
In conclusion, the legal frameworks regulating use of force in riot control contexts, and 
those regulating crimes against humanity still operate in silos. It will be interesting to see 
whether the ICC will continue to avoid applying them concurrently where the question 
arises before it in the future, or where it does not avoid doing so, how it will manoeuvre the 
strict standard of legality it is bound by under the ICC Statute without undermining its own 
legitimacy as the first permanent international criminal court.   
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Law on the Establishment and Jurisdiction of the National Police, No. 9 of 2000, Rwanda. 
Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/africa/Rwanda/Law%20on%20Establishment,%20General%20Organisation%20and
%20Jurisdiction%20of%20National%20Police%20Rwanda%202000.pdf)   
  
Law on State Police No. 9749 of 2007, Albania. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/eastern-
europe/Albania/Law%20on%20State%20Police%20Albania%202007.pdf) 
    
Law on Police 2004, Armenia. Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/eastern-europe/Armenia/The%20Law%20on%20Police%20Armenia%202004.pdf) 
  
Law of Georgia on Police, 2013 (Unofficial translation). Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/eastern-
europe/Georgia/Law%20of%20Georgia%20on%20Police.pdf) 
  
Latvia Law on Police, 1992 as amended on 5th December 1996. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/eastern-
europe/Latvia/Law%20on%20Police%20Latvia%201992.pdf) 
  
Lithuania, law on Police17 October 2000 No. VIII-2048 Vilnius, (As last amended on 11 
May 2006 No. X-603). Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/eastern-europe/Lithuania/Law%20on%20Police%20Lithuania.pdf) 
   
Malaysia Police Act, 344 of 1967 (incorporating all amendments up to 1 January 2006). 
Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/asia-
pacific/Malaysia/Police%20Act%20Malaysia%201967.pdf) 
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Malaysia Public Order Preservation Act, 296 of 1958 (incorporating all amendments up to 
1 January 2006). Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/asia-
pacific/Malaysia/Public%20Order%20Preservation%20Act%20Malaysia%201958.pdf) 
  
Malta Public Meetings Ordinance, Cap. 68 of 1931. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/western-europe-
others/Malta/Public%20Meetings%20Ordinace%20Malta%201931.pdf) 
  
Malta Police Act, Cap 164 of 1961. Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-
of-force/western-europe-others/Malta/Police%20Act%20Malta%201961.pdf)   
 
 
National Police Service Act of Kenya, No.11 of 2011. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/africa/Kenya/National%20Police%20Service%20Act%202011.pdf)   
 
Organic Law of the National Police of Timor Leste, No.8 of 2004. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/asia-
pacific/TimorLeste/Organic%20Law%20of%20National%20Police%20Timor-
Leste%202004.pdf)   
 
Police Act, Nicaragua. Law No. 288 of 1996. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/latin-america-
caribbean/Nicaragua/Police%20Act%20Nicaragua%201996.pdf)   
 
Police Act, Uganda, Cap. 303, 1994. Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-
of-force/africa/Uganda/Police%20Act%201994.pdf)  
  
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, Australia, 2000. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/western-europe-
others/Australia/Police%20Powers%20and%20Responsibilities%20Act%202000.pdf) 
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Public Order (protection of persons and property) Act, Australia, No. 26 of 1971. Available 
at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/western-europe-
others/Australia/Federal/Public%20Order%20(Protection%20of%20Persons%20and%20
Property)%20Act%20Australia%201971.pdf)  
 
Public Order Act, Brunei, Cap. 148 of 1998. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/asia-
pacific/Brunei/Public%20Order%20Act%20Brunei%20Darussalam%201998.pdf)  
 
Public Order Act Kenya, Cap. 56, 2009. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/africa/Kenya/Public%20Order%20Act%20Kenya%202003.pdf)  
 
Public Order and Security Act of Zimbabwe, Cap. 11:17 of 2007. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/africa/Zimbabwe/Public%20Order%20and%20Security%20Act%202007.pdf)  
  
Plan of Operations No. 01/10 of the National Gendarmerie Director for Personnel 
(Unofficial translation), Argentina. Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-
of-force/latin-america-
caribbean/Argentina/Translations/Argentina%201/Information%20use%20force%20and%
20firearms.docx)   
 
Pakistan Police Rules, 1934. State communication available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/asia-
pacific/Pakistan/State%20Response%202014.pdf)  
 
Pakistan Police order, 2002. Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/asia-pacific/Pakistan/Police%20Order%20Pakistan%202002.pdf)   
 
205 
 
Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. State communication available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/asia-
pacific/Pakistan/State%20Response%202014.pdf)   
 
Protest Law 107, (2013) Egypt. Available at: 
(http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/protest_law_issued_nov_24.pdf)  
 
Philippines National Police Operational Procedures, Rule 24 on Civil Disturbance 
Management Operations, 2013. Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/asia-pacific/Philippines/National%20Police%20Manual%202010.pdf)  
 
Russia Federal Law on Federal Security Service, 1995. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/eastern-
europe/Russia/Federal%20Law%20on%20Federal%20Security%20Service%20Russia%20
1995.pdf ) 
 
South African Police Service Standing Order, 262 of 2004. Available at: 
(http://policehumanrightsresources.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/South-African-Police-
Service-Standing-Order-262-2004.pdf)   
 
South Africa, Regulation of Gatherings Act, No. 205 of 1993. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/africa/South%20Africa/Regulation%20of%20Gatherings%20Act%201994.pdf)   
 
South Africa, National Municipal Policing Standard for crowd management during 
gatherings and demonstrations, GN 307 of 2008. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-
force/africa/South%20Africa/Policing%20Standards%20South%20Africa%201995.pdf)  
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Sri Lanka Police Ordinance: Department Order No. A/ 19 (Under review pending 
amendment) State communication available at: ( http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-
of-force/asia-pacific/SriLanka/State%20Response%202013.pdf)   
 
 
The Nigeria Police Act, Cap. P19. Available at: (http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-
of-force/africa/Nigeria/Police%20Act%20Nigeria%201967.pdf)  
 
 
The Police Act of Iceland No. 90 of 1996 as amended in 2000. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/western-europe-
others/Iceland/Police%20Act%20Iceland%201996.pdf)   
 
 
Taiwan Act Governing the use of Police Weapons (2002). Available at: 
(http://glrs.moi.gov.tw/EngLawContent.aspx?Type=E&id=242).   
 
 
Police Training Manuals Referenced 
 
Mexico: Manual on the use of force, Common to the three armed forces. Available at: 
(http://www.icla.up.ac.za/images/un/use-of-force/latin-america-
caribbean/Mexico/Manual%20of%20the%20Use%20of%20Force,Common%20to%20the
%20Three%20Armed%20Forces.pdf)  
ANNEXURES: 
 
TABLE B: CODED REPRESENTATION OF DISPARITY IN STANDARDS OF 
SELECTED LAWS ON LAWFUL STATE RESPONSE TO RIOT CONTROL 
CONTEXTS 
Key to colour code: 
Unstructured 
Fairly structured   
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Highly structured     
 
 Justification  Precaution –
warnings 
specified? 
Protected people 
specified?  
Means and Methods -
list of weapons 
specified or not?  
Means of use specified?  
1. Nigeria    
2. Uganda 
 
   
3. Kenya 
 
   
4. Egypt 
 
   
5. Rwanda 
 
   
6. Zimbabwe 
 
   
7. South Africa 
 
   
8. Mexico 
 
   
9. Argentina 
 
   
10. Nicaragua 
 
   
11. Canada 
 
  As much force as 
necessary in good faith 
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12. Australia 
 
  ‘take steps reasonably 
believed necessary’ 
13. Fiji    
14. Finland 
 
  ‘necessary forms of 
force considered 
justifiable’  
15. Iceland 
 
   
16. Germany 
 
   
17. India 
 
   
18. Malaysia 
 
  ‘may do all things 
necessary’ ‘use such 
force necessary’  
19. Taiwan 
 
   
20. Indonesia 
 
   
21. Pakistan    
22. Sri Lanka 
 
  ‘A police officer may 
fire upon the crowd to 
protect life and 
property’ and may 
consider whether or not 
immediate action is 
necessary – no 
regulation for how force 
is to be used 
23. Afghanistan 
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24. China 
 
  ‘necessary measures’  
25. Philippines 
 
   
26. Bhutan 
 
   
27. Albania 
 
   
28. Armenia 
 
   
29. Bulgaria 
 
   
30. Czech Republic 
 
   
31. Russia 
 
   
32. Serbia    
33. Timor Liste 
 
  PTNL can use weapons 
of any model and 
caliber, use of firearms 
to be regulated by 
specific order 
34. Brunei 
 
  Force may include the 
‘use of lethal weapons’  
35. Azerbaijan 
 
   
36. Croatia 
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37. Georgia 
 
   
38. Lithuania 
 
   
39. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
   
40. St. Lucia 
 
   
41. Malta  
 
revolt/opposition    
42. Latvia   Special means 
permitted and their use 
to be determined by the 
Minister of the Interior 
 
 
 
 
TABLE C: SUMMARISED CATEGORIZATION OF THE WAYS IN WHICH 
SELECTED LAWS DIFFER ON THE THREE PILLARS OF MEASURING 
FORCE. 
TABLE OF FORCE INDICATORS  
JUSTIFICATION/NECESSITY-
why use force? 
Unstructured: wide discretion, no indicators for specificity of 
thresholds 
maintaining and securing of public safety and public 
order,  lawful objective’,  Self defense or defense of 
person from violence and defense of property, dispersal 
of assemblies or quelling riots, sufficient grounds to 
assume that persons are preparing to put up an armed 
resistance, preventing mass riots, address a risk of crime, 
to execute their duties, breach of the peace, 
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Moderately structured:language in law but liberal indicators 
for thresholds 
Security Director to apply to a court of first instance for an 
authentication of the ‘non peacefulness of the gathering’ before 
dispersal,  prevention of crimes committed or pending 
preparation, detention of a person who committed administrative 
wrong or crime, dealing with violation of legislation combined 
with use of violence, repulse of group assaults upon residential 
buildings, offices, 
Highly structured:step by step and detailed language in law as 
instruction for thresholds 
Following refusal of specific directives to disperse or reroute for 
stipulated reasons and after officer has taken specific steps 
namely: notifying the convener of perceived inability to 
adequately protect the crowd, to ensure pedestrian safety, to 
ensure protection from rival gangs, among others, 
A police officer may use firearms to prevent the committing of a 
criminal act for which a prison sentence lasting five years or more 
can be pronounced; 3. prevent the escape of a person caught 
committing a criminal act for which a prison sentence of more 
than ten years can be pronounced, or of a person for whom search 
on the grounds of having committed such a criminal act has been 
announced 
PRECAUTION- 
When to start force to minimize 
casualties 
 
 
 
 
 
Unstructured:wide discretion, no indicators for specificity of 
thresholds 
upon the expiration of a reasonable time after an order to disperse,  
after giving due warning,  after giving such due warning as he 
may consider necessary, sufficient time for the warning to be 
observed, 
Moderately structured:language in law but liberal indicators 
for thresholds 
-Upon the expiration of one hour after an order to disperse,  
-firing shall not be resorted to for the dispersal of the assembly 
except under specific direction from the Assistant Superintendent 
or Deputy Superintendent of Police.   
-use non-violent means first and force may only be employed 
when non-violent means are ineffective or without any promise of 
achieving the intended result  
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-Warning to be in a language understood by assembled persons, 
clearly indicating that there would be use of firearms, 
-allow participants to leave after warning 
-The police must announce its decision of applying weapons or 
explosives against persons. In this case the announcement will be 
complete by warning them with a loud voice (3 verbal warnings) 
and firing three warning gunshots. 
 
Highly structured: step by step and detailed language in law as 
instruction for thresholds 
Milder forms of force to be used first: namely martial arts, if 
ineffective, to be followed by the use of a truncheon, a service 
dog to be used when conditions escalate to beyond truncheon, 
-actions in phases starting from the use of verbal persuasion, and 
non lethal weapons, to lethal weapons as circumstances may 
demand as follows: phase I) preventive arrest, phase 2 declare 
assembly unlawful, warn through microphone or order the crowd 
to disperse or resort to show of force if the crowd still refuses to 
disperse.Phase 3: non lethal weapons: if after phase two the crowd 
is still resolute and is preparing to start engaging in violent 
disorder, the most senior police officer is to seek out the relevant 
Dzongdag or Dungpa to be physically on the spot to authorize the 
use of the following non lethal weapons to contain their actions:  
water cannons, Tear smoke, Riot Batons, Rubber Pellets. Phase 4: 
when the less extreme means are insufficient and the police are in 
danger of being overrun by the violent mob elements, the riot 
control force shall resort to the use of firearms. Prior to this 
however, the officer concerned shall secure the relevant 
Dzongdag or Dungpa to be physically present at the scene and 
authorize in writing the use of lethal means 
-verbal warnings at an audible level, indicating the departure 
routes, 2. escalate to: water cannons, gas canister, batons  in 
successive order (refusal to disperse) 3. escalate to: warning shots, 
sound or gas bombs, rubber cartouche bullets, non rubber 
cartouche bullets. In successive order (violence and destruction of 
property, assault on individuals and officers, 4. ‘tools 
proportionate to response to threat to life, property and money’. 
(resort to firearms) 
Planning stage: dialogue and preparation, initial and peaceful 
stage: supervision, Brach of peace/confrontational stage: If 
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violence reaches a stage where rocks are thrown at the CDM or 
other persons or at property causing damage to it, the ground 
commander shall warn the participants that if the violence 
continues, the assembly will be dispersed.  
If the violence continues, another audible warning will issue and 
after allowing sufficient time, an order for dispersal will follow, 
following which, the demonstrators shall be disbanded, contained 
and isolated. Water cannons and riot sticks may be used to aid the 
process 
-During any operation ongoing negotiations must take place 
between officers and conveners or other leadership elements. (2) 
If negotiations fail and life or property is in danger, the following 
procedure must be followed: Step Action 1 Put defensive 
measures in place as a priority. 2 Warn participants according to 
the Act, of the action that will be taken against them, should 
defensive measures fail. 3 Bring forward the reserve or reaction 
section or platoon that will be responsible for offensive measures, 
as a deterrent to further violence, should the above-mentioned 
measures not achieve the desired result. 4 Give a second warning 
before the commencement of the offensive measures, giving 
innocent bystanders the opportunity to leave the area. 5 Plan all 
offensive actions well and execute them under strict command 
after approval by the CJOC.  
-In a loud voice order them in at least two of the official 
languages and, if possible, in a language understood by the 
majority of the persons present, to disperse and to depart from the 
place of the gathering or demonstration within a time specified by 
him, which shall be reasonable. (b) If within the time so specified 
the persons gathered have not so dispersed or have made no 
preparations to disperse, such a member of the Police may order 
the members of the Police under his command to disperse the 
persons concerned and may for that purpose order the use of 
force, excluding the use of weapons likely to cause serious bodily 
injury or death. (c) The degree of force which may be so used 
shall not be greater than is necessary for dispersing the persons 
gathered and shall be proportionate to the circumstances of the 
case and the object to be attained. 
-precaution should be taken that a force armed with firearms is 
not brought close to a dangerous crowd as to risk it either being 
overwhelmed by numbers or being forced to inflict heavy 
casualties. If the use of firearms cannot be avoided, firing should 
be carried out from a distance sufficient to obviate the risk of the 
force being rushed and to enable strict fire control to be 
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maintained.  
PROPORTIONALITY/ MEANS 
AND METHODS 
What can you use or not use and 
how to use it to minimize 
casualties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unstructured: wide discretion, no indicators for specificity of 
thresholds 
may do all things necessary for dispersing the persons, may use 
such force as is reasonably justifiable in the circumstances, 
including lethal force, use of as much force as the peace officer 
believes, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, to be sufficient 
firearms and other weapons likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury shall, if used, be used with all due caution and deliberation, 
and without recklessness or negligence 
-a list of firearms and types of ammunition in the armament of the 
police shall be approved by the approved by the Government of 
Armenia. It shall be prohibited to accept those arms and 
ammunition into the armament of police which cause especially 
grave injuries or are a source of unjustifiable risk 
The types of special means permitted to the police pursuant to this 
Law, and the procedures for storing, carrying and use of such 
shall be determined by the Minister for the Interior of the 
Republic of Latvia, after co-ordination with the Ministry of 
Health of the Republic of Latvia. 
-The PNTL cannot impose restrictions or use coercive means 
other than those that are strictly necessary. 4. The PNTL can use 
weapons of any model and calibre 
Moderately structured: language in law but liberal indicators 
for thresholds 
-force used shall be proportional to the objective to be achieved, 
the seriousness of the offence, and the resistance of the person 
against whom it is used ,  Force to be used when strictly necessary  
 
-use of firearms is considered to be an extreme measure and is not 
to be used except when a suspect or offender offers armed 
resistance uses deadly force or otherwise poses risk to the lives of 
others, 
Firearms may only be used against a crowd of people when acts 
of violence are committed by or from [somebody] within the 
crowd or such acts are imminent and coercive measures against 
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individuals do not succeed or are without any promise of success, 
-not to use private force, special means and firearms against 
women, juveniles or persons who accompany minors, have 
obvious signs of disability, are privately and mental handicapped, 
as well as in crowded places with high probabilities of harm to by 
passers, except for the cases of assault by means of firearms and 
armed resistance 
Authorized officials, shall be entitled, in accordance with the law, 
to use the following coercive measures: physical force, night-
sticks, hand-cuffs, chemicals, physical means for restraining 
persons, barriers for vehicles, police dogs, water cannons, and 
other reasonable means under the circumstances. 
Before using firearms, the Police shall whenever possible use the 
following equipment: water spray, batons, tear gas canisters, 
rubber bullets, or any other ‘relevant devises’ used in controlling 
riots. 
If the group fails to disperse, only the following instruments of 
restraint may be used: 1) physical force; 2) police baton; 3) 
special motor vehicles; 5) service dogs; 6) service horses; 7) 
water cannons; 8) chemical agents; Instruments of restraint 
referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article may be used only on 
order of head of regional police directorate, i.e. police officer 
empowered by the head. 
Highly structured: step by step and detailed language in law as 
instruction for thresholds 
The riot control police shall use firearms only under the following 
circumstances:  I) when their performance and security is 
threatened by sporadic isolated gunfire from mob elements, 
returning fire should be ordered when targets can be identified, 
and when it is impossible to effectively defend oneself from the 
assailant other than by the use of a weapon: the firing is intended 
to hit the assailant alone and in doing so, the law enforcement 
officials must respect and preserve life and minimize injury and 
damage 
PROHIBITED:-4) The following are prohibited or restricted 
during crowd management operations: (a) the use of 37 mm 
stoppers (prohibited); (b) the use of firearms and sharp 
ammunition including birdshot and buckshot (prohibited); and (c) 
the use of rubber bullets (shotgun batons) (may only be used to 
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disperse a crowd in extreme circumstances, if less forceful 
methods prove to be ineffective - restricted). 
-In order that the decision to open fire may be acted upon without 
loss of control or confusion, the responsible officer shall, as soon 
as it appears likely that the use of fire arms will be necessary, tell 
off a detachment of armed police to be held in readiness. When 
fire is to be opened, the responsible officer shall decide the 
minimum volume necessary to be effective in the circumstances, 
and shall give precise orders accordingly, as to the particular men 
or files who are to fire and the number of rounds to be fired and 
whether volleys of independent aimed shots are to be fired. And 
shall ensure that his orders are not exceeded.  Whatever volume 
of fire is ordered, it shall be applied with maximum effect.  The 
aim shall be kept low and directed at the most threatening parts of 
the crowd. In no circumstances shall firing over the heads of, or at 
the fringes of the crowd be allowed.  Since buckshot is not safe 
from any range at which it is shot, government has directed that 
the use of buckshot ammunition against crowds is prohibited. 
-Special weapons and explosive devices may not be used for the 
purpose of preventing a person from escape. Explosive devices 
may not be used against persons gathered in a crowd 
- Chemical agents means short-term effect teargas, without lasting 
effects on psychophysical and general health, as well as chemical 
substances with effect lenient than teargas. Special protective 
measures shall be taken when using chemical agents in vicinity of 
children's institutions and nursing homes, primary schools, busy 
traffic routes or inflammable substances. Chemical means shall 
not be used against persons near inflammable substances, at great 
heights, or in similar locations where human life could be 
endangered.  
-Rubber Bullets only be used for defensive purposes in case of 
danger to physical integrity of any member of the security 
institutions of demonstrators or third person. In no case you may 
use this type of ammunition as a means disperse a demonstration. 
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TABLE A: A GROUPING OF SELECTED LAWS ON LAWFUL STATE 
RESPONSE TO RIOT CONTROL CONTEXTS 
 
NECESSITY/JUSTIFICATION OF FORCE 
Unlimited discretion: Unspecified/abstract/un-prescribed/highly within the realm of discretion: 
unclear language, no lists or clear references to specific law, high references to discretion, no clarity 
on steps, or directives, but on rhetorical declarations about human life, necessity etc. 
 
Nigeria: 10. Public safety and public order (1) The President may give to the Inspector-General such 
directions with respect to the maintaining and securing of public safety and public order as he may 
consider necessary, and the Inspector-General shall comply with those directions or cause them to be 
complied with. (2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the Commissioner of a 
State shall comply with the directions of the Governor of the State with respect to the maintaining and 
securing of public safety and public order within the State, or cause them to be complied with: 
Provided that before carrying out any such direction the Commissioner may request that the matter 
should be referred to the President for his directions.  (The Nigeria Police Act, section 10, chapter 
P19) 
Rwanda: Police officer may use force in pursuance of a ‘lawful objective’ that cannot 
otherwise be achieved.  Self defense or defense of person from violence and defense of 
property, dispersal of assemblies or quelling riots 
(Section 40 of Law No. 9 of 2000 on the establishment and Jurisdiction of the National Police) 
Kenya: -Unlawful public meeting, ‘breach of the peace’ or ‘public order’ (section 5 of Public Order 
Act, 2009, Cap. 56) 
Uganda: 36. Dispersal of assembly after it has been ordered to be terminated. If upon the expiration 
of a reasonable time after a senior police officer has ordered an assembly to disperse under section 
35(4) the assembly has continued in being, any police officer, or any other person acting in aid of the 
police officer, may do all things necessary for dispersing the persons so continuing assembled, or for 
apprehending them or any of them, and, if any person makes resistance, may use all such force as is 
reasonably necessary for overcoming that resistance, and shall not be liable in any criminal or civil 
proceedings for having by the use of that force caused harm or death to any person. (Police Act, 1994. 
Cap 303) (combines precaution and means and methods) 
Fiji: section 9(3) of the Public Order Act as amended by the Public Order Amendment Decree 
which provides as follows; Any police officer, if in his or her opinion such action is necessary for the 
public safety, after giving due warning, may use such force as he or she considers necessary, 
including the use of arms, to disperse the procession, meeting or assembly and to apprehend any 
person present thereat, and no police officer nor any person acting in aid of such police officer using 
such force shall be liable in criminal or civil proceedings for any harm or loss caused by the use of 
such force. (combines precaution and means and methods) 
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Zimbabwe: 29 Dispersal of unlawful public gatherings (1) A police officer and any person assisting 
him may do all things reasonably necessary for— (a) dispersing the persons present at a public 
gathering the holding or continuance of which is unlawful by virtue of any direction or order under 
section twenty-five, twenty-six or twenty-seven; and (b) apprehending any such persons; and, if any 
such person makes resistance, the police officer or the person assisting him may use such force as is 
reasonably justifiable in the circumstances of the case for overcoming any such resistance. (2) If a 
person is killed as a result of the use of reasonably justifiable force in terms of subsection (1), where 
the force is directed at overcoming that person’s resistance to a lawful measure taken in terms of that 
subsection, the killing shall be lawful. (Public Order and Security Act, 2007) (combines precaution 
and means and methods) 
India: The Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958: Any commissioned officer, warrant officer, 
non-commissioned officer or any other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces may, in a 
disturbed area,- (a) if he is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for the maintenance of public order, 
after giving such due warning as he may consider necessary, fire upon or otherwise use force, even to 
the causing of death, against any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order for the 
time being in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons or the 
carrying of weapons or of things capable of being used as weapons or of fire-arms, ammunition or 
explosive substances; (combines precaution and means and methods) 
Albania: A police officer may use force to ‘achieve a legal purpose’ and only when it is necessary. 
(Law on State Police 2007, Art.118) 
Armenia: The choice to exercise physical force, special means or use firearms shall be in the 
discretion of the Police employee, issuing from the situation, the seriousness of the offense and the 
personality of the offender. Art 29 (Law on Police 2004) 
But see towards the specific: Art.  31: A right to exercise special means to repel and attack against a 
police officer or members of the public, overcome resistance to a police officer or persons ensuring 
the maintenance of public order, where there are sufficient grounds to assume that persons are 
preparing to put up an armed resistance, while preventing mass riots and illegitimate group acts 
threatening the works of transport, communication and other organization.  
Art 32 supra: Police employees are entitled to use firearms while defending citizens from attacks 
harmful to their life and health, while in self-defense and when there’s an attempt at forceful 
disarming. While repulsing  group or armed attack against citizens’ apartments, areas occupied by 
state bodies, and organizations, 
Bulgaria: The police shall not abuse the rights given to it by the law to use physical power, auxiliary 
devices and weapons. The police shall use physical power, auxiliary devices or weapons only in 
cases, provided by the law, in case of unavoidable necessity, proportionate to the risk, and to a degree, 
which is necessary in order to achieve a lawful goal. 85. The police on a crime scene is in the position 
to make an assessment whether to use physical power, auxiliary devices or weapons, and to what 
extent Code on Police Ethics, 2004. 
Criminal Code of St. Lucia (2004) Force to preserve order 43. Any person who is authorised as a 
police officer or in any judicial or official capacity (a) to keep the peace or preserve order at any 
place; 
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(b) to remove or exclude a person from any place;(c) to use force for any similar purpose; may use 
such force reasonable in the circumstances as is necessary for the execution of such authority. 
Force within statutory authority justifiable 45. Any person who is authorised under any enactment 
to use forcemay use such reasonable force as is necessary according to the terms and conditions of his 
or her authority. 
Force against riotous or unlawful assembly 46. For the suppression or dispersion of a riotous or 
unlawfulassembly, reasonable force may be used subject to the provisions of thisCode with respect to 
riotous or unlawful assembly. 
 
Dispersing rioters after order made 
343.— (1) If, upon the expiration of one hour after such order has been made or after the making of 
such order has been prevented by force, persons continue riotously to assemble together, the police 
officer or any other person acting in aid of such officer, may do all that is necessary for the purpose of 
dispersing the persons so continuing to assemble or arresting them or any of them. (2) Where any 
person resists, the police or the person acting in the aid of such officer, may use such force as is 
reasonably necessary for overcoming such resistance, and is not liable in any criminal or civil 
proceeding for having, by the use of such force, caused harm or death to the person resisting. (3) 
Nothing in this section affects or limits the power to use such force as mentioned in this section at any 
time before the expiration of one hour from the making of the order, or after the making of the order 
has been prevented, if in the circumstances it is reasonably necessary to use such force for the 
suppression, or prevention of the continuance of any riot 
Czech Republic, Police Act 1991 section 38:A police officer is entitled to use coercive means in the 
interest of the protection of security of persons and his/her own, protection of property and public 
order, against a person endangering those. 
Brunei Public Order Act 1998: Power to use force. Section 21. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the 
contrary contained in any other written law, any police officer may in any special area use such force 
as, in the circumstances of the case, may be reasonably necessary, which force may extend to the use 
of lethal weapons, in order — (a) (I) to effect the arrest of any person who fails to comply with any 
order under section 11 or 15 or whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to have committed an 
offence against section 28, 29 or 30; or (ii) to effect the arrest of any person who fails to comply with 
a direction or signal to stop at or before reaching any barrier erected or placed under section 14; or 
(iii) to effect the arrest of any person whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to have 
committed an offence against any provision of any written law which is for the time being specified in 
the Schedule; (b) to overcome forcible resistance offered by any person to such arrest; or (c) to 
prevent the escape from arrest or the rescue of any person arrested as aforesaid; or (d) to disperse any 
unlawful group.(combines precaution and means and methods) 
China’s law on processions and demonstrations 1989: Article 27 The people's police shall stop an 
assembly, a procession or a demonstration that is being held, if it involves one of the following 
circumstances: (1) .. (2) … or (3) the emergence, in the course of the activity, of a situation which 
endangers public security or seriously undermines public order. If any of the circumstances specified 
in the preceding paragraph occurs and the instruction to stop the activity is ignored, the chief officer 
of the people's police present at the scene shall have the authority to order a dismission; for those who 
refuse to dismiss, the chief police officer present at the scene shall have the authority to decide, in 
accordance with relevant state, provisions, on the adoption of necessary measures to force a 
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dismission and to take away from the scene by force those who refuse to obey or detain them at once. 
(combines precaution and means and methods) 
Malaysia Police Act 1967 Use of force in dispersing or arresting persons pursuant to section 27 or 
27A 27B. If persons are ordered to disperse pursuant to subsection 27(3) or 27A(1) and do not 
disperse, any police officer or any other person acting in aid of a police officer may do all things 
necessary for dispersing them and for arresting them or any of them pursuant to subsection 27(6) or 
27A(5), and, if any person makes resistance, may use such force as is reasonably necessary for 
overcoming resistance (Power to stop certain activities which take place other than in a public place) 
Malaysia Public Order Preservation Act, 1958 Section 5 (2) Any police officer may, if it is 
necessary for the public security, use such force as may be necessary to disperse any procession, 
meeting, assembly ordered to be dispersed or prohibited under the provisions of this section, which 
force may extend to the use of lethal weapons. (combines precaution and means and methods) 
Australia: Public Order (protection of persons and property) Act 1971, section 8(4) For the 
purpose of: (a) dispersing an assembly in respect of which a direction has been given under this 
section; or (b) dispersing or suppressing an assembly to which paragraph (1)(b) applies (whether or 
not a direction has been given under this section in respect of the assembly); it is lawful for a person 
to use such force as he or she believes, on reasonable grounds, to be necessary for that purpose and is 
reasonably proportioned to the danger which he or she believes, on reasonable grounds, is to be 
apprehended from the continuance of the assembly. (Provisions applying to common wealth premises 
and territories). Also see section 17(4) (b) for diplomatic and consular premises.  
Australia Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000: section 51 Prevention of riot (1) It is lawful 
for a police officer to take steps the police officer reasonably believes are necessary to suppress a riot. 
(2) It is lawful for a police officer, acting under reasonable orders given by a justice for suppressing a 
riot, to suppress a riot (combines precaution and means and methods) 
Criminal Code of Canada 2013, s.32. (1) Every peace officer is justified in using or in ordering the 
use of as much force as the peace officer believes, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, (a) is 
necessary to suppress a riot; and (b) is not excessive, having regard to the danger to be apprehended 
from the continuance of the riot. 
(combines precaution and means and methods) 
Finland Police Act, Section 19 Dispersing a crowd (1) Police officers have the right to order a crowd 
to disperse or move if the gathering threatens public order and security or obstructs traffic. If an order 
to disperse or move is not obeyed, police officers have the right to use force to disperse the crowd and 
to apprehend noncompliant persons. 
Section 27 Use of force (1) When carrying out official duties, police officers have the right to use 
necessary forms of force that can be considered justifiable to overcome resistance, remove a person 
from the scene, carry out an apprehension, prevent the escape of a person who has lost his or her 
liberty, eliminate an obstacle or address an immediate risk of a crime or other dangerous act of being 
committed, or some other dangerous situation developing. (2) When judging the justifiability of force, 
the importance and urgency of the assignment, the danger posed, the resources available and other 
factors influencing an overall assessment of the situation shall be taken into consideration 
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27(4) The police have the right, with the assistance of the Defence Forces, to use military force to 
prevent or intervene in the commission of a terrorist offence as laid down in the Act on Executive 
Assistance to the Police by the Defence Forces (781/1980). (523/2005) (5) Provisions on the 
excessive use of force are laid down in Chapter 4, sections 6(3) and 7 of the Criminal Code. 
(517/2003) (combines precaution and means and methods) 
Timor Leste, Organic Law National Police (2004) Article 5 Legitimate use of force 1. In the case of 
disturbance of public order and peace, the use of force is authorized, and where this is insufficient, 
other means can be used to overcome illegitimate resistance against members of the PNTL, in the 
performance of their duties. 2. The coercive means will only be able to be used in the following cases: 
(a) to repel an immediate and unlawful aggression in self defense or in defense of other people; (b) 
after the use of all means to overcome resistance to the performance of their functions and after 
having given an explicit warning. 
The Police Act of Iceland, 1996: Article 14 The use of force. Those who exercise police authority 
may use force in the course of executing their duties. At no time, however, may they use force to a 
greater extent than is necessary on each given occasion. (combines precaution and means and 
methods) 
The powers of enforcement officials mentioned by the law specify that they only may use force "as of 
necessity": 
Art 184. -. The police officials or security forces have the 
following powers: (...) 11) Use of public force as of necessity.   
 
Argentina Minimum criteria for the development of protocols and the Police Forces Federal 
Security Forces in public demonstrations (Resolution no. 210/2011 of Ministry of Security )  
 
The main objective of the police and security forces acting on concentrations or public demonstrations 
is the respect and protection of the rights of participants and reduce the damages that the 
concentration or manifestation cause or could cause the rights of people who do not participate in it 
and the public goods. In fulfilling these objectives will grant security forces prominence to the 
protection of life and physical integrity of all involved. 
[...] 
Argentina: Regulation No. 8 of Guns and Shooting (ODI No. 25 of February 6, 2012) 
The rules of Guns and Shooting Range of the Federal Police Argentina regulates it pertains to 
the use of weapons 
fire by members of that force. [...] CHAPTER X 43 Use of firearms can be justified: for the 
preservation of life and for public security, In extreme circumstances when decisions must be made 
under uncertain and changing circumstances. The use of weapons here always requires sufficient 
cause and demonstrable reason for confrontation with armed people, but with minimum possible risk 
to the physical integrity of third parties. It is justified to stop flight where the aggressor continues 
gunning down police personnel and to prevent circumstances involving imminent danger of death to 
police or to third parties.  
Argentina: Plan of Operations No. 01/10 of the National Gendarmerie Director for Personnel 
Operation Sentinel (containing the "General Rules on the Use of Weapons 
Fire)  Gendarmerie staff FIREARMS USED AGAINST PEOPLE ONLY: 1) In self-defense or 
others, 2) In case of serious and imminent danger of: - Death or; - Serious injury. 3) To prevent a 
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particularly serious crime involving a serious threat to life. 
4) In order to arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting armed to their authority and only 
when less extreme means are insufficient measures to achieve those objectives. 
 
Pakistan Police Rules 1934 
1 a) The main principle to be observed is that the degree of force used shall be regulated by the 
circumstances of each case. The object of the use of force is to quell a disturbance of the peace, or to 
disperse an assembly which threatens such disturbance and has either refused to disperse, or shows a 
determination not to disperse.   
 
 
Fairly limited discretion:  Fairly specified/Moderate/moderately prescriptive within the law: 
vague references to some laws or procedures  
 
Egypt:  -If the participants in the public meeting, procession, or demonstration take any action that 
constitutes as a crime punishable by law or violate the peaceful nature of expressing opinions.  
              -Security Director may apply to a court of first instance for an authentication of the ‘non 
peacefulness of the gathering’.  
(article 11, Protest Law 107, (2013))  see Amnesty International Criticism 
:https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2013/11/egypt-new-protest-law-gives-security-forces-free-
rein/ 
Azerbaijan: I. Police officer shall be entitled to use private force in respect of any person failing to 
implement his legal demands only in the following cases: 1) prevention of crimes committed or 
pending preparation; 2) detention of a person who committed administrative wrong or crime; 3) 
dealing with violation of legislation combined with use of violence. 4) repulse of group assaults upon 
residential buildings, offices, enterprises etc.  (Police Act. Section 26) 
Police officer shall be entitled to use special means in respect of any person failing to implement his 
legal demands only in the following cases: 1) assault or any other violent action posing real danger to 
human life and health; 2) riots and mass public disturbances; 
IV. Police officer shall be entitled to use firearms in order provided by the legislation of the Republic 
in the following cases: 1) prevention of crimes committed or pending preparation; 2) detention of a 
person who committed administrative wrong or crime; 3) dealing with violation of legislation 
combined with use of violence. 4) repulse of group assaults upon residential buildings, offices, 
enterprises in cases mentioned in paragraph 7 of Subsection II of the present Section; 3) 
encroachments upon human lives and failure in using forced preventive means; 4) armed resistance in 
the course of detention; 5) prevention of criminal offences posing an imminent danger to human life; 
6) prevention of attempt to procure possession of firearms by other person;(Police Act Section 26) 
No liability for action: According to the requirements of the present ACT, use of private force, 
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special means and firearms in cases of extreme necessity shall be adequate to the imminence of 
danger. Deprivation of life as a result of the use of private force, special means and firearms in cases 
of extreme necessity shall not be considered as a violation of the right to live(Police Act supra, 
Section 26 VI) 
Croatia law on Police (2000), Article 54: The means of coercion may be used to protect human 
lives, to surmount resistance, to prevent escape or to reject an attack if the measures of warning and 
ordering do not guarantee success. 
Bhutan Police Act 2009: Section 65: The use of firearms is considered to be an extreme measure and 
is not to be used except when a suspect or offender offers armed resistance uses deadly force or 
otherwise poses risk to the lives of others. 
Section 79: the use of force: the use of force by police shall be regulated entirely by provisions of the 
law. The object of the use of force is to quell a disturbance of the peace, or to disperse an unlawful 
assembly, which either refused to disperse or showed a determination not to disperse, the degree of 
force employed shall be regulated according to the circumstances of each case. (see structured 
precaution) 
German Act on the use of Direct Force by Federal Police Officers exercising Public Authority 
(1961) 
§ 10 firearms against persons (1) Firearms may only be used against individuals, 1. to prevent the 
imminent execution or the continuation of an unlawful act, which under the circumstances a) is a 
crime or b) committed an offense, using or keeping firearms or explosives 2. a person who is  
escaping arrest  
(2) Firearms may only be used against a crowd of people when acts of violence are committed by or 
from [somebody] within the crowd or such acts are imminent and coercive measures against 
individuals do not succeed or are without any promise of success. 
 
Taiwan Act Governing the use of Police Weapons (2002) Article 4 While performing duties, the 
police may use knives or firearms under the following circumstances: 1. When an extreme mishap is 
imminent and it is urgent to maintain the public order. 2. When the uproar is reaching the point of 
causing social disorder. 3. When the person to be arrested or detained by law resists arrest or escapes, 
or anyone helps him/her resist the arrest or escape. 4. When either the land, building, tools and 
supplies, vehicles, boats, aircrafts under police’s protection or people’s lives, bodies, freedom, or 
properties is endangered or under threat. 5. When the police’s lives, bodies, freedom or equipments 
are endangered or threatened, or there is enough evidence to believe that the foresaid parts will be 
endangered. 6. When a person carrying a weapon is believed to cause trouble, and he/ she refuses to 
be at the police’s command after being ordered to drop the weapon. 7. If there is no alternative to the 
use of deadly force to stop the situations prescribed in subparagraph 1 and 2 of the preceding article. 
Other approved weapons may also be used in the circumstances, prescribed in the preceding 
paragraph, if necessary. (combines precaution and means and methods) 
 
Armed Forces Act of Singapore, 1975: Restriction on «use «of «force likely to cause death or 
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grievous hurt 201F. —(1) A serviceman in exercising any power under section 201B(3) or (4) or 
201C(9) shall not, in using force against any person –– (a) do anything likely to cause the death of, or 
grievous hurt to, the person unless the serviceman believes on reasonable grounds that doing that 
thing is necessary to –– (I) protect the life of, or to prevent serious injury to, another person (including 
himself); or (ii) protect infrastructure specified in an order made under section 201C(1) against 
damage or disruption to its operation; or (b) subject the person to greater indignity than is reasonable 
and necessary in the circumstances. [25/2007 wef 01/08/2007] (2) If a person attempts to escape being 
detained, a serviceman shall not do anything that is likely to cause the death of, or grievous hurt to, 
the person unless the person has, if practicable, been called on to surrender and the serviceman 
believes on reasonable grounds that the person cannot be apprehended in any other manner. 
 
Law of Georgia on Police, 2013: Article 31: Right to apply coercive measures 1. In order to ensure 
the implementation of the police tasks, a police officer is authorized to apply suitable coercive 
measures proportionally (strictosensu), only in cases of necessity and with such intensity that ensures 
the achievement of a legitimate goal. 
Article 33: In order to protect public security and legal order, a police officer uses active and 
passive special means. 
Article 34: A police officer is authorized to use firearms as a means of last resort: a) in order to 
protect a person and himself/herself, when life and/or health is endangered; b) in order to free persons 
illegally deprived of their liberty; c) in order to prevent an escape of a person detained for violent act 
or omission, or especially grave crime, with a prior knowledge of a police officer; d) in order to 
suppress a violent crime, if a person shows resistance to a police officer; e) in repelling an attack on a 
protected object, state organ and/or public organization; 
 
Latvia Law on Police 1992 Section 13. Rights of Police Officers to Use Physical Force and 
Special Means 
Police officers have the right to use physical force, special fighting techniques, handcuffs, means of 
tying, batons, tear eliciting substances, special paints, psychological impact lights and sound devices, 
devices for opening premises occupied by persons violating the law, means to demolish barriers and 
forcibly stop transport, water cannons, armoured vehicles, helicopters and other special means of 
transport, as well as service dogs and horses, if such are necessary in order to: 
1) repel an attack on persons, police officers, other workers of institutions of the Ministry of the 
Interior, and persons who are performing their duties of service in guaranteeing public safety and in 
the fight against crime; 2) repel an attack on buildings, premises, structures and means of transport 
regardless of their ownership, or free facilities occupied by armed persons; 3) free hostages; 4) 
prevent mass disorder and group violations of public order; 5) arrest and convey persons violating the 
law to a police institution or other service premises, as well as restrain arrested, detained and 
convicted persons during conveyance and incarceration if such persons do not submit to or resist 
police officers, or if there is reason to believe that such persons may escape or do harm to other 
persons nearby or themselves; and 
6) stop intentionally wrongful resistance to lawful requests made by police officers or other persons 
performing service duties in guaranteeing public order or in the fight against crime. 
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See also: Section 14. The Right of Police Officers to Use Firearms 
Shooting on purpose shall be deemed to be use of a firearm. 
A police officer has the right on a continuing basis to keep and carry a firearm issued to him or her for 
use in the line of 
duty. The regulations and procedures with respect to keeping and carrying a firearm issued to a police 
officer shall be 
determined by the Minister for the Interior of the Republic of Latvia. 
A police officer is entitled to use a firearm in an absolute emergency in order to: 
1) defend other persons and himself or herself from attack that actually endangers life or may do harm 
to 
health, or to avert an attempt to obtain a firearm by force; 
2) free hostages; 
3) repel a group or armed attack on police officers or other persons who are performing the duties of 
the 
service in guaranteeing public safety and fighting crime; 
4) repel a group or armed attack on facilities, premises, structures, institutions, undertakings and 
organisations that are to be guarded; 
5) arrest a person who is showing armed resistance or who is surprised in the act of committing a 
serious or 
an especially serious crime or has escaped from detention, or arrest an armed person who refuses to 
comply 
with a lawful request to hand over a weapon or explosives; 
6) stop a means of transport, damaging it, if its driver through his or her actions is creating actual 
danger to 
the life or health of persons and does not submit to the request of a police officer to stop the means of 
transport and if there is no other way to arrest the driver; or 
7) render harmless an animal that endangers the life or health of a person. 
A police officer also has the right to use a firearm to give a warning signal or to summon help. 
 
 
Lithuania, law on Police: Article 42. Conditions for the Utilization of Firearms A police officer shall 
have the right to use firearms against persons, animals, motor vehicles, and other forms of 
transportation. A police officer shall have the right to use firearms against a person in the following 
cases: 1. when his or her health or life is in danger, or to prevent his or her firearm from being seized; 
2. to defend other persons from an attack which threatens their health or life, as well as to free persons 
who have been kidnapped or taken hostage; 3. to repel an armed attack; 4. while in pursuit of a 
criminal suspect, if the suspect uses or attempts to use a firearm, weapon, or other life threatening 
object, implement, or method in an attempt to evade arrest; 5. to apprehend a person caught in the act 
of committing a serious offence, provided that the person cannot be apprehended in any other way; 6. 
while attempting to apprehend an arrested or convicted person, if the person has escaped, or is trying 
to escape, from the place of imprisonment, or from the place of detention before trial or while being 
transported; 7. in the event of a mass prison escape or riot; and 8. in the event that a police guard or 
specially guarded facility is attacked; the list of such facilities shall be determined by the Government 
of the Republic of Lithuania. The use of firearms against a person and the consequences thereof shall 
be reported to the prosecutor immediately. The use of firearms shall be prohibited: in public gathering 
places, if it endangers innocent people; against citizens who have young children with them; against 
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women, minors, and persons who are visibly disabled, except in cases when said persons attack or 
resist with firearms themselves 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: (1) Authorized officials may only use firearms when it is necessary to 
protect human life. Art 30(1). But see: (2) Before using a firearm, an authorized official must identify 
himself and give a clear warning of his intent to use a firearm, except in cases where doing so would 
unduly place himself or others at risk of death or serious harm. (3) Authorized officials who perform 
responsibilities and duties within a unit or group, may use firearms only if ordered by the unit or 
group commander. The order to use firearms may be given only when expressly provided by law. 
(4) Coercive means may be used by authorized officials in order to: 1. repulse an attack on 
themselves, other persons or persons they have secured detained, kept in custody or arrested; 2. 
subdue one or more persons who violate the peace and public order; 3. prevent the escape of a person 
who is being escorted, detained, kept in custody or arrested; and 4. make a lawful arrest when the 
subject is resisting arrest. (Art 29(4),law on Police of the Brcko District) 
Nicaragua Police Act (1996) 
5) Rational use of force and use of firearms: 
Members of the police shall: 5 1. Use only the force necessary to avoid serious and irreparable 
damage immediately; doing so governed by the principles of congruence, opportunity and 
proportionality in using the means at its disposal, if other means remain ineffective. 
5.2. Use firearms only when there is a serious threat for his life, physical integrity or those of third 
parties; or in order to avoid the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to 
life, or to arrest a person presenting such a danger, which oppose resistance to authority, or to prevent 
his escape, and only if that result less extreme insufficient to achieve these objectives; or those 
circumstances that may pose a serious risk to public order and accordance with the principles which 
the preceding paragraph refers to. (combines precaution and means and methods) 
Afghanistan Police Law (2005), In normal cases the police may use weapons after given notice to 
the person in front in the following cases: to prevent a felony or misdemeanor, provided that the 
application of other means of force stipulated in this law are not possible or effective; public order and 
security are at stake; 5. if the police intense is a legitimate defense. (3) In normal cases the police may 
use explosives after giving notice to the person in the following cases: 7. a person or persons use fire 
arms or explosives against the police; 8. the use of fire arms against a person or persons in order to 
repulse their attack proved to be ineffective; 9. the intention of the police is to launch an effective 
action to destroy things that could pose a threat to public security.  
Use of Weapon against a Group of People Article 24: The police can apply weapon or explosives 
against a group of people only if it resorted to offensive acts of disturbing the security by means of 
arms, and if the use of other means of force applied against them individually has proved ineffective. 
In this case it is imperative to first announce the use of weapon or explosives by giving at least three 
verbal warnings followed by three gunshot warnings and that this action should happen within the 
provisions of the law and be based on a sound decision. 
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Germany-Act on the Use of Direct Force by Federal Police Officers exercising Public Authority 
1961  
Section 10: firearms against persons (1) ,Firearms may only be used against individuals, 1. to prevent 
the imminent execution or the continuation of an unlawful act, which under the circumstances ) is a 
crime or b) committed an offense, using or keeping firearms or explosives 2. a person who is  
escaping arrest  (2) Firearms may only be used against a crowd of people when acts of violence are 
committed by or from [somebody] within the crowd  or such acts are imminent and coercive measures 
against individuals do not succeed  or are without any promise of success. 
Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code: Chapter IX 
Section 128: If an assembly has been directed to disperse with no result, an officer may enlist the 
assistance of a male person who need not be a police officer, to disperse the crowd by force. This may 
be for the purpose of confining or arresting offending individuals, provided that firing shall not be 
resorted to for the dispersal of the assembly except under specific direction from the Assistant 
Superintendent or Deputy Superintendent of Police. 
129: If the assembly cannot otherwise be dispersed and if it is necessary for the public security that it 
should be dispersed, the Police Officer of the Highest rank not below Assistant Superintendent of 
Police or deputy Superintendent who is present may cause it to be dispersed by the armed forces.  
130(2). Every such army officer so required for the dispersal shall obey the requisition in the manner 
he or she thinks fit, but in so doing shall use as little force and do as little injury to person and 
property as may be consistent with dispersing the assembly and arresting and detaining such persons.  
 
Highly limited discretion: Specified/Highly Specified/Strict/highly prescriptive within the law: 
clear cues and references to the   law, actions and relevant authorities, names restricted or prohibited 
weapons, 
 
 
South Africa: Failed negotiation and a threat to life and property (Section 14, National Instruction on 
Public Order Police 2012).  
Following refusal of specific directives to disperse or reroute for stipulated reasons and after officer 
has taken specific steps namely: notifying the convener of perceived inability to adequately protect 
the crowd, to ensure pedestrian safety, to ensure protection from rival gangs, among others. (Section 
9, The regulation of gatherings Act, 1993).  
 
Sri Lanka –Section 78 police ordinance: No fire may be opened in any circumstances unless the 
crowds are committing any of the offences listed in the firing orders, namely, murder or grievous 
injury, arson, breaking into houses or places of worship by night, destroying houses, shops, stores or 
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places of worship in such a way that may cause death or grievous harm and if there is no person in 
authority from whom the police can get orders and if there is no other way to stop the mob.  
(Referenced under department Order No. A/ 19. But see precaution and means and methods:  A police 
officer is entitled to fire upon a mob to protect life or property. The provision contains no 
accompanying parameters for how the fire ought to be used. The officer should consider whether 
immediate action is necessary or whether mere armed presence of an armed party will be sufficient to 
cause the crowd to desist from violence.)   
(combines precaution and means and methods) 
 PRECAUTION -LEVELS OF FORCE/STAGES FOR INTERVENTION 
Open/mild: Unspecified/abstract/un-prescribed/highly within the realm of discretion: unclear 
language, no lists or clear references to specific law, high references to discretion, no clarity on steps, 
or directives, but on rhetorical declarations about human life, necessity etc 
 
Kenya:- 
-A police officer shall always attempt to use non-violent means first and force may only be employed 
when non-violent means are ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result. 
(National Police Service Act, 6th schedule). 
‘reasonably necessary’ force whenever the circumstances so permit without gravely jeopardizing the 
safety of persons and without grave risk of uncontrollable disorder,  
-firearms shall not be used unless weapons less likely to cause death have previously been used 
without achieving the purpose aforesaid; and firearms and other weapons likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury shall, if used, be used with all due caution and deliberation, and without 
recklessness or negligence.(Section 14.  Public Order Act, 2009) 
- The force used shall be proportional to the objective to be achieved, the seriousness of the offence, 
and the resistance of the person against whom it is used, and only to the extent necessary while 
adhering to the provisions of the law and the Standing Orders.(National Police Service Act, 6th 
schedule).  
An officer intending to use firearms shall identify themselves and give clear warning of their intention 
to use firearms, with sufficient time for the warning to be observed, except— (a) where doing so 
would place the officer or other person at risk of death or serious harm; or (b) if it would be clearly 
inappropriate or pointless in the circumstances. (National Police Service Act, 6th schedule). 
Rwanda: The use of force shall be preceded by warning, unless the warning defeats the objectives of 
Police.  (sec.40. law No. 9/2000). 
Warning to be in a language understood by assembled persons, clearly indicating that there would be 
use of firearms. The most senior officers are to authorize the use of firearms. However, where the 
crowd’s intent is murder, pillage and destruction of public buildings, the authorization may be waived.  
(Section 41, law No. 9/2000).  
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Malta Public Meetings Ordinance 1931. 15. (1) The order to disperse shall be given by distinct 
formal intimations given by such means as the senior member of the Police force present may deem 
adequate. For the purpose of giving such intimation any member of the Police Force may use any 
public address system which may be in use at the meeting. (2) Should the said intimations fail to have 
effect the meeting may be dispersed by the use of force. 4 CAP. 68.] PUBLIC MEETINGS (3) It shall 
also be lawful to use force if no intimation can be made owing to revolt or opposition. 
Criminal Code of St. Lucia (2004) 
Dispersing rioters after order made 
 
343.— (1) If, upon the expiration of one hour after such order has been made or after the making of 
such order has been prevented by force, persons continue riotously to assemble together, the police 
officer or any other person acting in aid of such officer, may do all that is necessary for the purpose of 
dispersing the persons so continuing to assemble or arresting them or any of them. (2) Where any 
person resists, the police or the person acting in the aid of such officer, may use such force as is 
reasonably necessary for overcoming such resistance, and is not liable in any criminal or civil 
proceeding for having, by the use of such force, caused harm or death to the person resisting. (3) 
Nothing in this section affects or limits the power to use such force as mentioned in this section at any 
time before the expiration of one hour from the making of the order, or after the making of the order 
has been prevented, if in the circumstances it is reasonably necessary to use such force for the 
suppression, or prevention of the continuance of any riot 
 
Albania Law on State Police 2007: The Police officer uses the minimum amount of force necessary 
in accordance with the principle of proportionality. When using force, the officer is to choose from a 
continuum of force options which includes: verbal persuasion, physical restraint, impact weapons, 
aerosol weapons (devices with chemical paralysing substances), electrical impulse devices, police 
dogs, and firearms. 
The Police officer must warn that he will use force prior to its execution. The warning may be 
abandoned if the circumstances do not permit it, in particular if the immediate execution of means of 
force is necessary to prevent immediate threat.  
(6) A group of persons has to be warned of the intention to use force or of the change of form of force 
as early as possible, allowing participants to leave. Art. 118 
 
Taiwan Act Governing the use of Police weapons:  
Article 6: The police shall properly use police weapons in case of emergency and shall not exceed the 
necessary degree of force. Article 7 Once the reason for the use of police weapons doesn’t exist, the 
police shall cease their use immediately. Article 8 When using police weapons, the police shall pay 
attention not to hurt innocent third parties. Article 9 The police should avoid using lethal force unless 
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the situation is so imminent that the lives of officers or bystanders are being threatened. 
 
Malta Police Act 1961: The Use Of Force, Proportionality. Added by: XIII. 2002.4.  
96. Police officers may use such moderate and proportionate force as may be necessary to ensure the 
observance of the laws. Remedy of last resort. Added by: XIII. 2002.4. 97. The use of force is a 
remedy of last resort and shall only be used for the duration that is strictly necessary when it is evident 
that all other remedies would be of no avail. Relevant time. Added by: XIII. 2002.4. 98. If in any 
Court or tribunal any question arises as to the reasonableness of the use of force the circumstances 
prevailing at the time when force was used shall be the criterion for examining such reasonableness. 
Arms. Added by: XIII. 2002.4. 99. (1) In exceptional circumstances the Force may, in the execution 
of its duties, use fire-arms and other offensive weapons or materials. (2) When assessing the existence 
or otherwise of the exceptional circumstances mentioned in sub article (1), consideration shall be 
taken of the conditions prevailing at the time when the use of fire-arms, or weapons or other materials 
becomes inevitable to preserve the life of a police officer or of others, or to avert an imminent danger 
of widespread violence. POLICE [CAP. 164. 23 Responsibility. Added by: XIII. 2002.4. 100. Saving 
any criminal or civil liability under any other law, it shall be considered as an offence against 
discipline if a police officer uses force for considerations extraneous to those permitted by law and the 
circumstances of the case. 
Moderately specified: negotiation (mode of communication. Effective communication?) see art 
22 of Romania Law on Police 
Fairly specified/Moderate/moderately prescriptive within the law: vague references to some laws 
or procedures  
 
 
Egypt:1.verbal warnings at an audible level, indicating the departure routes,  
              2. escalate to: water cannons, gas canister, batons  in successive order (refusal to disperse) 
              3. escalate to: warning shots, sound or gas bombs, rubber cartouche bullets, non rubber 
cartouche bullets. In successive order (violence and  destruction of property, assault on individuals 
and officers 
            4. ‘tools proportionate to response to threat to life, property and money’. (resort to firearms) 
(Article 12 of Protest law 107). 
 
Afghanistan law on police, 2005:  
Announcing the Application of Force Article Twenty-two (1) The police must announce its decision 
of applying weapons or explosives against persons. In this case the announcement will be complete by 
warning them with a loud voice and firing three warning gunshots. (2) The weapons and explosives 
shall not be used if uninvolved persons could suffer from it. 
Use of Weapon against a Group of People Article Twenty-four The police can apply weapon or 
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explosives against a group of people only if it resorted to offensive acts of disturbing the security by 
means of arms, and if the use of other means of force applied against them individually has proved 
ineffective. In this case it is imperative to first announce the use of weapon or explosives by giving at 
least three verbal warnings followed by three gunshot warnings and that this action should happen 
within the provisions of the law and be based on a sound decision. 
Azerbaijan:  
I. In the course of implementation of his/her duties in respect of the use of private force, special 
means and firearms, police officer shall be bound as follows: 1) to use private force, special means 
and firearms only as a means of last resort and for purposes of necessary defense, should all other 
means of influence fail to procure desired outcome, as well as to the degree proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence and personality of the offender; 2) not to use private force, special means and 
firearms against women, juveniles or persons who accompany minors, have obvious signs of 
disability, are privately and mental handicapped, as well as in crowded places with high probabilities 
of harm to by passers, except for the cases of assault by means of firearms and armed resistance; 3) to 
use firearms exclusively for prevention of an imminent danger; 4) to make an oral warning or 
precautionary shot prior to using firearms (in case of sudden, i.e. totally unexpected attack, as well as 
in cases if the attacker uses firearms, motor transportation vehicle, dangerous predatory, wild or other 
animal, police officers shall be entitled to use firearms without warning); (Police Act Section 29) 
Law of Georgia on Police:  
Article 34: The active use of firearms against a person shall be preceded by a following verbal 
warning on its use: “Police! Freeze or I will shoot!” followed by the warning shot. In case of 
necessity, a warning shot may not be conducted. 7. Firearms may be used without warning: a) upon 
armed attack, as well as upon unexpected attack with the use of military equipment, any vehicle or 
mechanic means; b) upon escape, by using a vehicle, of an arrestee or detainee who has committed 
especially grave crime, with the prior knowledge of a police officer; c) upon showing armed 
resistance by a person; d) upon giving the signal of distress or calling for additional support; 
Article 35. Restriction on the use of coercive measures 1. It is prohibited to use physical force, special 
means and firearms against persons with evident signs of pregnancy, minor age, disability or old age, 
except for the cases when they conduct an armed or group attack, show an armed resistance to a 
police officer endangering life and health of another person or a police officer, unless it is impossible 
to repel such an attack and resistance by applying other techniques and means. 2. The exception to 
paragraph 1 of this Article is the case when non use of physical force and special means makes 
impossible to implement police functions. 
Indonesia Police Regulations 2009:  
Article 43 (1) In seeking to overcome civil disorders, every INP personnel shall apply a series of 
actions, beginning from the least forceful or persuasive, before undertaking repressive actions or 
enforcement, in accordance with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. (2) In 
addressing civil disorder, no INP officer shall commit excessive action which may bring damage to 
the location of incident or the environment without legitimate grounds. (3) Any INP officer 
addressing a civil disorder shall at all times keep casualties and damage to minimum. 33 Article 44 
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(1) No INP officer shall use force under the pretext of public interest or restoring public order. 
Use of Force and Firearms Article 45 Every INP officer in taking measures involving the use of force 
must take into consideration the following: a. non-violent actions and methods should be attempted 
first; b. use of force should only be practiced if strictly necessary; c. force may only be used for 
legitimate law enforcement; d. no exception nor grounds shall exist to permit the unlawful use of 
force; e. use and application of force must be proportional and only to achieve objectives permitted by 
law; f. use of power, firearms or equipment in applying force must be in proportion to the threat being 
faced; g. clear boundaries must be established for the use of firearms/equipment or the use of force; h. 
damage and injury resulting from the use of force must be kept to the minimum. Article 46 (1) All 
officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying 
force. (2) All officers must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods. Article 47 (1) The use 
of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life. (2) Firearms may only 
be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self-defense against threat of 
death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury; 
34 d. to prevent a serious crime that threatens the life of others; e. to restrain, prevent or stop a person 
who is committing will be committing an action that can endanger lives; and f. respond to a situation 
that endanger lives, where more persuasive measures are inadequate. Article 48 Every INP officer in 
carrying out police action using firearms must abide by the procedure on the use of firearms as 
follows: a. The officer must understand the law enforcement principles of legality, necessity and 
proportionality. B. Prior to the use of firearms, the officer must issue clear warning by: 1. Identifying 
one’s self as an officer or personnel of the INP on duty; 2. Provide verbal warning in a clear and firm 
voice to the subject to desist, raise his/her hands, or lay down his/her weapon; and 3. Provide 
sufficient time for the order to be carried out. C. In extremely pressing circumstances where a delay 
could result in the loss of life or gross injury of the officer or another person within the vicinity, the 
warning as described in sub-paragraph b is not necessary. 
 
Philippines:  
National Police Operational Procedures, Rule 24 on Civil Disturbance Management Operations 
(2013) 
Rule 24 on civil disturbance operational procedures: General guidelines: Section 1) In cases of civil 
disturbance, The civil disturbance management (CDM) shall be located at least 100 meters from the 
crowd. In lightning rallies or demonstrations, the ground commander shall exhaust all efforts through 
dialogue with the leaders for a peaceful dispersal. In case of failure, orderly dispersal shall be resorted 
to by arresting the leaders.  
Section 2) The CDM shall not carry any kind of fire arms, but may be equipped with batons, riot 
sticks. Tear gas, smoke grenades, water cannons or any similar anti-riot devise shall not be used 
unless public assembly is attended by actual violence or serious threats of violence or deliberate 
destruction of property. 
Section 4 a) The role of the CDM contingent must be viewed as a last resort. Their role should never 
be greater than what is necessary in the circumstances. Doubts concerning the number of troops 
should normally be resolved in favour of deployment of a large number as this may prevent the 
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development of situations in which the use of excessive force may be necessary.  
4 b) The ground commander must adhere to the ‘minimum necessary force principle’ in selecting an 
operational approach to a civil disturbance. Force shall be used only when “strictly necessary”. Force 
applied shall be proportional to the law enforcement objectives  
Philippines: 
National Police Operational Procedures, Rule 25 Rallies and Demonstrations (2013) 
Rule 25:  The Philippine National Police adheres to the UN Code of Conduct for Law enforcement 
Officers which requires officers to limit the use of force to what is strictly necessary for the 
performance of their duties 
25.7: Police responses during Public Assembly: The following are the Police Responses During the 
Planning stage, initial and peaceful stage, confrontational stage, and violent stage and post operational 
stage.  
Planning stage: dialogue and preparation, initial and peaceful stage: supervision, Brach of 
peace/confrontational stage: If violence reaches a stage where rocks are thrown at the CDM or other 
persons or at property causing damage to it, the ground commander shall warn the participants that if 
the violence continues, the assembly will be dispersed.  
If the violence continues, another audible warning will issue and after allowing sufficient time, an 
order for dispersal will follow, following which, the demonstrators shall be disbanded, contained and 
isolated. Water cannons and riot sticks may be used to aid the process. 
During the violent stage, non-lethal weapons shall be used, to wit:  
During the confrontational stage, the truncheon or baton may be used to push back and not to strike 
individuals. However, when they do become violent, it may be used for dispersal, but with caution.  
Water cannons maybe used when crowds become unruly forcing the troops to fall back to secondary 
positions.  Tear gas may be used to break up formations or groupings who refuse to disperse and who 
continue to be aggressive.  
 
Argentina: 
 Minimum criteria for the development of protocols and the Police Forces Federal Security 
Forces in public demonstrations (Resolution no. 210/2011 of 
Ministry of Security ) 
 
Restrictions and control measures 
6. All resources will be exhausted to ensure conflict resolution that does not involve damage to the 
physical integrity of the people involved and not involved in the demonstration. To this end, measures 
will be established ensure against conflict situations, the intervention of the police and security forces 
is progressive, necessarily beginning with the dialogue with organizers of the demonstration. 
[...] 
Argentina: Regulation No. 8 of Guns and Shooting (ODI No. 25 of February 6, 2012) The rules 
of Guns and Shooting Range of the Federal Police Argentina regulates it pertains to the use of 
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weapons fire by members of that force. [...] 
43 Officers must issue a warning or notice before making use of weapons, when: d.1) This possible. 
D.2) It does not increase the danger of aggression to himself or others (eg  where the officer is 
surprised or at a numerical or tactical disadvantage). 
Argentina: Plan of Operations No. 01/10 of the National Gendarmerie Director for Personnel 
Operation Sentinel (containing the “General Rules on the Use of Weapons 
Fire) 58 and. General provisions for the use of weapons: The use of firearms is limited to extreme 
cases and as a last resort before concrete situations of unlawful violence with firearms that endanger 
the life of the acting official and / or third parties. There must be a standard order from lowest to 
highest. For example: before a direct confrontation attempt using  
natural physical force; then apply defensive judo among others. Aggressive chemical non-lethal 
rubber bullets must be used before wielding the gun with intimidatory purposes. This if circumstances 
permit and do not endanger the life of the victim, third or the staff member gendarmerie; Very serious 
and urgent circumstances may warrant a different reaction. 
 
Latvia Law on Police 1992 Section 13. Rights of Police Officers to Use Physical Force and 
Special Means 
 
The type of special means and the intensity of use of physical force or special means shall be 
determined by taking into account the specific situation, the nature of the violation and individual 
characteristics of the violator, restricting as much as possible the harm done by such means. It is 
prohibited to use special fighting techniques, handcuffs, batons, tear-eliciting substances and service 
dogs against women, against persons with obvious signs of disability and minors, except in cases 
when they make a group attack, endanger the lives or health of other persons and police officers, or 
show armed resistance. 
 
The types of special means permitted to the police pursuant to this Law, and the procedures for 
storing, carrying and use of such shall be determined by the Minister for the Interior of the Republic 
of Latvia, after co-ordination with the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Latvia. 
 
See also section 14: Before using a firearm a warning of intent to do so must be given. If necessary, a 
warning shot may also be fired. A firearm may be used without warning if: an attack is sudden or 
weapons, military equipment, or any type of mechanical means of transport is used in the attack; such 
is necessary to free hostages; It is prohibited to use and make use of firearms at locations where as a 
result of such use other persons may be injured; also, it is prohibited to use firearms against women 
and minors except in cases when they are executing an armed attack, show armed resistance, or by 
means of a group attack endanger the lives of other persons or police officers. A police officer has the 
right to take out a firearm and prepare it for shooting if the officer believes that in the specific 
situation its use or utilisation is not ruled out. If the arrested person on purpose makes sudden 
movements or other dangerous actions which the police officer may interpret as attempted violence, 
attempts to approach the police officer closer than the distance indicated by the officer, the police 
officer has the right to use a firearm in conformity with this Law. 
 
 
Pakistan Police order 2002 Chapter XVII 
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S. 156 h) Every precaution should be taken that a force armed with firearms is not brought close to a 
dangerous crowd as to risk it either being overwhelmed by numbers or being forced to inflict heavy 
casualties. If the use of firearms cannot be avoided, firing should be carried out from a distance 
sufficient to obviate the risk of the force being rushed and to enable strict fire control to be 
maintained.  
 
Highly/Strictly  specified: Specified/Highly Specified/Strict/highly prescriptive within the law: 
clear cues and references to the   law, actions and relevant authorities, names restricted or prohibited 
weapons, 
 
 
South Africa: Execution (1) The use of force must be avoided at all costs and members deployed for 
the operation must display the highest degree of tolerance. The use of force and dispersal of crowds 
must comply with the requirements of section 9(1) and (2) of the Act. During any operation ongoing 
negotiations must take place between officers and conveners or other leadership elements. (2) If 
negotiations fail and life or property is in danger, the following procedure must be followed: Step 
Action 1 Put defensive measures in place as a priority. 2 Warn participants according to the Act, of 
the action that will be taken against them, should defensive measures fail. 3 Bring forward the reserve 
or reaction section or platoon that will be responsible for offensive measures, as a deterrent to further 
violence, should the above-mentioned measures not achieve the desired result. 4 Give a second 
warning before the commencement of the offensive measures, giving innocent bystanders the 
opportunity to leave the area. 5 Plan all offensive actions well and execute them under strict command 
after approval by the CJOC.  
(a) the purpose of offensive actions are to de-escalate conflict with the minimum force to 
accomplish the goal and therefor the success of the actions will be measured by the results of 
the operation in terms of cost, damage to property, injuries to people and loss of life; (b) the 
degree of force must be proportional to the seriousness of the situation and the threat posed in 
terms of situational appropriateness; (c) it must be reasonable in the circumstances; (d) the 
minimum force must be used to accomplish the goal; and (e) the use of force must be 
discontinued once the objective has been achieved. (4) The following are prohibited or 
restricted during crowd management operations: (a) the use of 37 mm stoppers (prohibited); 
(b) the use of firearms and sharp ammunition including birdshot and buckshot (prohibited); 
and (c) the use of rubber bullets (shotgun batons) (may only be used to disperse a crowd in 
extreme circumstances, if less forceful methods prove to be ineffective – restricted). (5) Force 
may only be used on the command or instruction of the CJOC or operational commander (if 
appointed). Members may never act individually without receiving a command from their 
commander. (6) All members involved in the actions must form part of a unified command 
structure, consisting of sections, platoons or companies. Members not working in sections may 
not be deployed. All visible policing members deployed for such purposes must be trained in 
the management of crowds. (7) Common law principles of self-defense or private defense are 
not affected by this Order. 12. Reporting and record keeping (1) Members involved in an 
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operation must 
(South African Police Service Standing Order, 262 of 2004, Section 11 & The National 
Municipal Policing Standard, 2008, Section12)  
(2) (a) In the circumstances contemplated in section 6(6) or if a member of the Police of or 
above the rank of warrant officer has reasonable grounds to believe that danger to persons and 
property, as a result of the gathering or demonstration, cannot be averted by the steps referred 
to in subsection (1) if the gathering or demonstration proceeds, the Police or such member, as 
the case may be, may and only then, take the following steps: (I) Call upon the persons 
participating in the gathering or demonstration to disperse, and for that purpose he shall 
endeavor to obtain the attention of those persons by such lawful means as he deems most 
suitable, and then, (ii) In a loud voice order them in at least two of the official languages and, 
if possible, in a language understood by the majority of the persons present, to disperse and to 
depart from the place of the gathering or demonstration within a time specified by him, which 
shall be reasonable. (b) If within the time so specified the persons gathered have not so 
dispersed or have made no preparations to disperse, such a member of the Police may order 
the members of the Police under his command to disperse the persons concerned and may for 
that purpose order the use of force, excluding the use of weapons likely to cause serious bodily 
injury or death. (c) The degree of force which may be so used shall not be greater than is 
necessary for dispersing the persons gathered and shall be proportionate to the circumstances 
of the case and the object to be attained. (d) If any person who participates in a gathering or 
demonstration or any person who hinders, obstructs or interferes with persons who participate 
in a gathering or demonstration- (I) Kills or seriously injures, or attempts to kill or seriously 
injure, or shows a manifest intention of killing or seriously injuring, any person; or (ii) 
Destroys or does serious damage to, or attempts to destroy or to do serious damage to, or 
shows a manifest intention of destroying or doing serious damage to, any immovable property 
or movable property considered to be valuable, such a member of the Police of or above the 
rank of warrant officer may order the members of the Police under his command to take the 
necessary steps to prevent the action contemplated in subparagraphs (I) and (ii) and may for 
that purpose, if he finds other methods to be ineffective or inappropriate, order the use of 
force, including the use of firearms and other weapons. 
(Section 9 (2) of the Regulation of Gatherings Act.)  
 
Police Act of Bhutan 2009:  section 80: all attempts to disperse a crowd by extortion or warnings 
shall be made before it is declared and unlawful assembly. Once an order to disperse has been defied 
or when the attitude of the crowd is obviously defiant, force shall be used. The degree and duration of 
the use of force shall be limited as much as possible and the least deadly weapon, which the 
circumstances permit shall be used.  
Section 80: To save lives and property, the police shall adopt actions in phases starting from the use 
of verbal persuasion, and non lethal weapons, to lethal weapons as circumstances may demand as 
follows: phase I) preventive arrest, phase 2 declare assembly unlawful, warn through microphone or 
order the crowd to disperse or resort to show of force if the crowd still refuses to disperse.Phase 3: 
237 
 
non lethal weapons: if after phase two the crowd is still resolute and is preparing to start engaging in 
violent disorder, the most senior police officer is to seek out the relevant Dzongdag or Dungpa to be 
physically on the spot to authorize the use of the following non lethal weapons to contain their 
actions:  water cannons, Tear smoke, Riot Batons, Rubber Pellets. Phase 4: when the less extreme 
means are insufficient and the police are in danger of being overrun by the violent mob elements, the 
riot control force shall resort to the use of firearms. Prior to this however, the officer concerned shall 
secure the relevant Dzongdag or Dungpa to be physically present at the scene and authorize in writing 
the use of lethal means. The riot control police shall use firearms only under the following 
circumstances:  I) when their performance and security is threatened by sporadic isolated gunfire from 
mob elements, returning fire should be ordered when targets can be identified, and when it is 
impossible to effectively defend oneself from the assailant other than by the use of a weapon: ii) In 
self defense or in defense of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury  from fire 
bombers, saboteurs with explosives, arsonists, and looters, the firing is intended to hit the assailant 
alone and in doing so, the law enforcement officials must respect and preserve life and minimize 
injury and damage. Firearms may be used against the people as a last resort after appropriate warnings 
are given including firing in the air.  
PROPORTIONALITY/MEANS AND METHODS OF FORCE 
Unspecified/unrestricted: Unspecified/abstract/un-prescribed/highly within the realm of 
discretion: unclear language, no lists or clear references to specific law, high references to discretion, 
no clarity on steps, or directives, but on rhetorical declarations about human life, necessity etc 
 
Kenya: ‘reasonably necessary’ force. Whenever the circumstances so permit without gravely 
jeopardizing the safety of persons and without grave risk of uncontrollable disorder, firearms shall not 
be used unless weapons less likely to cause death have previously been used without achieving the 
purpose aforesaid; and firearms and other weapons likely to cause death or serious bodily injury shall, 
if used, be used with all due caution and deliberation, and without recklessness or negligence.(Section 
5. P.O. A, 2009) 
Firearms may only be used when less extreme means are inadequate and for the following purposes— 
(a) saving or protecting the life of the officer or other person; and (b) in self-defense or in defense of 
other person against imminent threat of life or serious injury. (National Police Service Act, 6th 
schedule Section B.para 1). 
Armenia Law on Police2004 supra: Art. 32: a list of firearms and types of ammunition in the 
armament of the police shall be approved by the approved by the Government of Armenia. It shall be 
prohibited to accept those arms and ammunition into the armament of police which cause especially 
grave injuries or are a source of unjustifiable risk.? 
Latvia Law on Police 1992: Section 13 (6) The types of special means permitted to the police 
pursuant to this Law, and the procedures for storing, carrying and use of such shall be determined by 
the Minister for the Interior of the Republic of Latvia, after co-ordination with the Ministry of Health 
of the Republic of Latvia. 
Russia Federal Law on Federal Security Service, 1995 Article 14. Use of arms, special means and 
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physical force (as per Federal Law No. 153-FZ of 27.07.2006) The staff of federal security service 
organs shall be permitted to possess and carry standard issue weapons and special means. They shall 
be entitled to use military equipment, arms, special means and physical force, including military 
combat tactics, in accordance with the legal and regulatory acts of the Russian Federation. 
Timor Leste Organic Law of National Police 2004 Article 5 (3). The PNTL cannot impose 
restrictions or use coercive means other than those that are strictly necessary. 4. The PNTL can use 
weapons of any model and 238aliber. 5. The use of firearms shall be regulated by specific order. 
Mexico:  
The manual on the use of force, common to the three armed forces.  
(Based on Article 19 of the Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration and in compliance with 
the provisions of Article 13 of the Directive governing the legitimate use of force by staff of the Army 
and Air Force of Mexico, pursuant to the exercise its functions in support of civil authorities and 
pursuant to the Federal Law on Firearms and Explosives, and the second article 27 ter of the 
secretarial agreement by which the directive amending and supplementing 003/09 of September 30, 
2009 , whereby the legitimate use of force by naval personnel, in performance of their duties in 
maintaining the rule of law is regulated) . 
3. Principles on the Use of Force. A. The use of force levels by members of the armed forces, it is 
only appropriate when strictly unavoidable or indispensable to the fulfilment of the mission that has 
been assigned in support of civil authorities. 
 
B. The use of force will be made in strict adherence to human rights, regardless of the type of 
aggression, according to the principles of opportunity, proportionality, rationality and legality. To. 
Opportunity: when used in the time required, should avoid any unnecessary action if there is evidence 
of danger or risk the lives of people outside the facts. This means that care must be taken at the time 
and place in which strictly limit the damage and disruption both to life and to the integrity of the 
people involved and their property and in general, the impact on the rights of the inhabitants. B. 
Proportionality: when used in the magnitude, intensity and duration necessary to achieve control of 
the situation, considering the level of resistance or aggression that front; It refers to the relationship 
between the threat to legally protected personnel or external to the facts civilian population, and the 
level of force used to neutralize it. The severity of a threat is determined by the magnitude of the 
aggression, the dangerousness of the offender, whether individual or collective, the characteristics of 
its already known behavior, possession or not weapons or instruments for aggression and resistance or 
opposition arise. C. Rationality: when use is the result of a decision in which the objective pursued, 
the circumstances of aggression, personal characteristics and capabilities of both subject to control as 
the member of the armed forces valued; which implies that the application of the use of force not to 
resort to alternative means, given the existence of the act or hostile intent, is necessary. D. Legality: 
when its use is developed with adherence to current regulations and with respect for human rights 4. 
Levels of resistance. 
7. It should not be forgotten that situations requiring the use of force are dynamic, they can move 
from one type of aggression to another and therefore personnel is within the same must make the right 
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decisions applying the principles of opportunity, proportionality, rationality and legality. 
. The following actions listed, are prohibited constitute a misuse of force. To. Control a person with 
the application of self-defense techniques that restrict breathing or blood supply to the brain. B. Place 
a person in handcuffs in a position to restrict his breathing. C. Shoot or from moving vehicles, except 
in those cases where failure to do so, it is clear and obvious that the personnel of the armed forces or 
others will be seriously affected and there is no alternative to avoid it. D. Shoot through windows, 
doors, walls and other obstacles, towards a goal that is not fully identified. And. Shoot when there is 
an imminent risk to third parties. F. Shoot to control people who are only causing damage to material 
objects. G. Shoot to neutralize people whose actions can only lead to injury or damage to themselves. 
15. General. A. In all operations carried out armed to be aware of the existence of a situation that 
potentially could reach forces use force must be carried out the following: a. Previous actions. 1. 
Identify those sites within the area of operations that present the greatest problems arising from high 
crime rates and the presence of organized crime groups. However, the level of force used should 
always respond to the threat it faces, and not the place or territory where they carried out the 
operation. 
 
Bulgaria:  The police uses physical power, auxiliary devices and weapons only as a last chance and 
stops using them immediately after the necessity to use them has ceased to exist. (Code on Police 
Ethics, 2004) 
 
Indonesia Police Regulations 2009, Use of Force and Firearms Article 45 Every INP officer in 
taking measures involving the use of force must take into consideration the following: a. non-violent 
actions and methods should be attempted first; b. use of force should only be practiced if strictly 
necessary; c. force may only be used for legitimate law enforcement; d. no exception nor grounds 
shall exist to permit the unlawful use of force; e. use and application of force must be proportional and 
only to achieve objectives permitted by law; f. use of power, firearms or equipment in applying force 
must be in proportion to the threat being faced; g. clear boundaries must be established for the use of 
firearms/equipment or the use of force; h. damage and injury resulting from the use of force must be 
kept to the minimum. 
Moderately specified : Fairly specified/Moderate/moderately prescriptive within the law: vague 
references to some laws or procedures  
Egypt: Water cannons, gas canister, tear gas, batons, gas bombs, rubber cartouche and non-rubber 
cartouche bullets, live bullets.  
Rwanda: Before using firearms, the Police shall whenever possible use the following equipment: 
water spray, batons, tear gas canisters, rubber bullets, or any other ‘relevant devises’ used in 
controlling riots. (Section 42 of Law No. 9 of 2000 on the establishment and Jurisdiction of the 
National Police) 
Armenia Law on Police 2004, Art 31, the police employees shall have a right to use special means 
as follows: rubber bullets for mass riots, preventing an attack against a civilian or police officer, to 
maintain public order, teargas and water cannons for all the foregoing scenarios and for suspicion of a 
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planned armed resistance, electric shocking devices for all the foregoing except for mass riots, and 
guard dogs for all scenarios except for mass riots. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Law on the internal Affairs of the Sarajevo Canton):  Authorized 
officials are entitled to use appropriate means of force such as: physical force and rubber baton, tying 
devices, chemicals, equipment for forcible stopping and obstructing vehicles and persons, trained 
dogs, cavalry and water cannon when necessary to protect themselves or another person or 
personalities under protection from being attacked, or to restrain the resistance of one or more persons 
disturbing public peace and order or endangering the safety of traffic or of the persons who are to be 
brought, detained or deprived of liberty, in order to settle the disturbance of public peace and order, as 
well as to prevent the escape of persons being escorted or who are to be brought, detained or deprived 
of liberty, if there is a suspicion that he will attempt to escape (Art, 40). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina :(2) The Chief Of Police, Deputy Chiefs of Police and authorized officials 
are entitled to use coercive measures only when strictly necessary and when all other means of control 
prove to be ineffective. In all circumstances the lowest stage of coercion necessary for control or 
enforcement shall be applied. The amount of force must be commensurate to the seriousness of the 
offense and the legitimate objective to be achieved. Lethal force shall be applied only as an uttermost 
solution necessary to protect lives, as specified in Article 32 of this Law. (3) Authorized officials, 
shall be entitled, in accordance with the law, to use the following coercive measures: physical force, 
night-sticks, hand-cuffs, chemicals, physical means for restraining persons, barriers for vehicles, 
police dogs, water cannons, and other reasonable means under the circumstances. (Art 29, Law on 
Police of the Brcko District.) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (law on the internal Affairs of Tuzla, Sarajevo,) Authorized official 
persons use firearms from the article 43. only if by using physical force, baton or other means of 
force, they cannot carry out a task or a duty. If the situation permits, the official authorized person is 
obliged to warn a person before using the firearms against him/her (Art. 45, 42, ) 
Authorized officials shall use fire arms from Article 39, in cases when they are not able to perform 
their jobs and tasks using physical force, night-sticks or other coercive means.Authorized officials, if 
given circumstances allow, shall be obliged to warn a person they will shoot at before using fire arms. 
(Internal Affairs of Posavina, Art. 40) 
 
Czech Republic, Act Regulating the police 1991:  
PART FIVE: 
 The use of coercive means and weapons by a police officer Section 38 Coercive means (1) Coercive 
means include: (a) self-defense holds, grabs, hits and kicks; (b) tear gas; (c) baton; (d) handcuffs; (e) 
service dog; (f) use of horses for crowd control; (g) vehicle immobilizer; (h) road spike or other 
means of forcible stopping of a vehicle; (I) water gun; (j) shock weapon; k) hit with a firearm; l) threat 
with a firearm; m) warning shot. (2) A police officer is entitled to use coercive means in the interest of 
the protection of security of persons and his/her own, protection of property and public order, against 
a person endangering those. (3) Before using coercive means, a police officer must warn the person 
against whom he/she is taking action to stop the unlawful conduct or else coercive means will be 
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used. This shall not apply in the case of the provision of paragraph (1)(g). He/she may refrain from 
using the police warning only in the case his/her life or health is in danger or the life or health of 
another person, and action must be taken immediately. In force of legislation from January 1, 2007 (4) 
The police officer shall choose the coercive means he/she will use with respect to the situation, in 
order to achieve the purpose of the police action, and use such a coercive means that is indispensable 
for breaking the resistance of the person violating the law. (5) A police officer must take care that the 
use of coercive means does not inflict harm on the person of a degree obviously disproportionate to 
the nature and dangerousness of his/her unlawful conduct. 
Czech Republic -Use of a weapon: Section 39 The use of a weapon (1) A police officer is entitled to 
use a weapon (a) in self-defense or assisting self-defense in order to obstruct an immediately 
threatening or continuing attack against his/her person or the attack against the life or health of 
another; (b) if a dangerous offender against whom action is being taken ignores the officer’s demand 
to surrender or is reluctant to leave his/her shelter; (c) if there is no other possibility to break the 
resistance aimed at frustrating the officer’s serious action; (d) in order to prevent the escape of a 
dangerous offender who cannot be stopped in another way; (e) in order to obstruct a dangerous attack 
posing threat to guarded or protected premises or point, after an ignored warning to refrain from such 
an attack; (f) if there is no other possibility to stop a vehicle the driver of which is by his/her reckless 
driving seriously endangering the life and health of persons and fails to stop upon a repeated warning 
or signal given to him/her pursuant to a special regulation 9); (g) in order to stop a vehicle the driver 
of which, in the immediate area of a state border, fails to stop upon a repeated warning or signal given 
to him/her pursuant to a special regulation 9); (h) if a person against whom the coercive means of a 
threat with a firearm or the coercive means of a warning shot has been used fails to obey the officer’s 
commands aimed at protecting his/her own security or the security of another person; (I) if there is a 
need to paralyze an animal endangering the life or health of persons. (2) “Weapon“ under paragraph 
(1) means a firearm, a stabbing or cutting weapon, unless it is a special weapon under this Act. (3) 
The use of a weapon by a police officer in cases referred to in paragraph In force of legislation from 
January 1, 2007 (1) (a) through (g) is admissible only if the use of coercive means would obviously be 
ineffective. (4) Before using a weapon in the cases referred to in paragraph (1) (a) through (e), a 
police officer must warn the person against whom he/she is taking action to refrain from the unlawful 
conduct or else a weapon will be used. He/she need not use the warning only if his/her life or health or 
the life or health of another person are endangered and he/she must immediately respond. (5) When 
using a weapon, a police officer must take the necessary care, in particular, not to endanger other 
persons‘ life and to spare as much as possible the life of the person against whom the action is being 
taken. Section 39a (1) Police officers assigned to the intervention squads of the Public Order Police 
Service and the Rapid Response Unit, to the Protection Service as well as to the Foreign and Border 
Police Service at airports are entitled to use special coercive means and special weapons when taking 
actions to save the life and health of persons or to protect property, except when provided otherwise 
by this Act. (2) Special coercive means are: (a) temporarily paralyzing means; (b) special ejection 
devices, unless having the character of a weapon or a special weapon under this Act; (c) special 
means of forced entry. (3) Special weapons are: (a) sniper rifle (b) shotgun; (c) gun with a silencer; 
(d) gun with laser sight; (e) mechanical firearm; (f) specially adapted firearm; (g) explosive, special 
explosive device and special ammunition. (4) Special coercive means under paragraph (2)(a) and 
special weapons under paragraph (3)(a) and (b) may also be used by police officers not referred to in 
paragraph (1) if they have a special training for their manipulation. In force of legislation from 
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January 1, 2007 (5) The use of special coercive means and special weapons shall be regulated by the 
provisions of section 38 (2) through (5), section 39 and sections 40 thorough 42 of this Act. 
 
Lithuania law on police:  
Article 43: Special Police Equipment and the Conditions of Use Thereof Police shall be permitted to 
possess and use the following special equipment and methods: rubber truncheons, handcuffs and 
restraining devices, methods of combat wrestling, gas, water cannons, police dogs, methods of 
stopping transport by force, and other means: 1. rubber truncheons may be used in the circumstances 
specified in paragraphs 1 8 of Part 2 of Article 42 of this Law, as well as during the apprehension of 
persons who are violating public order, if such persons resist the police officer or refuse to obey his or 
her demands; 2. handcuffs and restraining devices may be used: - in the apprehension and 
transportation to police head quarters of persons guilty of committing socially dangerous acts, if there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that such persons will resist the police officer or attempt to escape 
detention - while transporting persons who have been detained or arrested; and - when citizens, as a 
result of their dangerous actions, may potentially inflict harm on themselves or on others; 3. methods 
of combat wrestling may be used: - in the apprehension and transportation to police headquarters of 
persons guilty of committing socially dangerous acts, if such persons resist or attempt to escape 
detention by other actions; and - when persons intentionally refuse to carry out the lawful demands of 
a police officer or resist a police officer's lawful actions; 4. gas may be used for personal protection in 
cases provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 43 of this Law; - special purpose gas may be used: - in the 
event of mass riots or group actions which grossly violate public order; and - when apprehending and 
forcing persons guilty of committing socially dangerous acts to abandon certain premises, motor 
vehicles, or other forms of transport; 5. water cannons may be used in the event of mass riots or group 
actions which grossly violate public order; 6. police dogs may be used: - in the pursuit of criminal 
suspects who have fled from the scene of the crime; - when apprehending persons who have escaped 
from places of confinement, from places of detention before trial, while being transported under 
guard, or during interrogation; - when apprehending persons guilty of committing a crime or of 
grossly violating public order; - during mass riots or group actions which grossly violate public order; 
and - when police officers are defending themselves, citizens, or guarded objects from assault. 7. 
means of stopping transport by force may be used when the driver refuses to stop upon a police 
officer's demand, or in regard to a special road sign. It shall be prohibited to use special police 
equipment against children, pregnant women, women with children, and persons who are visibly 
disabled, except in cases when said persons are themselves the attackers. 
 
Act on the use of Direct Force by Federal Police Officers exercising Public Authority (1961) 
German § 12 Special rules for the use of firearms 
(1) Firearms may only be used when other measures of direct force are applied unsuccessfully or 
without any promise of success. Their [firearms] use against people is only permitted if the purpose is 
not achieved by the use of weapons against property.(2) The purpose of the use of firearms is only to 
[put the person in the position not to be able to attack or flee] . It is forbidden to shoot when, through 
the use of firearms, it is recognizable [perceivable] for law enforcement officers that bystanders are 
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highly likely to be jeopardized [at high risk of danger or hazard], unless it [the use of firearms] cannot 
be avoided during action against a crowd (§ 10 Para. 2). 
§ 13 Threat of force (1) The use of firearms must be threatened [as in: must be announced or 
warned]. The firing of a warning shot can be considered as threat/warning of force.  
In case of a crowd, the threat/warning of force must be repeated. 
(2) The use of water cannons and vehicles [police cars, tanks] against a crowd must be announced]. 
Pakistan Police order 2002  
Chapter XVII 
Section 156 f): In order that the decision to open fire may be acted upon without loss of control or 
confusion, the responsible officer shall, as soon as it appears likely that the use of fire arms will be 
necessary,  tell off a detachment of armed police to be held in readiness. When fire is to be opened, 
the responsible officer shall decide the minimum volume necessary to be effective in the 
circumstances, and shall give precise orders accordingly, as to the particular men or files who are to 
fire and the number of rounds to be fired and whether volleys of independent aimed shots are to be 
fired. And shall ensure that his orders are not exceeded.  Whatever volume of fire is ordered, it shall 
be applied with maximum effect.  The aim shall be kept low and directed at the most threatening parts 
of the crowd. In no circumstances shall firing over the heads of, or at the fringes of the crowd be 
allowed.  Since buckshot is not safe from any range at which it is shot, government has directed that 
the use of buckshot ammunition against crowds is prohibited.  
 
S. 156 h) Every precaution should be taken that a force armed with firearms is not brought close to a 
dangerous crowd as to risk it either being overwhelmed by numbers or being forced to inflict heavy 
casualties. If the use of firearms cannot be avoided, firing should be carried out from a distance 
sufficient to obviate the risk of the force being rushed and to enable strict fire control to be 
maintained.  
Pakistan Police Rules 1934 
Rule No. 14.56: Instructions regarding the use of force by the Police against crowds are as follows: 
1 The use of force by the police against crowds is regulated entirely by the law, particularly, chapters 
V and IX of the criminal procedure code.  
1 a) The main principle to be observed is that the degree of force used shall be regulated by the 
circumstances of each case. The object of the use of force is to quell a disturbance of the peace, or to 
disperse an assembly which threatens such disturbance and has either refused to disperse, or shows a 
determination not to disperse.   
1 d) The effectiveness of force depends upon the determination with which it is applied. It’s direction 
against the most defiant section of the crowd to be dispersed and its absolute control. Failure to act on 
this principle results inevitably in more force being applied than would otherwise have been 
necessary. It is not possible to lay down any more definite rule as to when different methods of 
different weapons shall be used. The officer responsible is required to decide this in each case on 
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consideration of the strength and attitude of the crowd to be dispersed and the strength of the force 
available for its dispersal. 
Highly structured: prohibited weapon/s are listed, steps and procedures highly prescriptive 
within the law: clear references to the  law, actions and relevant authorities, names restricted or 
prohibited weapons, 
 
South Africa: See above- The following are prohibited or restricted during crowd management 
operations: (a) the use of 37 mm stoppers (prohibited); (b) the use of firearms and sharp ammunition 
including birdshot and buckshot (prohibited); and (c) the use of rubber bullets (shotgun batons) (may 
only be used to disperse a crowd in extreme circumstances, if less forceful methods prove to be 
ineffective - restricted). (5) Force may only be used on the command or instruction of the CJOC or 
operational commander (if appointed). 
Note: But as per the National Municipal Policing Standard, Section 12, Pepper Spray as well as 
firearms and sharp ammunition are prohibited unless a specific commander permits their use, 
 
Croatia: (Law on Police, Article 21) The application of a police power must be proportional with the 
need for the reason of which it is undertaken. The application of a police power must not cause 
consequences more harmful than the ones that would have been caused if the police power had not 
been applied. Applied shall be the police power, by the means of which the lawful aim may be 
achieved with the least harmful consequences and within the shortest possible time. 
Croatia, law on police: Article 54A police officer shall always use the mildest means of coercion 
that guarantees success. The person, against whom the conditions are fulfilled for the use of the means 
of coercion, shall not be warned if the warning would jeopardise the performing of the office ial task. 
USE OF BODILY FORCE Article 55 For the purposes of this Law, the use of bodily force implies 
the use of various martial arts holds and similar actions on another person’s body, the aim of which is 
to reject an attack or to surmount a person’s resistance, with the least possible harmful consequences.  
USEOF TRUNCHEON Article 56 The use of truncheon is allowed if the milder forms of use of 
bodily force are ineffective or do not guarantee success. 
USE OF SERVICE DOGS Article 59 A service dog may be used as a means of coercion in the 
following cases: 1. when conditions for the use of bodily force or truncheon are fulfilled; 2. when 
conditions for the use of firearms are fulfilled; 3. when breached law and order is being restored. In 
cases referred to in Paragraph 1, Point 2 of this Article, a service dog may be used without muzzle, 
whereas in the cases referred to in Points 1 and 3, it must be used only with muzzle.  
USE OF CHEMICAL AGENTS Article 60 Apart from the cases described in Article 67, Paragraph 
1 of this Law, chemical agents may be used for forcing a person out of a closed area or for solving 
hostage situations. USE OF SERVICE HORSES Article 61 Service horses may be used as a means 
of coercion only to restore the breached law and order. USE OF FIREARMS AGAINST PERSONS 
Article 62 A police officer may use firearms if other means of coercion used already were inefficient 
or if they do not guarantee success. A police officer may use firearms when there is no other way to: 
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1. protect his/her own life as well as the lives of other people; 2. prevent the committing of a criminal 
act for which a prison sentence lasting five years or more can be pronounced; 3. prevent the escape of 
a person caught committing a criminal act for which a prison sentence of more than ten years can be 
pronounced, or of a person for whom search on the grounds of having committed such a criminal act 
has been announced; 4. prevent the escape of a person, who has been arrested for the commission of 
criminal acts referred to in Point 3 or of a person for whom search on the grounds of having escaped 
from prison has been announced. Before the use of firearms, a police officer shall verbally warn the 
person by uttering “Stop, it’s the police”, followed by the second warning “Stop or I’ll shoot!” The 
warning referred to in Paragraph 3 of this Article shall not be given if this would jeopardise the 
performing of a police task. Article 63 The use of firearms is not allowed when it would jeopardise 
other persons’ lives, unless the use of firearms is the only means of defense from a direct assault or 
danger. The use of firearms is not allowed against a minor, unless the use of firearms is the only way 
of defense from an assault or danger. 
Croatia: Article 65 Special types of weapons and explosive devices may be used when conditions 
referred to in Article 62, Paragraph 2 of this Law are fulfilled, in case the use of other types of 
weapons is inefficient or does not guarantee success. Special weapons and explosive devices may not 
be used for the purpose of preventing a person from escape. Explosive devices may not be used 
against persons gathered in a crowd. The Minister or a person authorised by him/her renders the 
decision on the use of special types of weapons and explosive devices. 
Croatia law on Police (2000) Article 64: A police officer is empowered to order a group of persons 
to disperse if the group has gathered and is acting in an unlawful manner, so that it might provoke 
violence. If the group does not disperse, the use of the following means of coercion is allowed: 1. 
special motor vehicles; 2. bodily force; 3. truncheon; 4. chemical agents; 5. water jets; 6. service dog; 
7. service horse. The measures referred to in Paragraph 1 of this Article may be used only upon the 
order given by the head of a police administration or a police officer authorised by him/her. 
Police law on Serbia Article 85: Use of instruments of restraint against a group of people Article 85 
Authorized officer shall be entitled to issue an order to a group of people to disperse provided that the 
group was unlawfully gathered, unlawfully behaves or may instigate violence. If the group fails to 
disperse, only the following instruments of restraint may be used: 1) physical force; 2) police baton; 
3) special motor vehicles; 5) service dogs; 6) service horses; 7) water cannons; 8) chemical agents; 
Instruments of restraint referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article may be used only on order of head of 
regional police directorate, i.e. police officer empowered by the head. 
3.2.8. Water cannons Article 97 Water cannons may be used only under condition and in a manner 
laid down by this Law for use of instruments of restraint against a gathered group behaving in a 
manner that may instigate violence. 3.2.9. Chemical agents Article 98 Chemical means may be used 
in order to fend off assault or to subdue resistance if this cannot be achieved by physical force or 
police baton, in order to restore public order, to expel people from closed areas, in resolving hostage 
situations and in when conditions have been met for use of special weapons or explosive devices, or 
for use of firearms laid down by this Law. Chemical agents means short-term effect teargas, without 
lasting effects on psychophysical and general health, as well as chemical substances with effect 
lenient than teargas. Special protective measures shall be taken when using chemical agents in vicinity 
of children's institutions and nursing homes, primary schools, busy traffic routes or inflammable 
substances. Chemical means shall not be used against persons near inflammable substances, at great 
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heights, or in similar locations where human life could be endangered. . 3.2.10 Special weapons and 
explosive devices Article 99 Special types of weapons and explosive devices may be used only if the 
conditions laid down by this Law for using firearms are met, and if other types of weapons prove 
unsuccessful or do not guarantee success. Special weapons and explosive devices are forbidden in 
preventing a person to escape. Explosive devices may not be used against crowds Decision to use 
special weapons and explosive devices shall be made by Director General of Police, with consent by 
Minister. 3.2.11 Firearms Article 100 In the course of duty, authorized officer may use firearms only 
if other restraint measures would fail and it is absolutely necessary to: 37 1) protect human life; 2) 
prevent a person who has been caught while committing a criminal offence for which the law 
prescribes a sentence of ten years or over ten years of imprisonment from escaping, if there is a direct 
threat to life; 3) prevent escape of a person lawfully deprived of freedom, or a person against whom 
an arrest warrant has been issued for a criminal offence referred to in point 2) of this Article if there is 
a direct threat to life; 4) fend off a life-threatening attack against the officers; 5) fend off an attack 
directed against a facility or person under officer protection, if there is a direct threat to life; 
Protection of human life Article 101 Use of firearms with respect to Article100, point 1) of this Law, 
shall mean the use of firearms for protection of life of one or several persons, attacked by one or more 
other persons, provided that there is immediate danger to life or the attacked or attacker. 
Special limitations on use of firearms Article 107 Use of firearms is prohibited when it would 
endanger the lives of others, except when use of firearms is the only instrument of performing duties 
as referred to in Article 100 hereof. Use of firearms is prohibited against minors, except in case when 
this is the only way to avert direct attack or danger. (Combines necessity, precaution, means and 
methods) 
 
Argentina Minimum criteria for the development of protocols and the Police Forces 
Federal Security Forces in public demonstrations (Resolution no. 210/2011 of 
Ministry of Security ) 
 
10. The ban on carrying firearms for all staff must be clearly defined police and security forces for 
their role in the operation could enter direct contact with the demonstrators. Lethal munitions must not 
be available to the staff of the police force or security who intervene in operational control of public 
demonstrations. The use of guns is prohibited.  It is considered as a serious disciplinary offense the 
use of arms or ammunition not provided by the institution.  
Rubber Bullets only be used for defensive purposes in case of danger to physical integrity of any 
member of the security institutions of demonstrators or third person. In no case you may use this type 
of ammunition as a means disperse a demonstration. 
Aggressive chemicals may be used only as a last resort and always after a previous order of the head 
of the operation, who will be responsible for the misuse of the same. In such cases, the use of force 
will be restricted solely to officers specially trained and equipped for this purpose. 
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